APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Terry Lee Robinson, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder and received a life sentence. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post divorce child custody case. The trial court changed custody to the father based upon the mother's homosexuality and the effect it would have on the child as he grew older. We hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that there had been a material change in circumstances to justify a change of custody in the absence of proof that the mother's sexual orientation had affected or would affect the child's well-being in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is reversed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for delivery of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, William Ferris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for the aggravated burglary convictions and twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The court merged the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and the two counts of aggravated burglary and ordered that the kidnapping, burglary, and robbery sentences be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte upon admission of testimony about the defendant’s pending indictment for attempted second degree murder; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for common law writ of certiorari as being untimely filed. We affirm.

I concur in the majority’s opinion. I write separately to stress that which is missing in this case, i.e., evidence, be it in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, showing that the subject child has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, adversely affected by his mother’s lifestyle. In my opinion, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed because of a lack of proof to support its critical finding of adverse effect.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of twenty-six (26) grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver. He appealed this conviction. We affirmed his conviction in State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial
court denied the petitioner’s petition. On appeal, we remanded the petition for the trial court to enter findings of fact. Frank Robert Bigsby v. State, No. M2002-02260-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 22927139 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 11, 2003). The trial court entered its findings, and we now address the appeal on the merits. The petitioner’s sole issue in his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction petition is that he was offered ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition was proper. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should have been appointed post-conviction counsel and given an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we remand this matter to the post-conviction court to determine whether the petitioner’s right to due process of law requires that the petition be considered regardless of its untimeliness.

The petitioner, Michael Braxton, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated rape and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as being untimely. The petitioner appeals the dismissal, arguing that his petition was not barred by the statute of limitations. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing on the timeliness of the petitioner's petition.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he has a repetitive-stress job-related condition in his right knee diagnosed as degenerative arthritis. Surgery was performed September 18, 1997. After giving notice in July 1999, this action was filed on March 20, 2000. The trial judge concluded that the one-year statute of limitations precluded recovery and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

The plaintiff in this medical battery case argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendant doctor summary judgment and argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she consented to an unnamed surgical procedure in addition to scheduled procedures named in a hospital consent form. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment upon findings that the case was actually a suit for medical malpractice, rather than medical battery, and that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that such surgery was not in her best interest. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for trial on the merits upon our finding that the plaintiff's suit states a cause of action for medical battery; and that the consent form signed by the plaintiff authorized the additional surgery only if it was required by an unforseen condition and whether there was an unforseen condition requiring the additional surgery remained a genuine issue of material fact.

Plaintiffs-landowners filed a chancery court complaint seeking to establish ownership of a parcel of real estate which they claimed by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 28-2-110 (failure to pay real estate taxes for twenty years) and also allowed defendants to take a voluntary nonsuit of a counter-claim against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had ruled that appellee was entitled to a dwelling house and all improvements on land owned by the Deceased. Appellant appeals this and numerous issues. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff complained of wrist pain which was subjectively diagnosed as cumulative trauma. The treating physician found no impairment, as did neither of the first two physicians to whom the plaintiff was referred. The third physician, Dr. Fishbein, relying on subjective complaints, made four years after the plaintiff left her job, found a 5 percent impairment in each arm. We find the evidence preponderates against the judgment.

Appellants are residuary beneficiaries of their father's estate. They challenge the estate's payment of attorney fees and expenses incurred by executrix (the widow of testator and stepmother of Appellants) in unsuccessfully defending against her removal as executrix. Appellants contend that because litigation concerning the removal of their stepmother as executrix was solely for the personal benefit of the executrix and was necessitated by her neglect in administering the estate, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering the attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending against the removal petition be paid out of the estate. Appellee, the former executrix, contends that the trial court did not err in exercising its discretion in ordering legal fees to be paid out of estate. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering the expenses paid out of the estate, we reverse and remand.

The defendant, Robert Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the circumstantial evidence presented in his case was sufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s petition to register and modify a foreign decree of child support for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

The petitioner, William L. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner's sentence for rape of a child is illegal, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed, relief is granted, and the cause is remanded to the Bledsoe County Circuit Court for transfer to the Hamilton County Criminal Court for appropriate remedial action.

The defendant, Candice Workman, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to soliciting the sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced her to one year in the workhouse to be served on probation and fined her $2000.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion. We affirm the trial court but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction.

The Petitioner, Larry W. Clark, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit.  Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In 1908, a fee simple determinable estate in real property was conveyed to the Davidson County Board of Education and its successors ("Metro"). The deed required the property to be used "for school purposes" and to be "devoted exclusively to the cause of education." The deed further provided that the property would revert to the grantors or their heirs should the property be "abandoned" for these purposes. In July 2000, the defendant Metro ceased using the property for classroom instruction and administration but continued to maintain the property, to use it to store surplus food service equipment, and to hold it in reserve for possible use in the indefinite future. In April 2001, heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them. Concluding that there had been no abandonment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the limitations "for school purposes" and the "cause of education" are satisfied solely by classroom instruction. The Court of Appeals thus not only held that Metro had abandoned the property for these limitations, but also granted summary judgment in favor of the nonmovants, the heirs of the grantors. We vacate the Court of Appeals' holding that "school purposes" and the "cause of education" require classroom instruction alone. We hold that these limitations permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training, and rearing. Further, we hold that in a fee simple determinable where the term "abandon" is not otherwise defined, the common law definition of abandonment applies; a complainant therefore must show both intent to abandon for the stated limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to abandon is effectuated. Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances. In the proceedings below, the parties lacked the benefit of our holding today concerning the legal standard for abandonment; consequently, the factual record relevant to this standard has not been sufficiently developed. We thus vacate both the Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties the opportunity to litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein.

The sole issue in this case is whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the attention of the jury.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Benton County terminating his parental rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the grounds of failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, that the Department of Children’s Services failed to exercise reasonable efforts toward reunification and/or relative placement, and that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Thomas Eugene Graham, appeals from the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules. The motion was properly denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellants, Rycine Ellison and Mandrell Christmon, appeal on a certified question of law after their guilty pleas. On appeal, they challenge the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.