APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, David Lynn McClure, was indicted on March 28, 1994 for one count aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. He was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery, rape of a child and attempt to commit the rape of a child. He received an effective sentence of 30 years as a Range I offender. The petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence, and they were affirmed. See State v. David Lynn McClure, No. 01C01-9505-CR-00145, 1997 WL 211254 (Tenn. Crim. App at Nashville, Apr. 30, 1997). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on October 14, 1999. Following an evidentiary hearing counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. This petition was denied on October 31, 2001. The petitioner then filed a notice of appeal on November 15, 2001. In this appeal the petitioner raises the issue of whether the post-conviction court correctly dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief concluding that he received effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the post-conviction court. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

The Defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years' incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) that the State did not establish a proper chain of custody concerning the stolen property in this case. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that legally sufficient evidence was presented at the Defendant's trial to support his conviction and thus that the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. We also conclude that a proper chain of evidence was established for the recovered property in this case and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the property into evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Sandra Kay Webb and Tabitha Nicole Webb, were convicted of forty-seven counts of cruelty to animals and each was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with incarceration for sixty days and a prohibition from either owning animals for ten years. In addition, the defendants were ordered to pay $39,978.85 in restitution to the Jackson-Madison County Humane Society and to perform fifty hours of community service work, and each defendant was fined a total of $5000. Soon afterwards, the trial court found that each had possessed animals since their convictions and revoked their community corrections sentences. On appeal, the defendants argue that their convictions should be reversed because the search warrant affidavit was defective, as was its execution; the affiant was untruthful in the affidavit; the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague; animal shelter records, utilized by the State during the trial, were hearsay and should not have been allowed; the evidence was insufficient, failing to prove either that the defendants acted knowingly or intentionally or failed to provide necessary care; the humane society was not entitled to restitution; the defendants should not have been required to serve their sentences in incarceration or prohibited for ten years from possessing animals; their community corrections sentences should not have been revoked; and the court should not have ordered that their dogs be forfeited. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to forty-seven of the counts, but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the defendants were acquitted of Count 8 and for an evidentiary hearing as to the payment of restitution.

The Defendant entered a "best interest" guilty plea to arson, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a split confinement sentence of four years, with one year to be served in the Bledsoe County jail and the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now challenges the propriety of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Paxton, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-five year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of DUI and imposed a $500 fine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the penal farm, which was suspended after service of forty-eight hours. The trial court further ordered the Defendant to perform fifty days of community service, imposed a fine of $510, revoked his license for a year, and required him to attend DUI school. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Robert Clark, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-four years to be served at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the definitions of the mental states pertaining to second degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Ricky Lamont Brigman, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of rape, one count of attempted rape, one count of sexual battery, one count of attempted sexual battery, and one count of sexual exploitation involving six minor male victims. For these convictions, he received an effective sentence of ninety-one years. On appeal, Brigman challenges both his convictions and sentences upon the following grounds: (1) with respect to certain convictions, a material variance exists between the indictments and the convicting evidence; (2) the "cancellation" rule requires dismissal of his conviction for sexual battery; (3) the trial court provided improper jury instructions with regard to the "cancellation" rule and the requisite mental states; (4) the sentences are excessive due to the trial court's failure to apply mitigating factors at sentencing; and (5) the improper imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Edward Peden, appeals his Lincoln County Circuit Court jury conviction of failure to appear, a Class E felony. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's ruling that allowed evidence of certain prior convictions to impeach his testimony. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The Appellant, David S. Eads, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a condition of the plea agreement, Eads reserved the right to appeal, as a certified question of law, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). On appeal, he asserts that the search warrant was invalid because: (1) the facts alleged in the affidavit supporting the search warrant were insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, and (2) the warrant was based on information obtained from an illegal warrantless search by a confidential informant. Finding that the issues presented are without merit, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The defendant, Delbert Eugene Orey, was convicted of DUI, third offense, and driving while license suspended, fifth offense, and was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but 180 days suspended, and six months, with all but forty-five days suspended, the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI, third offense, and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective term of six years with 120 days incarceration followed by probation as a result of the defendant's guilty pleas to three counts of vandalism over $10,000, one count of vandalism over $1,000, one count of vandalism over $500, and one count of vandalism under $500. In this appeal, the defendant argues: (1) his sentence is excessive; (2) the trial court erred in denying him full probation; and (3) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We remand for correction of clerical errors in some of the judgments but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, George C. Peery, III, appeals his sentence of split confinement imposed upon his plea of guilt to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. In his appeal, Defendant requests full probation and challenges the imposition of a one-year period of confinement followed by two years probation in the community corrections program for his felony conviction. Defendant does not challenge his misdemeanor sentence. We affirm the trial court's denial of full probation but reverse the one-year period of confinement and remand for modification of the judgment to reflect a period of confinement of 10.8 months to be served in the local jail or workhouse. In addition, because there is a conflict between the transcript and the judgment, we remand this case for correction of the judgment.

On April 12, 1999, the Williamson County Grand Jury returned a five-count indictment charging Defendant, Jerry W. Yancy, Jr., with two counts of aggravated assault and three counts of felony reckless endangerment. The district attorney general denied Defendant's request for pretrial diversion. In a writ of certiorari, Defendant asked the trial court to review the district attorney general's denial of pretrial diversion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied certiorari. The trial court also denied Defendant's motion to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P. Defendant applied for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10, Tenn. R. App. P., which this Court denied. Defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of felony reckless endangerment and was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault. He was acquitted on the remaining count of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve sixty days in confinement and four years on probation. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal and held that this Court erred by looking to the entire record in deciding whether the denial of pretrial diversion was proper. State v. Yancey, 69 S.W.3d 553 (Tenn. 2002). The supreme court remanded the case back to the trial court for application of the proper standard of review. Id. On remand from the supreme court, the trial court entered an order affirming the denial of pretrial diversion. Defendant appeals that decision.

The Appellant, Alphonzo Chalmers,¹ appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Chalmers argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we find that Chalmers’ brief fails to provide any argument in support of the issue presented. Due to his procedural default, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, in exchange for a six-year, one-month sentence as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be left to the trial court's later determination. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve her sentence in continuous confinement. The defendant appeals, arguing that the record does not support a sentence of full confinement and that the trial court erred in denying her request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Howard Keith Lightsey, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury, on one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of drug paraphernalia. The appellant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to one count of simple possession of cocaine, one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a sentencing hearing on February 19, 2002, the trial court ordered another sentencing hearing for April 19, 2002. At that sentencing hearing the court sentenced the appellant to eleven months twenty-nine days on each count. This sentence was suspended except for twenty days and an aggregate fine of $1,150. The appellant now brings this appeal claiming that the trial erred in denying him full probation. We find the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

A Lauderdale County Jury convicted the Appellant, Thomas L. Jackson, of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a class C felony. On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we conclude that the proof is sufficient to establish that Jackson knowingly possessed the marijuana found in his cell. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.