APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Weakley County jury convicted the defendant, Donald L. Elliott, of resisting arrest for which he received a sentence of six months with all but seven days suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the jury’s verdict.

The Petitioner, Juan LaSean Perry, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He asserts on appeal, as he did in his petition, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment for second degree murder. He also asserts for the first time that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors during sentencing. Following careful review, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.

The plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his petition to quiet title based on res judicata and waiver. This is the fourth action between the parties, or their privies, involving real property the plaintiff lost in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2012. The first three actions were decided on the merits adversely to the plaintiff. Following the dismissal of the third action regarding the same real property, the parties entered into a settlement agreement wherein the plaintiff consented to the sale of the property to the defendant and waived all claims that had been or could have been asserted in relation to the real property. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title to the same real property. Upon the motion of the defendant that had purchased the property, the trial court summarily dismissed the action. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed by an inmate, Allen C. Bond (“Petitioner”), against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), concerning the calculation of Petitioner’s sentence and whether he had been awarded the correct number of pretrial credits.  The Trial Court dismissed Petitioner’s complaint for declaratory judgment upon its finding that TDOC had calculated Petitioner’s sentence in compliance with the criminal court’s most recent judgment.  Discerning no error, we affirm. 

This appeal arises from a health care liability action. Darryl G. Rush-Mack (“Decedent”) died while receiving care at Baptist Memorial Hospital (“the Hospital”). Alvin Mack (“Mr. Mack”), Kevin Mack, and Darwisha Mack Williams (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued the Hospital and Dr. Aaron Kuperman (“Dr. Kuperman”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Thirty days from entry of the order passed without Plaintiffs filing a notice of appeal. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to set aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 asserting that the order was not stamped to be mailed until six days after it was filed and it went to a PO Box Plaintiffs’ counsel does not use for business. The Trial Court granted the motion and entered a new order of dismissal, from which Mr. Mack appeals. We find that Mr. Mack failed to meet the clear and convincing evidentiary burden necessary for Rule 60.02 relief; indeed, the Trial Court relied only upon statements of counsel rather than evidence. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ Rule 60.02 motion.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Termaine York, of first degree premeditated murder for a shooting he committed at his former workplace. The Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of first degree premeditated murder because the State failed to establish premeditation. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Rutherford County jury convicted Defendant, John Dennis Green, of aggravated assault and domestic assault, for which the trial court imposed an effective three-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Upon a petition for common law certiorari filed by a community organization comprised of several homeowners’ associations and individual homeowners, the trial court reversed a decision by the Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) affirming the Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission’s approval of the respondent developer’s neighborhood development plan. The trial court determined the BZA’s decision to be illegal upon finding that the development plan included an on-site wastewater treatment plant in violation of the applicable zoning ordinance. The trial court subsequently denied cross-motions to alter or amend the judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Echols, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for advising the Petitioner not to testify at trial and for failing to timely file a motion for new trial. However, because the Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal document and the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the timely filing requirement in this case, this appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Marcus Johnson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for relief from his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault and his effective life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his Rule 36.1 illegal sentence, habeas corpus, and post-conviction claims. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case in order for the trial court to enter an order reflecting findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each claim for relief.

The Petitioner, DeShawn McClenton, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging that the trial court used four judgments of conviction from a prior case that were void on their face to sentence him as a career offender in the present case, which rendered the judgments of conviction in the present case void. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals the denial. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

Defendant, Jessie James Somerville, IV, was indicted by the Lauderdale County Grand Jury for one count of premeditated first degree murder and one count of felony reckless endangerment. Defendant entered no contest pleas to second degree murder and felony reckless endangerment. On the day of Defendant’s scheduled sentencing hearing, Defendant made an oral motion to withdraw his pleas, which the trial court took under advisement and subsequently denied by written order. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to serve concurrent sentences of 22 years for his second degree murder conviction and one year for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his pleas and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

John Ingram, Defendant, pled guilty to several offenses including one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault, with a total effective sentence of seven years, as a Range II offender. The trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentence after a sentencing hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing, concluding that Defendant’s prior criminal history and failed attempts at conditions involving release into the community rendered him an unfavorable candidate for an alternative sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This divorce action concerns the trial court’s valuation and division of the marital estate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

A woman against whom the trial court granted an order of protection appeals the order of protection. The trial court granted the order based upon its finding that the woman, a former girlfriend of the petitioner’s husband, threatened the petitioner and her husband with physical violence through a series of videos. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ladarius Sankevious Foster, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of failure to maintain lane, possession of drug paraphernalia, and theft of property, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with the Defendant to serve ten days in jail and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-123, 39-17-425(a), 39-14-103. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and theft of property, and (2) the trial court failed to conduct an independent assessment of the fines fixed by the jury in this case. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The plaintiff commenced the instant action by causing a detainer warrant to be filed against the defendant in the Shelby County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) on September 23, 2019, alleging that the defendant had been unlawfully inhabiting the residence at issue. The general sessions court subsequently entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, determining that she had submitted sufficient proof to demonstrate superior ownership of the residence. The defendant has appealed. However, due to significant deficiencies in the defendant’s brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Charles Nesbit (“Employee”) worked as a bucket truck driver for Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division (“Employer”). Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for a gradually occurring injury to his knees. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the trial court found Employee suffered a compensable gradually occurring injury at work, and gave timely notice of his claim. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We find that Employee did not give timely notice of his claim, and we reverse the judgment.

Charles Hopper filed this workers’ compensation action after suffering a work-related injury to his neck. The trial court found that Mr. Hopper is permanently and totally disabled. Employer concedes that Mr. Hopper suffered a work-related injury but argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment as to permanent and total disability. Employer also argues that any award should be limited to 1.5 times the impairment rating. The appeal has been referred to this Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

On June 24, 2015, Terrell Lamont Reid (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pursuant to the criminal gang enhancement statute, the firearm offense was enhanced from a Class C to a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-121(b) (2014). On April 7, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process. See State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 158-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner did not file a post-conviction petition challenging his guilty plea. Instead, the Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”), arguing that the intermediate appellate court’s decision declaring the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional rendered his sentence illegal. The trial court denied his motion, concluding it did not state a claim for relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the Bonds decision rendered the Petitioner’s sentence for the firearm conviction void and, thus, illegal under Rule 36.1. In accordance with this Court’s holding in Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83-85 (Tenn. 1999), we hold that the Petitioner’s sentence was voidable, not void and illegal. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decision and reinstate the trial court’s order denying the Petitioner’s motion.

In this termination of parental rights case, the child was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because the child’s parents were incarcerated. The mother’s parental rights were later terminated based upon the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence regarding two statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A former county commissioner appeals the trial court’s decision finding him liable for defamatory statements made about a private individual during a county legislative meeting. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse.

Appellants, purchasers of a residential property, filed an action against Appellees, sellers and owners of the residential construction company that built the subject property, for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”) and intentional misrepresentation for failure to disclose water damage and substandard repairs to the property. Appellants also sued a termite inspection company for negligently failing to disclose termite damage to the property. Appellants settled with the termite company for $45,000.00 but proceeded to trial against Appellees. Although the trial court found that Appellees intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property to Appellants, it found that Appellants were not “consumers” under the TCPA, and that the Act did not apply to this real estate transaction. The trial court awarded Appellants a $43,811.00 judgment against Appellees, for intentionally failing to disclose the water damage to the property, but found that Appellants had been fully compensated for their loss from the settlement with the termite company. As such, Appellants were not entitled to further compensatory damages from Appellees. We conclude the trial court erred in finding that Appellants were not consumers under the Act and that the TCPA was not applicable to this real estate transaction. We remand for a determination of whether Appellees violated the Act, and, if so, whether Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and treble damages. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

The petitioner, Earley Story, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Shelby County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists which is material to his case. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Terrell Jackson, of two counts of aggravated rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends the statute of limitations was not tolled during the period of time he was involuntarily residing in Louisiana, and therefore, his prosecution was barred. The defendant also argues the State delayed the testing of the victim’s rape kit to obtain a tactical advantage. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.