APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Memphis Bonding Company appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's order denying its petitions for exoneration of liability for the defendant Howard C. Covington's bail bonds for various offenses. Because the record fails to reflect that this case is properly before us as a rightful appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

Bonding company for absconded defendant appeals final forfeiture of bond and alleges that its agents were without authority to issue an alleged illegal bond. Concluding that bonding company's employee had authority to act, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After failing to report to his arrest house and failing a drug screen, defendant's sentence in the Community Corrections Program was revoked, and defendant appealed the revocation. The record contains substantial evidence to support the revocation. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Joe Hibbler, III's petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the Shelby County Criminal Court following an evidentiary hearing. Because the record supports the lower court's determination that the petitioner did not demonstrate the ineffective assistance of counsel by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted of one count of theft of property, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal simulation, one count of evading arrest, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The criminal simulation convictions were merged by the trial court, and the defendant was sentenced as follows: four years for theft of property, four years for criminal simulation, ten years for aggravated assault, and eleven months and twenty nine days for both evading arrest and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for theft, criminal simulation, and evading arrest. He also alleges that the trial court failed to exclude from evidence hearsay testimony and statements to law enforcement in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Further, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted criminal simulation. Finally, the defendant challenges the length and manner of service of his sentences. After a review of the record, we reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction of criminal simulation. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Madison County deputy jailer saw a plastic bag of 2.5 grams of cocaine fall from the defendant's crotch area as he removed his clothing for a strip search after his arrest for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony. He argues on appeal that he cannot be convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution when his entrance into the jail was involuntary, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Based on our review of the record and of applicable law, we conclude that a voluntary entrance into a penal institution is not a requirement of the offense, and that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the defendant's convictions in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Earl Turner, appeals as of right from the judgment of the trial court, which found him to be in violation of the terms of the probation he was serving for two separate, non-related convictions. After a hearing, the trial judge ordered the Defendant incarcerated for the balance of the sentences, which were being served consecutively to each other. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to the offense of carjacking and was sentenced to 7.2 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal he claims that he was improperly denied probation because the trial judge mistakenly held that individuals convicted of carjacking were statutorily ineligible for probation. We hold that the legislature has allowed individuals convicted of carjacking and sentenced to eight (8) years or less to remain eligible for probation. Moreover, the trial judge also erred in determining that the use of a weapon in a carjacking was, standing alone, sufficient reason to deny the defendant probation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree murder, and the State elected to seek the death penalty in this case. Following the guilt phase of the defendant's bifurcated trial, the trial jury convicted him as charged. At the close of the sentencing phase, the trial jury further found that the evidence supported the existence of the alleged aggravating factor but concluded that this factor did not outweigh the mitigating factors. The jury, therefore, sentenced the defendant to serve a life term without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the defendant filed a new trial motion which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in barring him from the courtroom because of his outbursts in the jury's presence; (3) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after deciding that the defendant could not be present at his trial because of these outbursts; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting three letters written by the defendant; and (5) that the prosecution, in its closing argument, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense by commenting on a witness mentioned by the defense in its opening statement but not called to testify at trial. Upon reviewing these issues, we find that none merit relief and, therefore, affirm the defendant's conviction.

The Appellant, Travis Jones, Jr., appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On March 22, 2000, Jones, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, entered "best interest" pleas to two counts of second degree murder. As provided by the plea agreement, Jones was sentenced by the Davidson County Criminal Court to consecutive fifteen-year terms for each conviction. On appeal, Jones challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition, arguing that he was "forced" into pleading guilty due to trial counsel's inadequate pre-trial preparation. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Timothy Roberson, was convicted in 1995 of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, receiving respective sentences, to be served consecutively, of life without parole and fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal of his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the order denying the petition.

The defendant, Gerald E. Saylor, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years imprisonment. The defendant appeals, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; (3) the trial court erred in excluding testimony that several hours before the killing the victim had stated to a third party that he was going to kill the defendant; (4) the trial court erred in excluding testimony to rebut the state's inference that the defendant planted weapons on the victim and that the victim had made prior threats to the defendant; (5) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when the jury heard references to his being "on parole" and "on the run"; and (6) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors to his sentence. Although we conclude that enhancement factor (5) regarding exceptional cruelty should not have been applied, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.