APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Williamson County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram of marijuana nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. Through counsel the defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence or statements resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional search of the defendant's vehicle. When the motion to suppress was denied, the defendant waived his right to a trial by jury and pled guilty as charged. For this offense the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years, which would be suspended after the service of one hundred days, day for day; placed him on supervised probation for a period of four years; and fined him five thousand dollars. According to the Negotiated Plea Agreement form, there was also an agreement with the State that the defendant would later submit a certified question of law to this Court. Through this appeal the defendant asks us to consider two search related issues. However, the State asserts that the defendant did not properly reserve the certified questions, and, thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Finding the State's position has merit, we, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Although I agree with Judge Welles that it is problematic to use voluntary
manslaughter as the intermediate offense for the purposes of applying the Williams harmless error rule, I concur with Judge Riley in affirming the conviction, based on the facts of the present case and the defendant’s use of those facts in formulating a theory of defense. Given the facts, the defendant’s theory of defense, and the jury’s verdict of second-degree murder, I conclude that the failure to charge the included offenses lesser than voluntary manslaughter was harmless error.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court’s erroneous failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Appellant, Barry N. Waddell, proceeding pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found Waddell's petition was time-barred. On appeal, Waddell argues that: (1) his petition was timely filed, and (2) alternatively, if the petition was untimely filed, the statute of limitations was tolled under the holding of Dexter Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. In a timely appeal to this court, the petitioner raises the issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving while license suspended, revoked, or cancelled, third offense, a Class B misdemeanor. On appeal to this court, he argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial and in admitting expert testimony on breath alcohol testing devices. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the defendant's convictions resulted from jury verdicts, rather than guilty pleas.

A Carroll County jury convicted the appellant, Marion Lee Chapman, of one (1) count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, suspended after serving ten (10) days in confinement. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance on the day of trial. We hold that the appellant has waived this issue for failing to prepare an adequate record for this Court's review. In addition, we conclude that, based on the limited record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey E. Dunlap, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.