APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value
of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse’s holdings.

Alfred Lee Mauldin appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.

In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.).
aggravating circumstances1 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution on the conviction for first degree murder. On the arson conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years consecutive to the death penalty. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court2 and set for oral argument with respect to eight of the issues raised by the defendant. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds

Plaintiffs Kevin and Patricia Sanders appeal the trial court’s judgment which dismissed their complaint against Defendants/Appellees Lincoln County and Steve Graham, Chairman of the Lincoln County Commission, based upon the court’s rulings that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim against the Defendants and, alternatively, that the Sanders’ equal protection claim was barred by principles of res judicata.1 We conclude that both of these rulings were in error and, thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petition in this case seeks judicial review of real property valuations established by a final order of the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission (“AAC”), a body created by the State Board of Equalization to hear “appeals regarding the assessment, classification and value of property for purposes of taxation.” T.C.A.§ 67-5-1502(a). The AAC’s order in the instant case fixed, for ad valorem tax purposes, the separate values of 15 parcels of Wayne County woodland owned by the petitioner, Willamette Industries, Inc. (“Willamette”). Upon review of the AAC’s order, the trial court held, among other things, that the appraisal methodology utilized by the AAC was not per se contrary to Tennessee law, and that the record contained substantial and material evidence to support the AAC’s valuations based upon that methodology. Accordingly, it affirmed the AAC’s order. Willamette appeals, raising the following issues for our consideration:

The Wilson County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) denied the petition of Wilson County Youth Emergency Shelter, Inc. (“the Shelter”) for a use on review to construct a group home on 5.46 acres of property in Wilson County. The Shelter proposes to move its existing facility in the county to the new location. On petition for certiorari, the trial court affirmed the action of the BZA. The Shelter appeals, arguing that the BZA’s decision was illegal, arbitrary, and beyond its jurisdiction. By way of a separate issue, the Shelter argues that there is no material evidence to support the BZA’s denial of its petition.

This appeal involves jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Defendant/appellant, John W. Scherer, Jr. (Scherer), appeals the order of the trial court awarding plaintiff/appellee, United Agricultural Services, Inc. (Ag Services), damages for breach of contract.

In this action alleging breach of contract, the Trial Judge granted the plaintiff summary judgment for damages for breach of contract in the amount of $12,180.24. Defendant has appealed.

This is an action to enforce an arbitration award. Plaintiff/appellant, D & E Construction Company (D&E), appeals the order of the Chancery Court vacating an arbitration award rendered against defendant/appellee, Robert J. Denley Company (Denley).

In this capital case, the appellant, Gaile K. Owens, appeals as of right the judgment of the Criminal Court of Shelby County denying her petition for postconviction relief. In 1986, the appellant was convicted of accessory before the fact to first degree murder. In a joint trial, the appellant’s co-defendant, Sidney Porterfield, was also convicted of first degree murder and following a separate sentencing hearing, both were sentenced to death by electrocution. The appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.), reh’g denied, (1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756 (1988).

This is a suit in chancery for declaratory judgment relative to a policy of insurance. The primary question presented is whether or not participation by the insured in a motorbike event known as an "enduro" constitutes "racing" within the meaning of an exclusion in the policy. After the insured died from injuries he received while participatingin an "enduro," the defendant insurance company denied coverage. The lower court found that the particular loss in this case was excluded from coverage. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this action filed against TFE, Inc. (hereafter “TFE”), Michael King appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to TFE as related to King’s claims for breach of an alleged employment contract. The trial court granted TFE’s motion for summary judgment based on the court’s conclusion that an employee handbook distributed by TFE did not constitute an employment contract. For the reasons hereafter stated, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

This case involves the refusal of the Metropolitan Department of Codes Administration ("the Department") to issue building permits to the petitioner/appellant landowner. Planning to divide and sell his land, the petitioner made preparations to subdivide this land pursuant to the Department's advice on how to avoid regulation by the Metropolitan Planning Commission ("MPC"). However, due to a new interpretation of existing statutory law, the petitioner's preparations, once completed, were no longer adequate and the Department deemed that the land must undergo review before the MPC as a subdivision. Consequently, the zoning administrator of the Department denied the petitioner the building permits and the petitioner brought suit claiming first that the division of land was not a "subdivision" as that term is defined by statute. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the zoning administrator's application of the newly-interpreted law to him violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and effected against him the application of a retrospective law. In addition, the appellant claimed that the Department should be equitably estopped from refusing to issue the building permits. The trial court granted the Department's motion for involuntary dismissal of the petitioner's case. We affirm the decision of the trial court on all issues.

This case represents an appeal from the grant of divorce upon stipulation of grounds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129. The parties to this action, Terry David Mackie ("Husband"), and Sarah Catherine Campbell Mackie ("Wife") were married on November 6, 1984. Husband filed a complaint in Williamson County Circuit Court on March 6, 1997, seeking divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. On March 20, 1997, Wife answered and counterclaimed. In her answer, Wife admitted the ground of irreconcilable differences and alleged inappropriate marital conduct on the part of the Husband. Over the next 14 months the parties participated in successive proceedings regarding pendente lite custody of their severely ill minor child. The case was originally set for trial on June 3, 1997. Both parties agreed to continue the case; each sought a scheduling order for the sequence of discovery. The parties were ordered to attend mediation on February 23, 1998. On May 18, 1998, Husband moved to change pendente lite custody and to compel discovery. This motion was to be heard on June 3, 1998. At the June 3, hearing, in an admittedly unorthodox proceeding, the parties stipulated under oath that each had grounds for divorce. At this point in the hearing, both parties were sent into an antechamber to provide for the division of the marital estate and custody of the child. These negotiations are documented in handwritten notes, signed by the parties and their counsel, and appearing in the record.

A construction company sued a hotelkeeper for payment of the balance due on their contract. The trial court ordered the hotelkeeper to pay the balance, as well as pre-judgment interest and attorney fees. We affirm the award of pre-judgment interest, but we reverse the award of attorney fees. We also reverse a $500 offset the trial court granted to the defendant for the plaintiff’s alleged failure to complete a punch list.

The plaintiffs, a mother and her son owning adjoining farms on a rural road in Maury County, sued the county for a nuisance created when the county improved the road. The county argued that the exclusive remedy was for inverse condemnation, and that the one year statute of limitations barred the action. On appeal the county asserts, in addition to its original defense, that the damages awarded were beyond the range of reasonableness. We reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Michael and Caroline Newcomb and Darden and Ann Davis, from the decision of the Davidson County Chancery Court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants/appellees William and Lois Gonser. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

Two of the beneficiaries of a will sued the witnesses and a notary public because the will was not properly executed. The plaintiffs also sued a bank, the witnesses’ employer, for not training its employees on how to properly witness wills.  The Chancery Court of Sumner County granted the defendants summary judgment.  We affirm.

Defendant Terry Muncey appeals, and Plaintiff Tim Taylor cross-appeals, the trial court’s judgment awarding Muncey $1000 in damages on his counterclaim for wrongful injunction against Taylor. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that Muncey failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of his claim for wrongful injunction.