APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State has appealed from a ruling of the Criminal Court of Anderson County in which the trial court ruled that the Juvenile Court of Anderson County did not have jurisdiction to require a juvenile traffic offender to attend psychological counseling.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause.  It is so ORDERED.

This is a suit brought by William Bland (Bland) against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for breach of contract for failure to pay a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy. At trial, the jury found for Bland and awarded him damages under the insurance contract for the loss of his home and its contents due to a fire. Allstate argued at trial that material misrepresentations on the application, as a matter of law, warranted Allstate’s decision to void Bland’s policy ab initio. Allstate appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and alleges error in a number of the jury instructions. We affirm the trial court.

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman
Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

This is a breach of contract action brought by Henry County Medical Center (HCMC) against Henry Gronski, M.D. (Gronski). In response, Gronski admitted the amounts owed to HCMC under the contract but claimed that he was owed a larger amount as set-off. The trial court awarded HCMC a judgment of $44,900.40 on the contract and awarded Gronski $56,204 as set-off. The court also ordered HCMC to pay Gronski's attorney's fees and accountant fees. HCMC appeals the court’s award of set-off to Gronski as well as the award of attorney’s and accountant fees. We affirm the trial court on all issues.

Plaintiff, Eldred Reid, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Northwest 2 Correctional Center in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various officials at the correctional center violated his constitutional rights.

This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.

This is an action for damages for breach of a construction contract and of an implied warranty of good workmanship and materials and for negligent construction.

This is an appeal by petitioner, Allen B. Cole, from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Davidson County granting the motion to dismiss of respondent, the Tennessee Board of Paroles ("the Board").

In this wrongful death case we have determined that when the plaintiffappellant accepted a jury verdict finding the decedent was forty-nine percent at fault, that finding became binding in the appeal of the trial judge’s action in dismissing another defendant on the day of the trial. We, therefore, pretermit the issues raised by the appellant and affirm the judgment below.

Even though I concur completely with Judge Lewis’s opinion, I have prepared this separate opinion to elaborate further on the procedure whereby a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) requires this conversion whenever “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the [trial] court.”

This appeal involves one of the central principles of our comparative fault system - that all persons involved in an occurrence giving rise to injury or damages should have their rights and liabilities determined in one action. Douglas Samuelson perfected this appeal solely to obtain appellate review  of the summary dismissal of his malpractice claim against one of  several defendants on the day of trial. Rather than deciding this question, the majority has decided that the jury’s verdict with regard to the remaining parties somehow forecloses Mr. Samuelson from ever obtaining relief from the defendant who was removed from the case even before the trial started. I cannot agree with this decision.

This appeal involves a post-divorce contempt proceeding. The appellant, Mrs. Brenda Cherry, filed an unverified complaint in the Probate Court for Davidson County seeking to recover unpaid child support from her former husband, Mr. Songoleke Kurante Kotunu (formerly Joseph Tyree Glanton). Mr. Kotunu filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the Complaint was defective since Mrs. Cherry had not verified it. The probate court agreed with Mr. Kotunu, and dismissed Mrs. Cherry’s suit. The court also awarded Mr. Kotunu his attorneys fees. Mrs. Cherry asserts on appeal that the probate court erred by requiring her to have verified her complaint, and in granting Mr. Kotunu’s attorneys fees. We partially disagree with Mrs. Cherry, and therefore affirm the probate court in part.