APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs Erica Rebecca Hurd, deceased, by and through her parents and next friends, Charles and Virginia Hurd, and Cortney Deshaun Ragland, a minor, by and through his next friend, Wanda Kay Grimes, appeal the trial court’s order dismissing their wrongful death actions against Defendants/Appellees Madison County and David Woolfork, Madison County’s Sheriff. We affirm.

This appeal involves a motion to set aside an order modifying child custody. Defendant, Gary Thomas Moore (Father), appeals the trial court’s order granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by plaintiff, Beverly Dianne Privette Moore (Mother), and denying his Motion for Relief Pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 60.02.

Plaintiff Krisinda Bowers, a minor, by next friends Tammy K. Bowers and Steve Bowers (Krisinda’s parents), appeals the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Stephen Hammond, The Jackson Clinic Professional Association, and Jackson-Madison County General Hospital. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court ruled that Krisinda’s action against the Defendants was barred by the threeyear statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions and, further, that Krisinda’s action against the Hospital was barred by her failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements formerly applicable to actions against governmental entities. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an interlocutory appeal by appellants, Charles R. and Teresa Noland Browder, from the trial court’s denial of a motion seeking to amend their complaint to name an additional party defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-1-119. The statute was enacted in response to the supreme court’s decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), which abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence in Tennessee and adopted principles of comparative fault. The statute allots a plaintiff in cases of comparative fault additional time beyond the normal running of the statute of limitations within which to join a previously unnamed defendant by either amendment of the complaint or institution of a separate action. The issue presented here is whether the statute as enacted contemplates the joinder of a third party defendant whose liability, if any, is vicarious only.