APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and two counts of the sale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, Class E felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's request for judicial diversion, concluding he was eligible for diversion because he had not previously been convicted of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor and his history and circumstances demonstrated he was a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. The State appealed, arguing that the defendant was eligible for diversion only because the trial court modified his prior conviction from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C misdemeanor. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The Johnson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Tammy Hart, for child endangerment, vehicular homicide, and aggravated vehicular homicide after the Defendant's car collided "head-on" with another car, killing the other driver. A Johnson County jury convicted the Defendant of child endangerment and vehicular homicide. The Defendant waived her right to a jury trial on the third count of the indictment, and the trial court found the Defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide and merged the vehicular homicide conviction with the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for child endangerment, all of which was suspended except for thirty days, and twenty-three years for the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress her medical records; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's medical records into evidence; (3) that the Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission of her medical records into evidence; and (4) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her convictions. Finding no reversible error and concluding that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the Defendant's convictions, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This case involves the seizure and forfeiture of a leased vehicle. The Department of Safety ("the Department") sent a notice of the forfeiture proceedings to the corporate owner/lessor at the address listed on the vehicle's certificate of title. Because the owner had moved two years previously and the Postal Service had ceased forwarding its mail, the unopened certified letter was returned to the Department marked "Not Deliverable as Addressed Unable to Forward." The Department took no further steps to locate the owner and summarily ordered the forfeiture of the vehicle. Upon learning of the forfeiture, the owner filed a petition for a stay and reconsideration, which the Department denied. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County in which it challenged the adequacy of the notice procedure. The trial court ruled the notice procedure did not meet constitutional due process requirements under the circumstances, in which the corporate owner had a registered agent for service of process whose name and address were easily obtainable through the Secretary of State's Office. The Department appeals, arguing that due process does not require that it seek out a corporate owner that has failed to notify the Department of its change of address, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-131. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant pled guilty to simple burglary. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence with sixty days to be served in the county jail followed by probation. In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred: (1) in denying judicial diversion; and (2) in denying full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the  Union County Board of Education had authority to enter into a four-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. The trial court found that the parties' four-year contract was valid. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that no statutory authority existed for the Union County Board of Education to enter into a multi-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Robert Michael Winters appeals his Hamilton County convictions of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery relative to events which culminated in the death of Vernise Sheffield, for which the defendant is serving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and 12 years, respectively. In this direct appeal, Winters alleges that his convictions are unsupported by sufficient evidence, that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, that the trial court erroneously admitted a letter from the defendant to his wife which was properly subject to the marital communications privilege, and that the trial court erroneously admitted a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a state's witness. Because we are unconvinced that harmful error occurred, we affirm the defendant's first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions. However, instructional error with respect to the first-degree premeditated murder conviction requires that we reverse that count and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Fredrequos Damon Neal, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to require a jury to determine
whether the insurer waived compliance with insurance policy provisions requiring the insurer’s
consent to a third-party settlement by its insured. After the insurance company denied her claim, the insured filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and bad faith. The trial court directed a verdict for the insurance company, finding that the insured failed to comply with the subrogation provisions of her policy and that the insurance company did not waive these provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the insurance company waived the subrogation provisions. We also conclude that the insured was not required to demonstrate that the insurance company had not been prejudiced and that the trial court improperly directed verdicts on the insured’s claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the bad faith statute. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded to the Trial Court.

The appellant, Richard Phillip Mather, pled guilty in the Anderson County Circuit Court to criminally negligent homicide. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to two years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to recuse himself from the proceedings; and (2) the trial court erred by rejecting the initial plea agreement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this divorce case to determine: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying a "joint benefit" definition of marital debt and holding that debt incurred by Wife during the parties' ten-year separation was marital debt; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly allocated this debt when it held that Husband should be required to pay Wife's marital debts. We hold that debts incurred by either or both spouses during the course of a marriage are properly classified as marital debt; therefore the debts at issue in this case are marital. In allocating marital debts, trial courts should consider the following four factors: (1) the debt's purpose; (2) which party incurred the debt; (3) which party benefitted from incurring the debt; and (4) which party is best able to repay the debt. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine how the debts in this case should be allocated, this case is remanded to the trial court to determine the proper allocation of the marital debts. The trial court's determination shall be guided by the four factors set out above.

A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Terrance Heard, along with fourteen other members of the "Gangster Disciples" street gang, for first degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping after two men were kidnapped and beaten by the gang, leaving one victim dead. A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court merged the murder convictions, imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and twenty-five years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and ordered all the sentences to run consecutively. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the pre-trial identification of the Defendant made by a witness and by limiting cross-examination of the witness regarding this identification; (2) that the assistant district attorney improperly commented on the state of mind of the victim and a co-defendant during his opening statement to the prejudice of the Defendant; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify as to the victim's state of mind just prior to his murder concerning the Gangster Disciples; (4) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request for a special jury instruction addressing the theories of duress and mere presence; and (5) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no reversible error and conclude that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the Defendant's convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant now appeals contending that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the defendant’s impeachment with  inadmissible evidence, and (2) he was denied a fundamentally fair trial because of improper questions and argument by the prosecution. We hold that (1) the defendant’s impeachment was improper, however, the  error was harmless, and (2) the State’s questions and argument were  not improper, and even if they were improper, they did not rise to the level of plain error.

We granted review in this case to decide whether a probate court's rejection of all purported wills submitted for probate and the entering of an order finding that the decedent died intestate constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal. Jeff Henderson, the plaintiff-appellant, asserts that the trial court's order rejecting the decedent's wills and finding that he died intestate was not a final order because the trial court did not certify it as such under Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant-appellee, Kenneth Henderson, responds that the rejection of the submitted wills and the finding of intestacy represent a final judgment which must be appealed, if at all, within thirty days. The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and held that the probate court's order rejecting the wills for probate was a final judgment that had to be appealed within thirty days. Since the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed beyond thirty days, the appeal was dismissed. After careful consideration, we have determined that the intermediate court correctly resolved the case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant, Russell Dale Oliver, was convicted by a jury in the Johnson County Circuit Court of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the violation of his right to a speedy prosecution and trial and that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of murder in the first degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a contract dispute between the plaintiff, an incorporated municipality, and the defendant, a nonprofit water systems corporation that supplied water to residents living outside the city limits. The parties entered into several agreements for the sale of potable treated water from the plaintiff to the defendant, the specific terms for which varied under each agreement. In particular, a 1981 agreement placed limits on the defendant's ability to assign its rights under the contract and required that the defendant purchase all its water requirements up to eight million gallons per month from the plaintiff, while an agreement executed in 1994 contained no minimum purchase requirement for the defendant and expressly provided that successors to the defendant, "whether the result of legal process, assignment, or otherwise," succeeded to the rights of the defendant under the contract. In 2002, the defendant entered into negotiations for the sale of its assets to a third party water company. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the contract between the parties did not allow the defendant to assign its rights without the plaintiff's prior consent and that the City would suffer irreparable harm if deprived of the income generated by its water sale to the defendant. Following an injunction hearing and a subsequent trial, the trial court ruled, inter alia, that the 1994 contract superceded the previous agreements between the parties and the defendant was free to transfer its assets to the third party water company without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing the 1994 contract was ultra vires because its mayor lacked the authority to execute it, there was no meeting of the minds to form a valid contract between the parties, and the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving the temporary injunction and denying the City's request for a permanent injunction. Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction petitioner, Kelvin Wade Cloyd, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide and possession of a controlled substance. After appointment of counsel and a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal of right, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that the state withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a divorce case involving the division of marital property. In 1988, the husband moved into the wife's house. The parties married in 1992 and remained married for ten years. During that time, the parties sold the wife's house and bought a new home with the proceeds. The new home was purchased in the names of both the husband and the wife. In 2002, the parties divorced. The trial court found that the parties' property had become so commingled that virtually none of it could be considered separate property, and divided the marital assets evenly. The trial court also allocated to the wife a larger portion of a marital debt to the wife's mother. From that decree, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding of commingling and transmutation of property, and finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allocation of the marital debt.

The defendant, Christopher Lovin, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and submits that the trial court erred by failing to exclude cumulative medical testimony. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, fifth offense. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock, contending that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, the roadblock guidelines are unconstitutional, and the police did not substantially comply with the roadblock guidelines. The defendant also made a motion in limine to keep out testimony regarding the defendant's use of a racial slur. Both motions were denied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to all issues.

A Knox County jury convicted the juvenile defendant, Edward L. Williams, of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the premeditated murder conviction and twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and deleting any reference to a merger of the premeditated murder count and the felony murder count. We further order that the sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.