APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Hamadi G. Haley, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder, 17 years for the especially aggravated robbery, and eight years for the aggravated robbery, with all terms to be served concurrently. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that he was denied access to material witnesses by the state and that he should have been granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary and possession of burglary tools. After a review of the record, we conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by the State’s failure to redact an obscure reference to the defendant’s probation status from an audio taped statement that was played at trial. However, we are unable to find sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had a hammer and screwdriver in his automobile with the intent to commit burglary. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor, is reversed and dismissed. The aggravated burglary conviction is affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher Campbell, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court following his jury conviction for aggravated robbery. At sentencing, the trial court ordered that Campbell's eight-year sentence in this case be served consecutively to three prior convictions for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Campbell argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Because the trial court failed to recite any reasons for imposing consecutive sentences as required by Rule 32, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, we are unable to perform appellate review of the sentencing issue. Accordingly, the case is remanded for determination of consecutive sentencing as provided by Rule 32.

The Appellant, Nakia Rumph, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Rumph pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, Rumph challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Johnny Moffitt, entered a plea of guilt to second degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. By agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court should have dismissed the charge due to the loss or destruction of evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Elwood Jeffrey Barrigher, appeals the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the Community Corrections program and reinstating his original nine-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Prior to his revocation, Barrigher was serving a nine-year Community Corrections sentence, which stemmed from his 1999 class B felony conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the revocation.

The appellant, Jacky E. Jones, was found guilty by a jury in the Blount County Circuit Court of one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Blount County Jail. The trial court later granted the appellant probation. Months into the service of his probationary sentence, the appellant stopped reporting to his probation officer. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and sentenced him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sentence him to community corrections after revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his convictions of rape of a child and incest. We conclude that the State did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony on direct examination. In addition, the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him or to an impartial jury when the trial court denied his request to question a non-witness about an alleged statement made out-of-court. Furthermore, the State was not obligated to disclose the contents of a Department of Human Services file requested by the defendant under Brady v. Maryland or Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We must, however, reverse the defendant's conviction of incest and remand for a new trial on Count Two based upon the State's failure to make a proper election for the offense. We, therefore, affirm the rape of a child conviction, reverse the conviction of incest, and remand for a new trial.