APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Jonathon Christopher Hood, entered a best-interest guilty plea to felony reckless endangerment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to one year imprisonment with a release eligibility date of 30%. The Petitioner filed for and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this domestic relations case, Husband complains, inter alia, that the trial court erred: in awarding primary custody of the parties’ children, ages two and four, to Wife, in the amount of support obligations, and in failing to award his attorney fees. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

This is a custody proceeding wherein Mother offered no proof except her own testimony. When the judgment was entered against her, she argues that the trial court should have conducted a comparative fitness analysis and that the case should be remanded for this purpose. Judgment of the
juvenile court affirmed.

The defendant, Danny Strode, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The State sought the death penalty. The defendant asserted he could not be put to death because he was mentally retarded within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a). The trial court held a hearing and determined that the defendant was indeed mentally retarded under the definition provided in the statute and therefore could not be sentenced to death. The State requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, we determine that the defendant is not mentally retarded under the definition of the statute and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Andrew Rochester, contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence taken from his vehicle after his arrest; (2) failing to object to testimony elicited from two witnesses not qualified as experts; and (3) failing to comply with the requirements of Momon v. State on the record at trial. Following our review, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective in his representation; therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Kevin Frank Mercer, contends that: (1) his plea was involuntary and unknowing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective by providing little meaningful advice as to whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial. Following our review, we conclude that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that counsel was effective in his representation of the petitioner. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Husband appeals the trial court’s distribution of marital property and award of alimony in futuro.  We affirm.

This is a Title IV child support case. The State appeals from the trial court’s Order refusing to set support because the Petitioner did not have legal custody of the child at the time she received public assistance from the Department of Human Services, nor was the biological parent given notice that she would have to reimburse the Department of Human Services for moneys spent on behalf of her son when she placed him in the custody of the Petitioner. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Walfrido L. Rodriguez, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider the charges sequentially, that the convicting evidence is insufficient, and that the trial court erred in rejecting a request for a special jury instruction. We discern no reversible error and affirm the convictions.

This is a contempt action arising out of a divorce. The parties’ final decree of divorce incorporated a marital dissolution agreement. The husband filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against the wife for several alleged violations of the martial dissolution agreement. At the first hearing on the husband’s petition, the husband requested leave of court to amend his petition for contempt. Leave to amend was granted, and in light of the amendment, the trial court ordered a two-day continuance of the hearing. When the proceedings were reconvened, the trial court ruled that the wife had committed three violations of the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court awarded the husband $12,000 in attorney’s fees for prosecuting the contempt petition. The wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in granting the husband leave to amend his petition, finding that the wife violated the terms of the MDA, and in awarding the husband $12,000 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the grant of leave to amend the petition and the finding that the wife violated the terms of the MDA. However, the award of  attorney’s fees is vacated and the cause remanded for reconsideration of this issue.

The appellant, Daniel Potin, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of $20,000.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s designation of a witness as an expert, and the fine imposed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a request for prejudgment interest in a personal injury case. After the Circuit Court for Cheatham County entered a $27,787.50 judgment for the prevailing motorist, the motorist filed a post-trial motion seeking prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the motion, and the prevailing motorist appealed. We affirm the trial court because prejudgment interest in not available in personal injury cases.

This appeal stems from a divorce case. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it named the wife as the primary residential parent, when it adopted a visitation schedule requiring the children to be transported between husband and wife on a daily basis during the week, and when it declined to award husband alimony. The husband contends on appeal that naming him primary residential parent and adopting his permanent parenting plan would be less disruptive on the children. Further, he asserts that the court should have awarded him alimony as he was the economically disadvantaged spouse and has a limited income due to his medical condition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This appeal involves the discharge of a clerical employee by the Metropolitan Nashville General Hospital. After her discharge was upheld by the Metropolitan Nashville Hospital Authority, the employee filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the decision to discharge her. The trial court affirmed the discharge, and the employee has appealed. Like the trial court, we have determined that the decision to discharge the employee for deficient and inefficient performance of duties is supported by substantial and material evidence.

The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in an action alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and denied Defendant’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Gary and Gail Weaver filed suit against Coldwell Banker Hoffman-Burke, Inc. Realtors (“Defendant CBHB”), Jim Perdue (“Defendant Perdue”), Thomas McCarter (“Defendant McCarter”), and Chip Hunter (“Defendant Hunter”) seeking damages resulting from a failed real estate sale. The Plaintiffs specifically sought damages from Defendants CBHB and Perdue for negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue of liability for all Defendants, but reserved ruling on damages for trial. At trial, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $134,225.06 plus attorney’s fees and held all Defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire award. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendants CBHB and Perdue assert various issues on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Earl Jerome Lee, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping, attempted felony escape, concealing stolen property, and fraudulent use of a credit card, and he received a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentences imposed were illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals the dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Capital Petitioner David Keen appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner Keen pled guilty to first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of the rape of eight-year-old Ashley Nicole (Nikki) Reed. See State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1996). He was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the petitioner’s conviction was affirmed, but the supreme court reversed and remanded the sentence of death after finding reversible error due to erroneous jury instructions. Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 736. On remand, the jury, again, imposed the penalty of death. Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 202. Our supreme court affirmed the sentence of death on direct appeal. Id. A pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on May 3, 2001, which was followed by the appointment of counsel and an amended petition on November 16, 2001. An evidentiary hearing was conducted and, on August 2, 2004, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On direct appeal to this Court, the petitioner presents for our review the following claims: (1) whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial due to jury misconduct; (2) whether the petitioner received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing; (3) whether the death sentence violates the holdings in Apprendi, Ring, or Jones; (4) whether the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the death penalty violates Bush v. Gore; (5) whether the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional; and (6) whether imposition of the death penalty violates international
law. After a careful and laborious review of the record, this Court concludes that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a summary judgment case. Appellant/Husband and his ex-wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement wherein the ex-wife was awarded the marital residence subject to the condition that should she choose to sell the property Appellant was then entitled to $20,000.00 from the net proceeds of the sale. The ex-wife refinanced the property and executed a Deed of Trust in favor of the Appellee. When ex-wife defaulted on her payments, Appellee foreclosed on the property. Appellant/Husband filed suit against the Appellee seeking enforcement of an equitable lien against the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. We affirm.

The petitioner, James McClennon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. A review of the record reveals support for the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm.

The defendant, Cassandra Robinson, was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed Range I, concurrent sentences of four years, nine years, and four years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Edward Jankowski, Sr., appeals from the sentencing decision of the Sequatchie County Circuit Court. The Defendant pled guilty to one count of incest. The victim was his eighteen-year-old daughter. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

While I concur in part with the conclusion of the majority affirming Stephenson’s convictions, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses and the state constitutional right to confront witnesses “face-to-face” does not apply to capital sentencing hearings. The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Similarly, Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face . . . .” It is disingenuous to argue that the sentencing phase of a capital murder case–tried before a jury–is not a critical part of a “criminal prosecution” covered by these provisions.1

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
Employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding a heart attack suffered by the Employee arose
out of his employment with the City of Murfreesboro and in awarding medical benefits for the
implantation of intra-coronary stints that the employer alleges is treatment for a pre-existing
condition and not a work-related injury. We agree with the findings of the trial judge and, in
accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ernest Cunningham, Jr., appeals his convictions for facilitation of sale of cocaine under .5 grams (Class D felony) and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell (Class B felony). The defendant received concurrent sentences of twelve years for the facilitation offense and thirty years for possession with intent to sell, as a career offender with a 60% release eligibility date. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Our review reveals that the evidence was sufficient. The judgments of conviction are hereby affirmed.