APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Stanley Mills, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not (1) prepare for trial adequately; (2) object to the trial court's erroneous jury instruction regarding his possible sentences; and (3) object to the trial court's amending his judgment of conviction to reflect that he was to serve one hundred percent of his sentence instead of thirty percent. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

In this appeal from the trial court's award of attorneys fees, Appellant seeks review of the trial court's refusal to award the full amount of fees sought. We modify the trial court's findings and affirm as to the amount of the award.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Board of Paroles regarding the revocation of his parole. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that he did not commit the crime that triggered the revocation of his parole. The trial court eventually dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. While his appeal was pending, the prisoner was released from the Department of Correction. Accordingly, because this appeal is now moot, we vacate the trial court's order and remand the case with directions to dismiss the prisoner's petition.

This appeal involves a conflict between neighbors over whether the Taylors have a right to use a gravel driveway located on property owned by the Rhoades to access their property. The trial court found that an implied easement was proved. The Rhoades appeal that judgment to this court arguing that the Taylors failed to prove two elements necessary for a finding of an implied easement. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

This case involves an insurance company's appeal of the trial court's decision that the company has a duty to defend its insured under a commercial general liability policy. Applying Texas law, we find that no such duty exists and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the trial court.

This case involves the termination of parental rights. The mother of the two young children at issue had a history of cocaine and marijuana abuse. In September 1999, the state department of children's services obtained custody of the children and placed them in a foster home. While the children were in foster care, the mother participated in drug rehabilitation programs and attempted to obtain permanent employment. The mother made some progress, but repeatedly relapsed back into drug and alcohol use, and failed to procure a permanent job or a permanent residence. In August 2001, the State filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The trial court granted the State's petition. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding clear and convincing evidence that the mother had failed to comply with the permanency plan, that conditions that prevented the children's safe return still persisted, and that termination of the mother's parental rights is in the children's best interest.

The defendant was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101 and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety days to be served in the county jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, in addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by ordering that he serve ninety days in confinement. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and the record supports the trial court’s sentencing determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jared Michael Christein, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of second degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant's second degree murder conviction was merged into his felony murder conviction and he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: whether sufficient evidence existed to support his convictions and whether the trial court properly charged the jury on the appropriate lesser-included offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant appeals adverse summary judgment as to diminution in value of a 1995 Jaguar XJ6 automobile based upon alleged undisputed expert testimony. Judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

The petitioner, Ronald Paul, appeals the Robertson County Criminal Court's disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The lower court ruled that, because appellate counsel's single issue raised on direct appeal was deemed waived by the appellate court, the petitioner would be entitled to a delayed appeal. The court also dismissed without prejudice the remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, indicating that the petitioner could file a new petition for post-conviction relief after the conclusion of the delayed direct appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

We granted review to determine whether Tennessee should adopt a cause of action allowing a child to recover for loss of parental consortium due to an injury to the child's parent. The trial court dismissed the claims for loss of parental consortium after finding that no such cause of action exists. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that this Court should not adopt a common law cause of action for loss of parental consortium in personal injury cases and that the issue of whether to create such a cause of action is a matter of legislative discretion. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Woods, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued over $500, and vandalism of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender for the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated burglary, three years for theft, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted the plaintiff's application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Chancellor erred in holding that a contractor is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b), and therefore is limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence, where the contractor possessed a valid contractor's license when the contract was formed but did not maintain a valid license throughout the entire time contracting services were performed under the contract. After carefully considering the relevant statutes, we conclude that the Chancellor properly held that a contractor who does not maintain a valid license throughout the entire contract period is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b) and limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join all of the tortfeasors in a single proceeding under Samuelson v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1998). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment after concluding that the plaintiff’s settlement with one tortfeasor did not require dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against a second tortfeasor. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join the tortfeasors in a single proceeding and that Samuelson is not applicable to the facts of this case. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Donnie Thompson, of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to the maximum sentences of six years for voluntary manslaughter and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, with the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends his sentences are excessive. We reduce the sentence for voluntary manslaughter to five years, affirm the four-year sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and order the sentences to run concurrently.

We granted this motion for a full court review of the Special Workers' Compensation Panel decision to determine whether the appellant, Clyde L. Long, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred as a result of a work-related incident as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the holding of the trial court and Special Workers' Compensation Panel, and that the appellant's injury did arise out of and within the scope of his employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special Workers' Compensation Panel is reversed. Because the trial court made no other factual findings, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make factual findings regarding: (1) the compensable medical benefits due to the appellant; (2) the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Long is entitled, and; (3) the proper permanent disability award to which Mr. Long is entitled. Additionally, in the interest of expediting the payment of Mr. Long's medical expenses and the receipt of disability benefits, we direct the trial court to hold such hearing within sixty days of the date of this Court's order.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding that his statement taken by law enforcement officers did not violate his constitutional rights. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Donald P. Wilcox, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his request for probation for his guilty pleas to violating a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony; violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of alprazolam pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Tommy William Davis, was convicted of Class D theft of property over $1,000 and was sentenced to a term of six years incarceration, as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s proof, and he challenges the length of his sentence as premised on an invalid enhancement factor. Our review convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and that, although improper enhancement factors were applied, a sentence of six years is appropriate.

While I concur with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for theft of property over $1,000, I reach that result from a somewhat different approach than that taken in the principal opinion. The majority concludes that the defendant’s presence in and operation of a borrowed vehicle is sufficient proof to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband contained therein. Concededly, this has been the conclusion reached by this Court in a number of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146, at *111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, having re-read the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2001), I am convinced that mere presence in and operation of a vehicle containing contraband is, without other proof of a power or intention on the part of the defendant to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, insufficient to establish “constructive possession.” Nevertheless, I believe that the record of the instant case provides sufficient other proof that, when coupled with the proof of the defendant’s presence in and operation of the vehicle containing contraband, establishes the constructive possession necessary in this case to sustain a theft conviction.

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Pointer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a violent offender to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his person and his home, in ruling that his prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes, in allowing testimony of a prior violent incident between him and the victim, and, additionally, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial during jury voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Luna, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial because the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by a non-responsive answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.