APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Darrell Phillips, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the court had no authority to revoke his suspended sentences because the State did not seek this action until after the sentences had expired. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Scott Bradley Price, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. Petitioner was convicted for rape of a child and sentenced as a Range I offender, to twenty-one years at one hundred percent, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged only the length of his sentence. This Court affirmed that judgment on November 19, 2001. State v. Scott Bradley Price, No. E2000-00441-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1464555 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2001). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was subsequently amended by appointed counsel. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel did not investigate Petitioner's claims that his audio recorded confession was materially altered; (2) trial counsel did not advise Petitioner to testify in order to rebut the State's evidence; and (3) trial counsel did not use available medical records to challenge the accuser's testimony at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the defendant of theft of property, $500-$1,000, and forgery of assignment of title. On appeal the defendant presents three issues: (1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a retrial based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We have reviewed the record and have found all of the defendant's issues to be without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action stems from a divorce case. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court applied an inappropriate standard when disposing of a husband’s motion to dismiss his wife’s complaint for divorce for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The wife asserts that, by considering evidence outside the pleadings, the circuit court converted the husband’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and that the circuit court failed to apply the standards under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when considering the husband’s converted motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Further, we decline to award damages to Appellee for frivolous appeal. Likewise, we decline to award Appellant attorney’s fees on appeal.

Over a span of several years, the Petitioner, Steve G. Hutton, was convicted of eight counts of passing worthless checks, one count of theft, one count of forgery, one additional count of passing a worthless check, and one count of reckless endangerment. The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his continued confinement is illegal. The trial court dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Mize, pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced to an eight year sentence, to run concurrently with "Knox and Anderson County cases." Subsequently, the Petitioner pled guilty to two aggravated robbery charges in the Anderson County Criminal Court and received concurrent eight year sentences on each count. The Anderson County judgment contains the notation, "This sentence may run concurrent with defendant's Knox County sentence if legally possible." The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Union County conviction is illegal and void because at the time he entered his guilty plea in Union County, he had not yet been convicted in the "Knox and Anderson cases." The Petitioner filed an additional petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Anderson County judgments of conviction are illegal and void because it is not "legally possible" for the Anderson County sentences to be run concurrently with the Knox County sentence. Both petitions were assigned the same docket number in the Morgan County Criminal Court and subsequently were transferred to the Davidson County Circuit Court, where they were assigned the same Davidson County docket number and ultimately summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his sentences are illegal and the judgments from the Union County Court and the Anderson County Court are void on their faces. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Darrell Toomes, of aggravated rape and aggravated criminal trespass in connection with the June 23, 2002 home invasion of Mamie Milliman’s residence in Ripley, and the assault of Ms. Milliman. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months and 29 days for aggravated criminal trespass and 23 years as a violent offender for the aggravated rape conviction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated rape conviction and claims that his 23-year sentence for that conviction is excessive. We affirm.

This is a petition in juvenile court to modify custody. In November 1997, the juvenile court issued an order granting the mother primary residential custody of the parties’ daughter, and granting the father liberal visitation. In October 2001, the father filed a petition to modify his visitation. The father’s petition was later amended to add a request for joint custody. In November 2001, the juvenile court entered an order rescheduling the matter for a later date and granting the father visitation with the child for a full week on alternating weeks, pending the hearing. The mother tried to obtain a rehearing of that order, but was unable to do so because of numerous procedural problems. In July 2004, a final hearing was conducted. The juvenile court determined that no material change in circumstances had occurred since the November 1997 order, and that the child’s best interest would not be served by granting the parties joint custody. The juvenile court slightly modified the visitation schedule for the father set forth in the November 1997 order. From that order, the father now appeals. We affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Clarence Bunton, of attempted child rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years in confinement. The appellant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gary Timothy Lawler, pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; one count of attempted rape, a Class C felony; and one count of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of seven years for each conviction. The sentence for the attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining two sentences, which were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Thus, the total effective sentence is fourteen years. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing and requiring him to serve the entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Lee Hamby, entered pleas of guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft over $500, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in a community corrections program. Fifteen months later, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his term in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the single issue presented for review is whether revocation was proper. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his sentence of three years confinement after entering a guilty plea to theft of property over $10,000. The defendant contends the trial judge erred in failing to sentence him to full probation or other alternative sentencing. Our review reveals that the trial judge complied with sentencing procedures, and we affirm the sentence.

The defendant, Clarence Edward Johnson, entered pleas of guilty to four counts of forgery, four counts of identity theft, speeding, failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, two counts of second offense driving on a revoked license, misdemeanor failure to appear, two counts of felony failure to appear, and theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years of incarceration followed by three years of supervised probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Nicholas Riendeau, pled guilty to theft over $1,000, forgery, identity theft, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, possession with intent to deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of cocaine, possession of a schedule IV drug (clonazepam), and theft over $10,000. The trial court imposed a Range I, effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying full probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Brandon Jerome Johnson, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court. Johnson pled guilty to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery, tampering with evidence, vandalism, and resisting arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of four years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Title IV child support case. The child involved in this action was born in September 2000.  The parents were never married. The child lived with the mother, and the mother began receiving financial assistance from the State when the child was born. In February 2002, the child was legitimated as the natural child of the father. In February 2003, the State, on behalf of the mother, filed a petition against the father for child support payments. In May 2003, the father was ordered to pay child support, plus a monthly amount toward his child support arrearage. The mother filed a petition for rehearing by the juvenile court judge, arguing that the established arrearage was too high, and asserting that she no longer wanted child support from the father because the two were reunited. In November 2003, a hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s monthly child support obligation and gave him a credit toward the child support arrearage for payments that had been made directly to the mother. The State filed a motion to alter or amend the decision, which was denied. The State now appeals. We reverse.

This case arises out of an ejectment action filed by Appellee against Appellant. Appellee claims ownership of the disputed property under a 1990 Warranty Deed and Appellant asserts that this Deed should be set aside due to fraud. The trial court found that the 1990 Deed was valid and that Appellant was a tenant at will on the property. The trial court further found that Appellant was in arrears on rent and that Appellee had a right to possession of the property and rents. We affirm.

In the divorce action, the Trial Court awarded wife a divorce, alimony, child support, and divided marital property and debts of the marriage, and awarded fees for the wife's attorney. The husband's issues on appeal are valuation and division of property, alimony, attorney's fees and amount of child support. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment.

The petitioner, Michael W. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, raising as his sole issue whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare and investigate his case. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Plaintiff Julie Nahon (“Plaintiff”) filed for divorce from Defendant Isaac Nahon (“Defendant”). The parties later entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) whereby Defendant agreed to obtain a loan and pay off certain marital debts. Four days later, Defendant repudiated the MDA after failing to obtain his anticipated loan. Plaintiff sought to enforce the MDA as a contract. The trial court held that the MDA was a valid and enforceable contract, and subsequently incorporated the MDA into the parties’ Final Decree of Absolute Divorce. Defendant appealed. Defendant subsequently failed to adhere to the financial obligations set forth in the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. As a result, Plaintiff filed several contempt petitions against Defendant. The trial court eventually entered an Order on Petition for Contempt against Defendant which granted Plaintiff final and enforceable judgments against Defendant for all delinquent obligations under the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. Defendant now appeals both the final divorce decree and the Order on Petition for Contempt. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

The appellant, Richard Gastineau, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to reckless driving, and the trial court sentenced him to a six-month suspended sentence and fined him five hundred dollars. The trial court also sua sponte ruled that the appellant had violated the implied consent law and revoked his driver’s license for one year. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by finding that he violated the implied consent law and by revoking his driver’s license. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the implied consent law violation and reverse the judgment of the trial court. We also remand the case to the trial court in order for it to clarify on the record whether the appellant should receive judicial diversion for the reckless driving conviction.

The defendant, Corey C. Abernathy, was convicted after a bench trial of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the defendant was not questioned, as required, before being allowed to represent himself. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Deangelo Demond Johnson, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, felony evading arrest, and driving on a suspended license. He received a total effective sentence of ten years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a divorce and child custody case. After thirteen years of marriage, the wife filed a complaint for divorce and sought custody of the couple’s two minor children, alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The husband admitted irreconcilable differences, but argued that the wife had committed the inappropriate marital conduct. After a lengthy trial, the trial court designated the wife as primary residential parent, ordered the husband to pay child support, divided the marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife $70,000, awarded the wife attorney’s fees, and taxed the costs of the litigation against the husband. The husband appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Darrell Braddock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.