APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more (D.U.I. per se) and driving on a revoked license. In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred by admitting the results of his breathalyzer test because the admission of this evidence in a D.U.I per se case violates a defendant's confrontation rights. We hold that the trial court did not err by admitting the Defendant's breath test results. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant's conviction.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the appellant, Douglas Bowers, of one (1) count of the delivery of 0.2 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to nine (9) years and six (6) months incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's request to instruct the jury on the "procuring agent defense"; and (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. Furthermore, because the "procuring agent defense" has been abolished by statute, the trial court did not err in failing to so instruct the jury. Finally, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was appropriate. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant/petitioner, Frank Holiday, appeals as of right from a dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court on the basis that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The petitioner, pro se, presents one appellate issue: Did the trial court err in failing to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing in this matter, in view of the egregious failure of counsel to protect the petitioner's right to an appeal, and if not, is the petitioner entitled to a delayed appeal?

This is a medical malpractice case. The paintiff’s husband died of a cardiac rupture while in the care of the defendant physicians. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit, asserting medical malpractice in the care of her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctors, finding that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony failed to show that a breach of the standard of care by the defendants caused the death of the plaintiff’s husband. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff did not present evidence that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a breach of the standard of care by the defendants caused the death of the decedent. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the trial court is affirmed
 

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is no basis for invalidating the 1993 award to Wife of Husband’s Air Force retirement -- an award made by the trial court “as a division of marital property.” As a part of an unappealed-from final judgment, the trial court’s division-ofproperty award is not subject to challenge in this proceeding, see Vanatta v. Vanatta, 701 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), in the absence of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 basis for relief, and I find no such basis in the meager record before us.

A divorce decree was filed in 1993 with the marital assets being divided by agreement of these parties. The decree awarded Husband’s military retirement benefits to Wife “as a division of marital property.” The decree also provided that inasmuch as Wife was to receive that pension, she should be responsible for the support of the parties’ two minor children. In 1999, after the children reached majority, Husband filed this “Petition to Discontinue Child Support and Modify Final Judgment by Restoring Retirement Benefits.” The Trial Court held that the divorce decree ordered Husband to pay Wife his military pension as a division of marital property, not child support, and therefore declined to modify the original decree. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County which convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for premeditated murder. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was the principal actor in causing the death of the victim. Nevertheless, the court found that his conviction could be sustained under a theory of criminal responsibility for premeditated murder because premeditated murder was a natural and probable consequence of aggravated robbery under the facts of the case. We then granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal. We hold that the natural and probable consequences rule can be used to sustain a defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder based upon criminal responsibility for the conduct of a co-defendant. The jury, however, must be instructed on all elements of a charge of criminal responsibility, including the natural and probable consequences rule. Because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences rule, the defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

In this appeal, we address whether prior inconsistent statements can be used substantively to corroborate a confession when the prior statements are admitted into evidence without objection. We also consider whether the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the limited use of the prior statements constitutes plain error. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that prior inconsistent statements could not be used as substantive evidence and that the failure of the trial court in this case to give a limiting instruction amounted to plain error. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that by not objecting to the admission of the statements, the appellee waived any objection to their use by the jury as substantive evidence to corroborate the appellee’s two confessions. Consequently, we hold that the evidence in this case is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, because the decision to forgo any objection to the hearsay testimony was a deliberate, tactical decision by trial counsel, we are precluded from considering admission of the evidence under a plain error analysis. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the appellee’s conviction and sentence for aggravated sexual battery.