APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charles E. Delapp, Jr., a.k.a. Charles E. Jackson, Jr., appeals as of right his conviction by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury for reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the resulting five-year, six-month sentence. He contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The defendant pled guilty to violating a habitual traffic offender order and to a second offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Pursuant to his plea agreement the defendant received a sentence of three years as a multiple offender for violating the habitual traffic offender order and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the second offense of driving under the influence. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently. At the conclusion of a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for probation or any other form of alternative sentencing. Through the instant appeal the defendant challenges this denial. After reviewing the facts and relevant caselaw, we find the denial appropriate concerning the violation of the habitual traffic offender judgment and, therefore, affirm the trial court's determination in this regard. We also affirm the denial of alternative sentencing with respect to the defendant's second offense of driving under the influence. However, because of a conflict between the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the judgment, we remand this case for correction of the judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Reginol L. Waters, of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-three years for the first count of aggravated rape, twenty-five years for the second count of aggravated rape, ten years for aggravated robbery, and as a Range II offender to ten years for aggravated burglary. The trial court further ordered the two sentences for aggravated rape and the sentence for aggravated burglary be served consecutively and the sentence for aggravated robbery be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of fifty-eight years. In this appeal of right, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress testimony regarding the "showup" identification of the defendant; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the defendant's statements to the police; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the tape recording of the victim's telephone call to the police; (4) whether the state failed to establish a proper chain of custody for evidence found during a search of the defendant's vehicle; (5) whether the two convictions for aggravated rape should be merged; (6) whether the conviction for aggravated burglary violates due process because it was incidental to the offenses of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery; and (7) whether the sentences are excessive. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Buford Barrett, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child and resulting twenty-year sentence. He claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) refused to let him testify at trial; (2) failed to subpoena his cousin, who could have testified that the petitioner was not present when the alleged crime occurred; (3) failed to request a DNA test for the victim; and (4) failed to investigate the facts surrounding a statement that his wife gave to the police in which she admitted that she had sexually abused the victim. In addition, the petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of his attorney's deficiencies prevented him from receiving a fair trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

Defendant, Anthony "Tony" Sandy, was indicted by the Lawrence County Grand Jury for first degree murder. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range I standard offender, to serve four years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of $10,000, which was assessed by the jury. In this appeal as of right, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Sammy D. Childers, appeals his jury convictions for two counts of aggravated assault. Following these convictions, the Circuit Court of Hardin County sentenced Childers to concurrent sentences of five years, with ninety days to be served in confinement, followed by four years and nine months of supervised probation. On appeal, Childers raises one issue for our review; whether he is entitled to a new trial because of alleged juror misconduct. After reviewing the record before us, we find this issue to be without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marcus Webb, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's jury instruction defining the mens rea of "knowing." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for driving on a revoked license, driving on a revoked license second offense, evading arrest, and reckless driving. After the State presented its proof at trial, the trial court entered judgments of acquittal for the charges of evading arrest and reckless driving. At the conclusion of the trial, a Marion County jury convicted the Defendant of driving on a revoked license and assessed a fine of $500. The Defendant waived a jury as to the second offense driving on a revoked license, and the trial court found him guilty. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for second offense driving on a revoked license and ordered that the sentence be served on probation except for thirty days to be served in the county jail. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a Tennessee Department of Safety driving record as proof of the Defendant's prior conviction for driving on a revoked license. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Clazelle Jennings,1 of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for aggravated robbery and four years for each of the aggravated assaults. On appeal, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault upon the same victim violate double jeopardy; and (4) whether the sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse and dismiss one of the aggravated assault convictions due to a double jeopardy violation. We remand for a clerical correction of the remaining aggravated assault judgment. We affirm in all other respects.

Defendant, Kenneth King, was convicted of burglary of a building and was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a career offender. Defendant now appeals his conviction alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mental evaluation prior to trial to determine Defendant's competency to stand trial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Andrew Nicholson, Jr., appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he was not effectively represented by counsel at his trial and on direct appeal. He also claims that his due process rights were impaired at trial when the court interrupted a defense witness's testimony and played an audio recording of the defendant's statement to the police for the witness. Because the record supports neither allegation, we affirm the lower court's order denying relief.

Joshua S. Grubb appeals from the Anderson County Criminal Court's imposition of incarcerative sentencing for his three aggravated burglary and three theft convictions. Contending that the lower court erroneously denied him probation, he asks us to reverse the sentencing orders entered below. We are, however, unpersuaded of the defendant's worthiness for probationary sentences and, therefore, affirm the lower court's judgments.

The trial jury convicted the defendant, Jimmy Ray Cureton, of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. However, the trial court amended the defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction to attempted aggravated robbery based on the wording of the defendant's indictment. This Court subsequently reversed the trial court, finding that the indictment language was sufficient to allege attempted especially aggravated robbery. See State v. Cureton, 38 S.W.3d 64, 83-84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). We remanded the case for re-sentencing, and, upon remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve ten years for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction consecutively to his life sentence for the felony murder conviction. The defendant now brings this direct appeal contending that his sentence is both (1) excessive and (2) improper because his indictment alleges that he merely committed attempted aggravated robbery. After reviewing the procedural history of this case and the record of the sentencing hearing, we find that neither of the defendant's allegations merits relief.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Donald Johnson, Jr., of first degree murder in perpetration of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, this court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for findings relating to the motion to suppress the defendant's statements to police officers. Upon remand, the trial court made additional findings and again denied the motion. Upon reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.