APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, David Remus, appeals the jury verdict of the Shelby County Criminal Court finding him guilty of burglary of a building, a Class D felony.. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years and three months in the county workhouse.  On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the jury’s viewing of the appellant while “shackled;” and (3) the trial court’s application of an enhancement factor in determining the appellant’s sentence.

In this tort action, the defendants appeal from an award of compensatory damages capped by the trial court at $130,000 pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). They also seek to reverse the trial court’s decision to assess them with discretionary costs of $3,440.98. We affirm all of the trial court’s judgment except the award of discretionary costs.

I dissent from the majority opinion affirming the judgment of the Trial Court awarding compensatory damages of $130,000. From my review of the record, Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that Defendant had notice of the condition of the roadway, and therefore I would reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The appellant, James A. Ayers also known as James Harris, appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition as being time-barred. Specifically, he argues that his claim was later arising under Burford and Sands.

The appellant, James Emmett Moses, Jr., a/k/a Ali Hakem Mahammed, appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court following his guilty pleas to the offenses of one count aggravated burglary, two counts of robbery, and one count of theft under $500. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty six years imprisonment.1 On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The defendant, Michael Thomason, appeals as of right his conviction by a Haywood County Circuit Court jury of four counts of sexual battery, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to two years on each of the sexual battery charges; ten years on the aggravated sexual battery charge; and eleven months and twenty-nine days on the misdemeanor count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant presents the following issues for review:

The petitioner, Steven DeWayne Bolden, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Lake County Circuit Court on March 26, 1999. Following a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the jury’s assessment of damages arising out of a premises liability case. Finding the plaintiff to be 49% at fault and the defendant to be 51% at fault, the jury awarded to the plaintiff 51% of the damages that it had assessed. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the jury’s damage award is not supported by material evidence in that it does not include damages for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. We agree with the plaintiff. Therefore, we reverse the jury’s award as to damages and remand this case for a new trial only on the issue of damages.

In Heck van Tran v. State,1 a majority of this Court established the protocol that an inmate sentenced to death must follow to assert a common law and constitutional challenge to his or her competence to be executed. In the context of a Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, I identified three components of the protocol which, when implemented, would each produce an unconstitutional result. Two are most significant: (1) use of the protocol would permit the execution of inmates who are, due to mental defect or disease, unable to consult with and assist their counsel; and (2) use of the protocol would deprive inmates of the right to have the ultimate issue–-competence to be executed-- determined by a jury of their peers.

The defendant, Christopher Walls, appeals from the denial of his motion for reduction of sentence by the Criminal Court of Morgan County. The defendant pleaded guilty to escape, a Class E felony, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-601 (1997), and theft of property valued over $1000, a Class D felony, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 (1997). In accordance with his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve his bargained-for sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. In his appeal, he complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to reduce his sentence. Following a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This is an appeal by the contestant in an election contest brought pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-17-101 to 2-17-116. The trial court dismissed the complaint specifically holding that the mandate of section 17-106, that trial of an election contest “be held no more than fifty days from the date the complaint was filed,” was jurisdictional such that after the expiration of this fifty-day period, the trial court lost jurisdiction.

On December 11, 1998, the defendant, Patricia Spencer, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I Violent Offender to 25 years for the second degree murder and as a Range I Standard Offender to 8 years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery, the sentences to be served concurrently. From this sentencing, the defendant now appeals asserting that the trial court erred in its 25-year sentence for the second degree murder; accordingly, she requests that her sentence be reduced. After careful review, we AFFIRM the sentence as imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Carlous Coman, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On April 19, 1997, the petitioner was convicted by a Madison County jury of second degree murder. For this offense, the defendant, a Range I offender, was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On February 17, 1999, he filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and upon appeal. The trial court denied this petition after a hearing. After careful review, we AFFIRM the order of the trial court denying the petition.

Defendant, Tim D. Smith, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of automobile burglary, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to six years as a career offender. The sole issue in this appeal as of right is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the guilty verdict. After a careful review of the record, we conclude the evidence is indeed sufficient to support the verdict.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, William Padilla, appeals from his Haywood County jury conviction of one count of rape of a child. The defendant received 25 years, the maximum sentence for a Range I standard offender. He appeals this conviction and sentence, arguing that:

(1) The evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; and

(2) the sentence was excessive.

After careful review, we AFFIRM the judgment and sentence from the trial court

The defendant, Marco Boyd, pled guilty to two counts of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies. In his negotiated plea, he agreed to a fine of $500 on each count and two one-year concurrent sentences. The manner of service of the sentences was reserved for a later hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant probation, and from that decision the defendant now appeals. After careful review, we AFFIRM the judgment from the trial court.

The Davidson County Board of Education conducted a termination hearing for a tenured teacher who had been caught on videotape stealing pills from a student’s prescription bottle. After the hearing, the teacher was dismissed -2- from her position. She subsequently filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was dismissed after a Chancery Court hearing. We affirm the Chancery Court.

On April 28, 1997, the appellant, Michael Gerard Coppola, pled guilty in the Benton County Circuit Court to an array of offenses. The plea agreement provided for an effective six-year sentence with the Tennessee Department of Correction (T.D.O.C.) and payment of $3,363.10 of restitution to various victims. In March 1998, appellant completed boot camp and T.D.O.C. released him to probation, the terms of which required payment of the previously ordered restitution. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s revocation of probation for failure to pay restitution. Based upon our conclusion that no probation violation occurred, we REVERSE and REMAND to the trial court.

The petitioner, James Webb, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. We REVERSE the judgment of the trial court and REMAND for appointment of counsel and review of petitioner’s claims.

This is a divorce case. The trial court awarded the husband sole custody of the parties’ children and ordered the wife to pay child support. Supervised visitation was awarded to the wife, and visitation was also awarded to the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother. The trial court also ordered that the marital home be sold, with the proceeds divided between the parties. We affirm the award of custody to the husband, reverse the award of visitation to the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother, reverse the order that the marital home be sold, and remand.
 

The appellant, Byron A. Peete, appeals his conviction in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Pursuant to the appellant’s conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirteen years and six months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction. Although not clearly articulated, his argument appears to encompass the following specific contentions: (1) the evidence presented at trial concerning his low intellectual quotient (I.Q.) precluded a finding that the killing was knowing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (1997); (2) alternatively, in light of the evidence concerning the appellant’s low I.Q., the record demonstrates the provocation required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a) (1997); or (3) in light of the evidence concerning his low I.Q., the record demonstrates that the appellant killed the victim, Terrance Baker, in self-defense within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a) (1997). Following a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kathleen Young-Green appeals from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Shelby County. Her complaint had sought imposition of a constructive trust over assets allegedly procured through the exercise of undue influence. The trial court dismissed the case under Rule 41.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure finding that the Plaintiff had not satisfied her burden of proof. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

A Shelby County jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Defendant received an eight-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, defendant claims (1) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated robbery, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon our review of the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction, and defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Thus, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.