State of Tennessee v. Dustin Russell
The defendant, Dustin Russell, appeals the trial court’s imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Lamar Moore v. Mike Parris, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Patrick Lamar Moore, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Maurice Deberry
Timing is everything. In this case, at least, that adage holds true. Marvin Maurice Deberry committed a criminal offense and was convicted. But the legislature repealed the statute creating that criminal offense before he was sentenced. Years ago, the legislature enacted a default rule to govern this situation and similar ones. That rule, known as the criminal savings statute, provides generally that an offense must be prosecuted under the law in effect at the time the offense is committed, even if the law is later repealed or amended. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-112 (2018). If the later-enacted law “provides for a lesser penalty,” however, the savings statute dictates that “any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act.” Id. At first, the trial court sentenced Deberry under the law in effect at the time of his offense. But Deberry eventually convinced the trial court that the “lesser penalty” exception applied, and the trial court entered an amended judgment retaining Deberry’s conviction but imposing no punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We now reverse and reinstate Deberry’s original sentence. We hold that a statute that repeals a criminal offense does not “provide for a lesser penalty” within the meaning of the criminal savings statute. Rather, a person who commits an offense that is later repealed should be convicted and sentenced under the law in effect when the offense was committed unless the legislature provides otherwise. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
In Re Jamarcus K. et al.
The parental rights of Taleada K. (“Mother”) and Lashaun K. (“Father”) were terminated by the Juvenile Court for Dickson County on September 8, 2021. Both parents appeal. We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights to all four of the children for severe abuse, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We reverse the juvenile court’s ruling that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated for abandonment by failure to support. We vacate the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests and, accordingly, affirm the overall ruling that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Lavergne v. Abass I. Gure
A circuit court found that a motorist violated the city’s ordinance prohibiting speeding. On appeal, the motorist argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to dismiss. He also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence from Google Maps showing his speed and that the evidence preponderates against the finding that he was speeding. Although the court erred in excluding the Google Maps evidence, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Campbell v. Klil, Inc. et al.
Homeowner appeals the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees after an action to enforce a construction contract. Trial court found the provision to be unenforceable based on its undefined “where applicable” language. Applying the rules of contract construction, we conclude that this provision is enforceable and entitles the homeowner to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine reasonable attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Conner Lewis Bell
Defendant, Conner Lewis Bell, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated robbery. Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault, and the remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I offender to be suspended on probation. Defendant requested judicial diversion, which the trial court denied following a hearing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of diversion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB SFH, Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
In this interlocutory appeal of a health care liability action, the only issue for review is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss based on its finding that “extraordinary cause” existed to excuse the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Claude Ellis v. Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis
In this divorce case, Claude Ellis (“Husband”) challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, the award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to Melisa1 Jane Godfrey Ellis (“Wife”), and the trial court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital assets. We hold that the trial court misclassified some of the assets in contention as marital, and we remand for a reconsideration of the division of the marital estate in light of this holding. Because the issue of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido is only properly considered after the issues of estate valuation and distribution are settled, we vacate the award of alimony in solido, so that the trial court has the opportunity to reconsider the award if the court finds it necessary. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
William Runion, Jr. v. Dianna Lynn Mashburn Runion
William Lee Runion, Jr. (“Husband”) filed for divorce from his wife of many years, Dianna Lynn Mashburn Runion (“Wife”), in 2019. Throughout the parties’ marriage they lived on a farm owned by Husband’s father. When dividing the parties’ marital estate, the trial court determined that Wife had no interest in the farm land, the real estate thereon, or the profits generated by the farm. The trial court found that these were neither separate nor marital assets, as they belonged solely to Husband’s father. Wife appeals, arguing that Husband and Grandfather were engaged in an implied partnership. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Denise Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Daryl J. Carter v. State of Tennessee
Daryl J. Carter, Petitioner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devondre DeQuan Samuel
Defendant, Devondre DeQuan Samel, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess 150 grams or more of heroin with intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school, a park, and a recreational center (Counts 1-3), conspiracy to sell 150 grams or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school, a park, and a recreational center (Counts 5-7), two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia (Counts 14 and 17), possession with intent to sell or deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park (Count 15), and manufacture of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park (Count 16). The trial court imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence, as a Range I standard offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion for a continuance; that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Mr. Berry; that his sentence under the Drug-Free School Zone Act constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jonathan S.
In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s grant of Father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and its modification of her child support obligation. Mother also appeals the denial of her petition to be named the Child’s primary residential parent. Father requests attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Because the income the trial court imputed to Mother is not supported by the evidence in the record, and because the trial court failed to find a significant variance before modifying Mother’s child support obligation, we vacate the trial court’s order modifying Mother’s child support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and Father’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy M. Dawson
The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy M. Dawson, was convicted by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury of theft of property of more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103; 39-14-105(a)(3). During a consolidated sentencing hearing on the Defendant’s convictions from three separate trials, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to 12 years’ incarceration, to be served consecutively to the sentences from his other two convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient to establish the value of the stolen property; and 2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion of acquittal, or in the alternative, erred in denying his motion for new trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Boesch v. Jay R. Holeman, Et Al.
This appeal concerns valuation of a business after a partner was disaffiliated. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief and damages from the defendants for wrongful disaffiliation from their flavored moonshine business. The trial court entered a judgment of $23,000 and interest, which included discounts for marketability and lack of control against the defendants and Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, jointly and severally, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701(b). The plaintiff appealed. We reversed and remanded the trial court’s valuation of the plaintiff’s interest because it included a discount for lack of control in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701. The trial court revaluated the plaintiff’s damages without the discount for lack of control and awarded him $35,000 and 2.5% interest from December 15, 2015. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Althea Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Cheryl Hanzlik
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Clint Wallace v. NewRez, LLC
This appeal arises from the trial court’s decision to allow expenses and claims against an insolvent estate to have priority over a recorded deed of trust to the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the decedent’s encumbered real property. We hold that the statutes governing the administration of insolvent estates do not affect amounts due under a perfected deed of trust. Accordingly, proceeds from the sale of decedent’s real property must first be used to satisfy the deed of trust. Any remaining surplus is available for distribution in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-317. The judgment of the probate court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rikealyn L. Fain
The Defendant, Rikealyn L. Fain, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective sixteen-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324(b)(1) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone De Angelo Shaw
The Defendant, Tyrone De Angelo Shaw, appeals from his guilty plea conviction for aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the agreed-upon ten-year, Range II sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dan E. Durell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dan E. Durell, acting pro se, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn L. Payne v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Shawn L. Payne, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years’ incarceration. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering him unable to make a “knowing and informed” guilty plea. Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the case adequately, failing to provide discovery to the Petitioner, and failing to apprise the Petitioner of all the consequences of his guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Samuel Randall Friedsam, III, v. Frankie Michelle Krisle
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award Father equal parenting time with the child, arguing that limitations are warranted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We affirm the trial court’s findings that neither abandonment nor abusive conflict support limitations on parenting time under section 36-6-406. We vacate the trial court’s finding that limitations are not warranted due to physical abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse because the trial court made no finding as to whether such abuse occurred. Finally, Mother’s argument as to the exclusion of evidence is waived, as she made no offer of proof. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |