Martin Holmes et al. v. David Karkau et al.
This is an action to set aside a change of beneficiary on a term life insurance policy under Tennessee’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“the TUFTA”), Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 66-3-301 to -314. The challenged event was the change of beneficiary from the wife of the insured/owner to two of their adult children, the form for which was executed by the wife as the attorney-in-fact for the insured/owner and transmitted to the insurance company the day before the insured/owner died. In pertinent part, the complaint alleged that the defendants—the wife and two adult children of the deceased insured/owner of the insurance policy—“devised and orchestrated” a “fraudulent scheme . . . to eliminate assets owned by [the insured’s wife] in the event that Plaintiffs obtain a judgment against her” in a separate civil action. The complaint further alleged that “[t]he transfer of the beneficiary interest in the . . . insurance policy was a fraudulent transfer under T.C.A. § 66-3-305(a)(1) because it was made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiffs as creditors defined under the Act.” The trial court dismissed the action under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the TUFTA. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alain Benitez
Defendant, Alain Benitez, appeals his convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences. Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence messages sent between Defendant and his girlfriend through Facebook Messenger; (3) the trial court erred in admitting “forensic evidence”; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but reverse the imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. The new sentencing hearing is limited to consideration of the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robbie Gibson
A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Robbie Gibson, of aggravated stalking, aggravated assault, and possession of a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon and that the trial court erred when it limited the length of his closing argument. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Todd Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Eric Todd Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his guilty pleas to forgery and theft of property were unknowing and involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence was illegal because he was innocent of the offenses. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Damonta M. Meneese v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Damonta M. Meneese, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding his petition untimely. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur M. Stewart
The defendant, Arthur M. Stewart, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original four-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation of the defendant’s probation but reverse the trial court’s imposition of the original sentence and remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation in accordance with State v. Craig Dagnan, --- S.W.3d ---, 2022 WL 627247 (Tenn. Mar. 4, 2022). |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. Jon David Rogers
This appeal concerns a claim of legal malpractice. Xingkui Guo (“Plaintiff”) filed a lawsuit for legal malpractice in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against his former attorney Jon David Rogers (“Defendant”). Defendant filed an answer denying Plaintiff’s allegations as well as a counterclaim alleging that Plaintiff failed to pay him in full pursuant to the terms of their agreement. Defendant later filed motions for summary judgment as to both Plaintiff’s complaint against him and his counterclaim against Plaintiff. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We hold, inter alia, that there is no genuine issue of material fact necessitating trial. The undisputed material evidence shows that Plaintiff’s loss in the underlying lawsuit was not due to negligence in Defendant’s representation. The undisputed material evidence shows further that Plaintiff breached his retainer agreement with Defendant by failing to pay him in full pursuant to the terms of the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Beverly Prye
This appeal involves an employment termination case in which an employee of the City of Memphis witnessed the signing of a will, but after the decedent’s death, the probate court determined that the will submitted to probate did not bear the genuine signature of the decedent. Following an administrative appeal, the Civil Service Commission for the City of Memphis unanimously affirmed the decision of termination. The employee filed a petition for judicial review with the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the termination of the employee finding that the Civil Service Commission’s decision to sustain her termination was arbitrary and capricious. The chancery court reinstated the employee with full backpay and benefits. The City of Memphis appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Caroline Harrill v. PI Tennessee, LLC et al.
A guest sued a landlord for negligence after the guest was injured by a vicious animal while visiting the landlord’s tenant. The landlord filed a motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted. Because the undisputed facts establish that the landlord did not breach any duty owed to the guest, we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Edna Gergel v. James Gergel
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, denial of the husband’s request for alimony in futuro, grant to the wife of sole decision-making authority over the parties’ minor child, and grants to the wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The husband, who received disability benefits for a prior mental health diagnosis, also appeals the trial court’s finding that he was voluntarily unemployed and the court’s denial of his motion to strike certain expert witness testimony. Having determined that an unspecified portion of the discretionary costs awarded to the wife for fees related to three expert witnesses, one vocational rehabilitation consultant and two psychiatrists, were not allowable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), we vacate the trial court’s award of discretionary costs as to the fees for these three experts’ work with the exception of $2,070.00 in demonstrably allowable fees paid to the vocational consultant. We remand for a specific determination of the fees for these three experts allowable, if any, as an award of discretionary costs to the wife under Rule 54.04(2). We also modify the trial court’s award of discretionary costs to the wife for court reporter fees to reduce them slightly pursuant to Rule 54.04(2). We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment. We deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Matthews Law v. Halbert Grant Law, Jr.
On May 1, 1992, Barbara Matthews Law (“Wife”) and Halbert Grant Law, Jr. (“Husband”), executed a prenuptial agreement. They married the following day. Wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County in December of 2017. The parties disputed, inter alia, the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, as well as the classification and division of several assets. Trial was held over multiple days in 2019 and 2020, and the trial court entered its final decree divorcing the parties on July 31, 2020. The trial court held that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, classified the parties’ assets, and divided the marital estate. Wife was awarded the parties’ family home and $4,500.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, challenging the classification of the parties’ home as marital property, as well as the classification of one bank account. Wife cross-appeals, challenging the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the classification of several assets. Wife also requests increased alimony. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable. We reverse the trial court’s classification of three assets – the parties’ home, a checking account, and an investment account. We vacate the trial court’s decision as to those three assets and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of the changes in classification of several major assets, we also vacate and remand the trial court’s award of alimony for reconsideration. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Noah Cassidy Higgins
Defendant, Noah Cassidy Higgins, pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to vehicular homicide by recklessness with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and probation and sentenced Defendant to five years’ incarceration with a thirty percent release eligibility. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly denied judicial diversion; (2) improperly denied probation; (3) considered facts outside the record; and (4) erred in applying and balancing certain enhancement and mitigating factors. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sheila Adams v. Henry Hughes
This appeal arises from an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff, who is the former fiancé of the defendant, claimed the defendant retained some of her personal property after he forced her to vacate the premises where they previously resided. This action was initiated with the filing of a civil warrant in the general sessions court. After the general sessions court awarded the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $7,500, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $4,745.30. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antywan Eugene Savely v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Antywan Eugene Savely, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present any proof on his behalf. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allison Haynes v. Perry County, Tennessee
A gunshot victim filed a tort action against a county, alleging misconduct on the part of a sheriff’s deputy. The plaintiff asserted that the county was liable under both the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302. The county moved to dismiss the complaint. The county argued that it was immune from liability under either the discretionary function exception or the public duty doctrine. The trial court dismissed the complaint. We conclude that, because the deputy sheriff’s actions as alleged in the complaint were operational in nature, the county is not immune from liability under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The complaint also contains sufficient factual allegations of reckless misconduct such that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine could apply. So we vacate the dismissal. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda S. Harper v. William H. Harper
In proceedings between ex-spouses long after the entry of their final divorce decree, the trial court concluded that it lacked authority to order the division of service-related disability benefits. The court also declared void a portion of the divorce decree that divided military retirement as marital property. As a result of the rulings, one of the parties sought relief from the divorce decree, arguing that she should be awarded alimony. The trial court denied relief. We affirm with modifications. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Dean Miller
The Defendant, Jackie Dean Miller, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2018) (subsequently repealed, replaced by § 39-14-1003 (Supp. 2021)) (aggravated burglary), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft), 39-14-105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). The trial court merged the theft convictions and imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) he was denied a fair trial because jurors may have seen the Defendant in a sheriff’s car, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Roshone Perry
Marcus Roshone Perry, Defendant, appeals his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in admitting hearsay evidence, (2) in admitting discoverable evidence that was not provided to Defendant, and (3) by empaneling a jury which was not representative of Defendant’s peers. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Cole Nicholson v. State of Tennessee
William Cole Nicholson, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. William Cole Nicholson, No. M2017-01761-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4203549, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick Russell v. Aluma-Form, Inc., et al.
Employee Frederick Russell was working for Employer Aluma-Forrn, Inc. in January 2018 when he sustained an injury to his left shoulder and neck. He reported the injury and received treatment from an orthopedic specialist whose conservative approach to his case included an MRI, an EMG, physical therapy, and referrals to a neurosurgeon and a pain management specialist. Though Employee reported continued pain despite these efforts, his medical providers opined that they could find no objective basis for his reported syrnptoms and believed them unrelated to his work injury. Employee later sought treatment from a different, unauthorized orthopedic specialist who performed surgeiy on his shoulder and thereby discovered and repaired a previously undiagnosed torn labrum. Employee sought compensation, and after considering the proof, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims held that Employee had established that his injury was caused by his workplace incident, that Ernployer was liable for his medical expenses including those incurred for unauthorized treatrnent, and that Employee was entitled to both permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred on all three issues. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Scott Donaldson
Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, the defendant, Brandon Scott Donaldson, appeals. He alleges error in the composition of the jury, arguing that the venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community and that the State improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike an African American. He claims error in both the admission and exclusion of evidence, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a sonogram photograph and by excluding text messages sent by the victim, certain of the victim’s medical records, and prior consistent statements of a defense witness. He also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a State’s witness offered improper testimony. He asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. He claims error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court, arguing that the trial court incorrectly defined the offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the sequential jury instruction essentially barred the jury from adequately considering voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second degree murder. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the total effective sentence. Finally, he asserts that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Matthew Houser
The Appellant, Sean Matthew Houser, pled guilty in the Grainger County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (DUI) per se, a Class A misdemeanor. As a condition of his plea, he reserved two certified questions of law regarding the admissibility of his warrantless blood alcohol test. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the certified questions do not comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) because they are too broad. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Matthew Houser
I concur with the majority’s conclusion to dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. However, I would dismiss the appeal on the basis that the certified questions are not dispositive because even if the results of the Defendant’s warrantless blood draw were suppressed, other sufficient evidence exists upon which the Defendant could be convicted of DUI. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Auto Owners Insurance v. Phillip H. Thompson, III
The plaintiff challenges the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action with prejudice. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion both as a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment despite stating in its order that it had not excluded extraneous evidence presented by the defendant and that it would treat the motion as one for summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion as a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss after having considered extraneous evidence and that the trial court erred by failing to include in its order the legal grounds for its decision to grant the defendant’s motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to file a proposed amended complaint in the trial court, we are unable to address the issue raised concerning the motion to amend the complaint. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Rule 56. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Lamont Collins
Defendant, Quincy Lamont Collins, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for one count each of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and he received an effective sentence of 31 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court should have suppressed the gun located as a result of information obtained during Defendant’s interrogation; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and that his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |