State of Tennessee v. Sidney Terrell Cason
M2008-02563-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

The Defendant, Sidney Terrell Cason, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-403(b), -402(b), -304(b)(1). On August 11, 2008, he pleaded guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-210(c). He was sentenced on that day as a violent offender to concurrent sentences of forty years as a Range II, multiple offender for second degree murder and fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender for especially aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On September 9, 2008, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Criminal Court of Davidson County denied the motion. The Defendant now appeals, contending that this denial was error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Myrtle B. Lambert
E2008-01670-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant, Myrtle B. Lambert, appeals from her guilty-pleaded convictions of several counts of identity theft, forgery, and theft. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider a pro se letter filed with the court on March 4, 2008, which, she claims, should have been treated as a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Although we find the defendant's argument misplaced, we conclude that the court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant's March 4, 2008 letter as a notice that the defendant would proceed pro se until having counsel appointed and her March 25, 2008 letter as a filing challenging jurisdiction. Because the defendant, though technically represented by retained counsel, had expressed that her relationship with counsel had ended, we hold that the trial court should have considered the letter as a pro se motion for an arrest of judgment. Because the record before this court is insufficient to determine whether Sullivan County possessed territorial jurisdiction to convict the defendant, we remand to the trial court for further fact finding.

State of Tennessee v. Andrew Hunter Heffel
M2009-01400-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace

The Defendant, Andrew Hunter Heffel, was charged with one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Before trial, he moved to suppress certain incriminating statements he made. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. The State was granted an interlocutory appeal from the order of the trial court suppressing the Defendant's statements. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Flint Green
E2008-01792-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma Mcgee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.

The appellant, Flint Green, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a new trial based upon two jurors observing him "in custody" during trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Henry Zillon Felts v. State of Tennessee
M2009-00639-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Henry Zillon Felts, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Henry Zillon Felts, No. M2005-01215-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2563374 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 25, 2006). He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. The Criminal Court of Sumner County found that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because: (1) trial counsel failed to fulfill his promise to the jury that the Petitioner would testify; and (2) trial counsel failed to argue attempted voluntary manslaughter as a defense. The post-conviction court thus set aside the Petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. In this appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting the Petitioner relief. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

James P. Stout v. State of Tennessee
M2009-01171-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl Blackburn

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Stout, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range II offender, to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his second such petition, alleging that his conviction is void because: (1) his indictment was void because the grand jury foreperson issuing the indictment was appointed by a Shelby County trial judge; (2) his sentence is unconstitutional because, on the judgment of conviction, the trial judge checked both boxes indicating that his sentence should run at 35% and 100%. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals that judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

State of Tennessee v. Quortez Deshawn Duncan
M2009-00525-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella Hargrove

The Defendant, Quortez Deshawn Duncan, was convicted by a Maury County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in the Department of Correction, to be suspended after service of one year. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient and that the Defendant's sentence is consistent with our 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act and its amendments, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mark Wayman d/b/a Able Towing Company v. Transportation Licensing Commission of the Metro Government
M2009-01360-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

The Transportation Licensing Commission revoked Petitioner's license to operate a wrecker service. The chancery court upheld the revocation. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cook
W2008-01367-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr .

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State's witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant's convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to Defendant's conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cook
W2008-01367-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State’s witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant’s convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. Weaffirm the trial court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment  consistent with this opinion.

Carl E. Watson v. Robert P. Fogolin, M.D.
M2009-00327-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initially brought suit in General Sessions Court against his former physician for defamation (libel and slander), breach of contract, and violation of the privacy provision of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). The General Sessions Court awarded a judgment of $25,000 to the plaintiff. The defendant timely appealed to the Circuit Court and filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff then amended his claims to include an alleged violation of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and medical malpractice. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician, reversing the Sessions Court judgment and holding that (1) the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Department of Education forms completed by the defendant physician on behalf of the plaintiff did not constitute a contract; (3) HIPAA and Federal Privacy Act of 1974 claims had been withdrawn by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to produce expert testimony to prove a claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiff timely appealed. We affirm.

Regina Day v. Zurich American Insurance
W2009-01349-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Regina Day, sustained compensable injuries to both of her shoulders. She returned to her pre-injury job, but the holding company which owned her employer had been sold to another entity. The employer, which had been a corporation, became a limited liability company (LLC). The trial court, applying existing case law, held that she had not returned to work for her pre-injury employer and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to apply the cap or, in the alternative, that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment.

Beth Proffitt v. Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc.
E2009-00667-COA-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

The plaintiff filed this action seeking to review the business records of the defendant, asserting under oath that she is a 25 percent shareholder of the defendant corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §48-26-104(a) – the corporate records statute – and ordered the defendant to comply with the request to inspect and/or copy corporate records. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. We reverse.

Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc. v. F&M Marketing Services, Inc.
E2009-01325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John F. Weaver

Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc., initiated this litigation against F&M Marketing
Services, Inc., with a complaint seeking a declaration that Christenberry had not contracted
to pay F&M a commission on loads Christenberry hauled for UPS/Dell Computer (“the
UPS/Dell account”). F&M filed an answer and counterclaim asking for a determination that
there was a contract with respect to the UPS/Dell account under which Christenberry was
obligated to pay F&M a commission of 6%. F&M’s counterclaim also asked for an
accounting and attorney’s fees. The case was tried without a jury, after which Christenberry
was allowed to amend its pleadings to allege that if there was a contract it was illegal and
unenforceable because F&M is not licensed as a broker by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“the ICC”). The trial court found that there was a contract between
Christenberry and F&M, but that the contract was rendered illegal and unenforceable because
of F&M’s lack of a broker’s license. F&M hired new counsel who filed a notice of appeal
that did not contain the signature of its trial counsel. Christenberry filed a motion with the
trial court to strike the notice of appeal. Six days later, F&M filed an amended notice of
appeal which bore, in addition to the signature of its new appellate counsel, the signature of
its counsel of record in the trial court. F&M argues on appeal that it was not required to be
licensed and, alternatively, that the contract should not be nullified for its lack of a license,
even if one was required. Christenberry argues that the notice of appeal is ineffective. We
vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Johnny L. Sapp
E2008-00663-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The appellant, Johnny L. Sapp, was found guilty of one count of possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number has been removed in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-111 and two counts of altering the serial number on a motor vehicle in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-112. He received a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that his convictions for possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number had been removed and altering the serial number on a motor vehicle violate double jeopardy; and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell
E2008-02672-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Dugger, Jr.

The Defendant, Teddy Ray Mitchell, appeals from his jury conviction in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of thirty days in jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that his conviction violates his First Amendment right to free speech, and (3) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an altercation with another police officer that was contemporaneous to the offense. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

Thomas E. Crowe v. Bradley Equipment Rentals & Sales, Inc.
E2008-02744-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, outrageous conduct, violation of Article 1, Section 18 of the Tennessee Constitution, and various violations of 11 U.S.C. § 362, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. After removal of the lawsuit to federal court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the federal claims and remanded the state law claims back to the state trial court. The trial court subsequently granted a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining claims. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell - Dissenting
E2008-02672-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Dugger, Jr.

Marilou Gilbert v. Don Birdwell and wife, Christine Birdwell
M2009-01743-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, J.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey L. Stewart, Chancellor
This case arises from a boundary line dispute. Appellants appeal the trial court's denial of their petition to reopen proof after the court rendered its decision, establishing the disputed boundary in accordance with the Appellee's survey. Finding no error, we affirm.

In the matter of: Sydney T. C. H.
M2009-01230-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, J.
Trial Court Judge: Max D. Fagan, Judge
This is an appeal from the Juvenile Court's decision finding Mother guilty of three counts of criminal contempt. Finding the orders of the Juvenile Court to be lawful, specific and unambiguous, and that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of willfulness, we affirm. Also, we find that the permanent injunction entered by the Juvenile Court to be a lawful order of that court.

Dock Walker v. Henry Steward, Warden
W2009-00989-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The pro se Petitioner, Dock Walker, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

State of Tennessee v. Willie Lewis
W2008-02636-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Lewis, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Roy Rowe, Jr.
M2009-00943-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Crigler

The Defendant, Roy Rowe, Jr., pled guilty to seventeen counts of sale of a controlled substance, and, after merging several of the counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court imposed a split sentence, ordering that the Defendant serve 365 days in the county jail, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence to the maximum within the range. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Rennee N. Dhillon v. Gursheel S. Dhillon
M2009-00017-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Andy D. Bennett, J.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins, Judge
Husband raises numerous issues regarding the trial court's handling of this divorce. He asserts that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon improper venue, in approving the parties' marital dissolution agreement and denying his subsequent motion to set aside the agreement, in denying his petition to modify pendente lite support, in failing to address Wife's alleged efforts to alienate the parties' child from Husband, and in awarding excessive attorney fees to Wife. We affirm the trial court's decisions, and because Husband's appeal is frivolous, we award Wife her attorney fees on appeal.

Stephanie D. Hill v. City of Germantown, Tennessee; Germantown Police Department; Board of Mayor and Alderman of the City of Germantown, Tennessee
W2009-00308-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This appeal involves the termination of a municipal police officer. The housemate of the petitioner police officer accidentally damaged the police officer’s take-home police vehicle. Although the police officer suspected that her housemate caused the damage, the police officer nevertheless filed accident and insurance loss reports indicating that the damage was caused by an unknown driver. About two months later, the police officer and her housemate had a tumultuous break up. After that, the police officer’s supervisor discovered that the damage to the police vehicle may have been caused by the housemate. After an internal affairs investigation, the police officer was charged with violating police department rules regarding neglect of duty and lack of truthfulness. After a hearing before the municipal board, the police officer was found to have violated these rules and her employment was terminated. The city administrator upheld the termination. The police officer then filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the administrative decision. The trial court
granted the petition, holding that the termination of the police officer’s employment was not supported by material evidence and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious. The city now appeals. We reverse, finding that material evidence supported the administrative decision to terminate the police officer’s employment.