T.O.T.S., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Cruse v. Rollins Truck Leasing, et al.
Employee had a heart attack in 1996. He and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement of the claim, requiring Employer to provide future medical treatment for the injury. In 2000, Employee experienced additional coronary problems, which required bypass surgery. The trial court denied his petition to require Employer to pay for that medical care. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Douglas Johnson
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Willie Douglas Johnson, of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of unlawful possession of a weapon. After merging the aggravated assault convictions into the conviction of attempted second degree murder and the weapon possession charges into a single conviction, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 25 years for attempted second degree murder and six years for unlawful possession of a weapon. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that the State would be permitted to impeach his testimony through the use of prior felony convictions and that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence on the basis that he showed no hesitation in committing the crimes when the risk to human life was high. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lena Jaden v. Vanderbilt University
A graduate student at Vanderbilt sued after the university terminated her graduate studies. She claimed that Vanderbilt breached its contract with her. The trial court granted summary judgment to Vanderbilt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc. et al. v. City of Memphis - Dissenting
At the heart of this case is the operation of the checks and balances that influence and control a municipality’s exercise of its power to annex adjoining property. The controversy involves a duly enacted annexation ordinance that was substantially altered in a negotiated settlement of litigation between some of the affected property owners and the attorney representing the municipality. Other affected property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the effectively amended annexation ordinance that had not been ratified by the municipality’s legislative body. The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court have dismissed the complaint because it was not filed within the thirty-day period within which a quo warranto action challenging the reasonableness of the annexation must be filed. I respectfully dissent. The aggrieved property owners are entitled to their day in court. They are not challenging the reasonableness of the original annexation ordinance. To the contrary, they are challenging the legality of the negotiated settlement that effectively amended the original annexation ordinance without the approval of the Memphis City Council. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
The Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a consent judgment entered in a lawsuit between property owners in an area of a proposed annexation and the City of Memphis. The earlier lawsuit, which the Plaintiffs failed to timely join, was a quo warranto challenge to an ordinance purporting to annex certain territory contiguous to the boundaries of the City. The consent judgment provided for the annexation of the territory described within the ordinance in two stages, with a portion of the area having an effective annexation date in 2006 and the remainder having an effective date in 2013. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the challenge to the consent decree approving of the two-step annexation. We hold that (1) the Plaintiffs are not authorized to file a declaratory judgment action challenging the consent judgment as violative of the terms of the annexation ordinance; and (2) the consent judgment did not create an unconstitutional taxing structure. The judgment of dismissal is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Robert Edwards, et al. v. City of Memphis
The Charter of the City of Memphis provided for automatic promotion of police officers to the rank of captain after thirty years of service. In 2005, the rank of thirty-year captain was abolished, except for pension purposes. Plaintiffs, police officers with the City of Memphis, filed suit stating that they had been denied promotions to which they were entitled under the Charter, and asking the court to require that such promotions be given. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim, finding that the suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Waters, et al. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Effective January 1, 2005, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a tax on the possession of unauthorized substances for the purpose of generating revenues to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drug crimes. Subsequently, Steven Waters was assessed with taxes, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $55,316.84 by the Tennessee Department of Revenue after purchasing nearly a kilogram of cocaine from a confidential informant. In a declaratory judgment suit in the Chancery Court of Loudon County, Waters challenged the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of self-incrimination, double jeopardy and due process. The chancellor declared the statute unconstitutional and set aside the assessment. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the enactment exceeded the General Assembly’s taxing power under article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Initially, we hold that the statute imposing the tax on unauthorized substances does not violate the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy or abridge the guarantee of procedural due process. Because, however, the tax cannot be classified as either a tax on merchants, a tax on peddlers or a tax on privileges, as authorized by our state constitution, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Steven Waters, et al v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
The Court today invalidates the Unauthorized Substances Tax on the ground that it exceeds the General Assembly’s taxing power under Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Court reaches this conclusion despite the precedents requiring us to interpret statutes in a manner that sustains, rather than defeats, their constitutionality. Even though I concur with the Court’s conclusions that the Unauthorized Substances Tax does not run afoul of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination and that it is consistent with the requirements of due process, I cannot concur with its decision that this tax cannot be imposed in a constitutional manner on persons who possess significant quantities of illegal drugs for the purpose of resale. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Megan Griswold v. Josh Williams, et al
Sellers of truck appeal award of damages and attorneys fees awarded to purchaser based on finding that sellers violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Janice L. Bane v. William E. Jarvis
Father appeals order finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to a total of 180 days incarceration. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sam Avery Wilhoite
The defendant, Sam Avery Wilhoite, was indicted on ten counts of forgery involving five forged checks. A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted him of eight counts of forgery and lesserincluded charges on two of the counts. The trial court merged five of the counts, including the lesser-included convictions, with the five other counts and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Lynn Averitt, Sr. v. Lynn Binkley Averitt
In this divorce dispute, Wife argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her the divorce, by characterizing her condominium as marital property, and in the division of marital assets, including funds that the court found Husband had dissipated from the marital estate. Finding that the Husband did not dissipate marital funds, we reverse. On all other issues, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcie Lynn Pursell
The Defendant, Marcie Lynn Pursell, aka Marcie Pursell Frazier, was indicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court for three counts of aggravated child abuse. Thereafter, the Davidson County Juvenile Court concluded that the State had not proved allegations, in a dependent and neglect petition, that the defendant had injured her child or allowed the child to be injured. The defendant sought to dismiss the felony child abuse charges in criminal court on collateral estoppel grounds. The trial court denied her motion. The trial court and this Court granted her Rule 9 application for an interlocutory appeal. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court finding that the State was not collaterally estopped from pursuing criminal prosecution against the defendant is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jecory J. Leonard
The appellant, Jecory J. Leonard, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to facilitation of second degree murder and facilitation of attempted first degree murder, Class B felonies. The plea agreement provided that the length and manner of service of the sentences would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryant D. Millen v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bryant D. Millen, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview and investigate witnesses. He further asserts that trial counsel failed to impeach the testimony of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Vincent Ricco
The defendant was convicted by jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. He was |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Anderson
The defendant, Christopher Anderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury on one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The defendant received sentences of three years for aggravated burglary and eight years for each count of aggravated robbery to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to sever his cases from the cases of his co-defendant; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count III, charging aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding defense counsel’s inquiry on cross-examination of the co-defendant regarding bias. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Samantha Nabors v. William M. Adams, M.D., et al.
This appeal involves a medical malpractice action. In a motion for summary judgment, defendant physician asserted that plaintiff’s expert witness failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule. The trial court granted the motion finding that plaintiff’s expert failed to demonstrate a familiarity with the standard of care in defendant’s community or a similar community. In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, plaintiff attached a supplemental affidavit of the same expert in order to cure the deficiency. The trial court considered the expert’s supplemental affidavit and denied the motion because the new affidavit still failed to satisfy the locality rule. Plaintiff appeals. Reviewing the record, we find that the expert’s supplemental affidavit cured the initial deficiency by relating facts which showed the similarity of the two communities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Silvino Gonzales, Invidually and as Next Friend of Rubcel Gonzales, a Minor v. Judith Long
This appeal arises out of a minor automobile accident. The plaintiff filed suit individually and on behalf of his son, claiming that his son suffered whiplash in the accident. The defendant admitted fault for the accident but denied that she caused any damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff presented testimony from a physician who opined that the son was injured in the car accident. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Advertising Company (formerly Outdoor Communications, Inc.) v. By-Pass Partners
This is a dispute over lease agreements. The plaintiff outdoor advertising company leased two parcels of property from the defendant real estate development company for the purpose of erecting billboard signs. The defendant then cancelled the leases. The defendant had contracted to sell the property to another outdoor advertising company, and cancelled the leases with the plaintiff in reliance on a lease provision allowing cancellation in the event that the plaintiff’s signs interfered with the defendant’s sale or development of the property. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s cancellation was ineffective because this was not the type of interference that was contemplated in the agreement. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages allegedly suffered as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to remove its billboards. Meanwhile, the third-party outdoor advertising company that was supposed to purchase the property filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that the plaintiff was interfering with its contractual relations with the defendant real estate development company. A trial was held, and no proof of damages was submitted. The defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company that sought to intervene asked for a hearing on damages in their post-trial brief. The trial court issued a letter ruling finding that the defendant’s termination of the leases was effective. Years later, an order was entered reiterating the finding that the defendant effectively terminated the leases; the order set the matter for a special hearing on damages owed to the defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company. The third-party’s motion to intervene was never explicitly granted. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge assigned to the case died. A substitute judge was assigned to hear the remainder of the case. In response to a series of motions, the trial court determined that the trial was properly bifurcated, that the third-party advertising company did not transfer its right to damages in a sale of its assets, and that its motion to intervene was never granted by the previous trial judge, and it therefore could not recover damages. The thirdparty advertising company now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision that the motion to intervene was never granted, finding that the motion to intervene was implicitly granted in the order following the trial. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the bifurcation was proper, that the defendant real estate development company effectively terminated the leases, and that the third-party advertising company that sought to purchase the property retained the right to damages after the sale of its assets. The case is remanded for a hearing on the damages owed to the third-party advertising company, if any. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cris R. Woods
The defendant, Cris R. Woods, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Union County for reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the trial court improperly denied his motion for acquittal. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we vacate the conviction. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Knox County, Tennessee, on the relationship of Environmental Termite & Pest Control, Inc., qui tam
Plaintiff filed this action as a “qui tam claim” pursuant to the Tennessee False Claims Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101 et seq. The Trial Court awarded plaintiff proceeds from the settlement under the Act and both parties have appealed. On appeal we hold that plaintiff did qualify under the statute as an original source, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to award a recovery. However, we hold there is not sufficient evidence to affirm the award. We vacate the award and remand pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3-128. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Eugene Armes
Defendant, Glenn Eugene Armes, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to arson and simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years for arson and eleven months and twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served consecutively. As a condition of his guilty plea, defendant properly reserved a certified question of law as to whether he was subjected to an unconstitutional traffic stop. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Talmadge Wayne Bradley
Appellant, Talmadge Wayne Bradley, pled guilty in Lawrence County to one count of possession of a Schedule III substance with intent to sell. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that enhancement factor (14), abuse of a position of public trust applied to appellant. Appellant was sentenced to four years, one year to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals arguing |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals |