APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense, and driving on a revoked license, second offense. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and he subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge refused to recuse himself; and that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence. We affirm the denial of the Defendant's request for post-conviction relief.

We affirm the defendant’s convictions of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder and the death sentence imposed on the murder charge, despite the defendant’s claims that: (1) the trial court erroneously disallowed expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification; (2) the jury’s capital sentencing verdict was infirm; (3) the trial court erroneously allowed the impeachment of a defense character witness during the penalty phase of the trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence that related to the impact of the victim’s death on persons or institutions other than the victim’s family; (5) the trial court erroneously limited the defendant’s argument to the jury during the penalty phase; (6) cumulative errors require reversal of the death sentence; (7) the Tennessee death penalty statute is, for various reasons, unconstitutional. We find no error and hold that the death penalty in this case was proportionate to the death penalty imposed in similar cases, the sentence was not arbitrarily imposed, and the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance and its finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (1997).

Defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder and received a life sentence. In this appeal, defendant alleges: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress both his oral and written statements given to authorities; and (2) the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges based upon race and gender. Upon our review, we are unable to resolve the suppression issue due to inadequate findings of fact and, therefore, remand for further findings regarding the oral and written statements. We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that there were legitimate race and gender-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. The judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further findings and/or proceedings.

The Defendant, Norman B. Thompson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. We find no abuse of discretion in the revocation; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s probation.

In 1982, the Petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County to two counts of rape, three counts of robbery, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, four counts of burglary, one count of attempted burglary, one count of first degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, and one count of a crime against nature. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years. In 1991, the Petitioner was convicted in Davidson County of twenty-one counts of rape, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of assault with intent to commit rape. In 1997, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his 1982 convictions and sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement he agreed to a three-year sentence as a Range I Standard Offender, with the manner of service to be determined after a hearing by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 270 days in the workhouse on weekends ("day for day") from 7:00 p.m. on Fridays to 7:00 p.m. on Sundays and five years probation with a 10:00 p.m. curfew on weekdays. The defendant contends he should have received full probation or some other less restrictive form of alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court's denial of full probation but modify the time of service in the workhouse on weekends to 104 days.