APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Zellburge Gleaves, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Gleaves agreed to an eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. The plea agreement further provided that the manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered total confinement. Gleaves appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant a sentence of split confinement. After review of the record, we affirm.

A Sullivan County Jury convicted the appellant, Henry Mitchell Dixon, Jr., also known as "Mackie" Dixon, of one count of attempted first degree murder (Count One), one count of attempted second degree murder (Count Two), one count of attempted aggravated assault (Count Four), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts Three and Five), one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle (Count Six), and one count of aggravated burglary (Count Seven). The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-two (22) year sentence as a Range I offender for Counts One through Six and four (4) years probation on Count Seven, to run consecutively to the twenty-two (22) year sentence. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his sentence, and the trial court's refusal to set aside the appellant's conviction for attempted first degree murder based on the jury foreman's statement after the trial that there was a mistake as to how the verdict was returned. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that none of these claims merit relief. However, we must reverse and remand the conviction for attempted second degree murder due to an erroneous jury charge on the definition of "knowingly." In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder. He now contends that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

On May 19, 2001, a jury in Memphis convicted the defendant, William Wilson, of aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I Standard Offender to life in prison for the first degree felony murder conviction and to eight (8) years for the aggravated robbery to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals these convictions. He argues four issues on appeal: (1) He was not criminally responsible for his co-defendant's actions, and therefore, not guilty of first degree murder; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery and first degree murder; (3) the trial court erred by failing to charge the affirmative defense of duress; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing him to eight (8) years consecutive to his life sentence with the possibility of parole. We affirm the trial court's actions with regard to these issues.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, facilitating aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He now appeals these convictions contending that the (1) evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions, (2) trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated kidnapping or in refusing to merge the charge of aggravated kidnapping with his aggravated robbery charge, (3) trial court erred by denying him his right to effective cross-examination by stating that questions regarding the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would allow the admission of more damaging testimony against the defendant, and (4) trial court erred in sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor four; however, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The petitioner's filing of a motion to reconsider did not toll the running of the thirty day requirement for filing notice of appeal. We conclude that the record evinces no basis for determining that justice requires us to excuse the timely filing of a notice of appeal.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Tarver, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing the habeas petition under the peculiar circumstances presented in the instant case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

The defendant appealed his convictions on two counts of facilitation of second degree murder and one count of aggravated arson, as well as the effective 65-year sentence. The defendant's appeal raised the following issues: insufficiency of evidence to support the convictions; error in allowing hearsay testimony under the conspiracy exception; error in allowing cross-examination of the defendant during limited purpose jury-out hearing; error in allowing a medical expert to testify outside his area of expertise; failure to instruct the jury on inadequate crime scene investigation; and error in application of "particularly vulnerable" enhancement factor during the sentencing phase. We conclude that the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the convictions and sentence as imposed by the trial court.

This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

The defendant, Mona Ray Cloud, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act, a Class E felony; and criminal impersonation, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received four-year, one-year, and six-month sentences, respectively, with the one-year and six-month sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the four-year sentence for an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that she should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.