APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal of a judgment entered against Father for child support arrearage. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, sought a modification of the judgment against Father under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure due to an alleged erroneous calculation of child support owed by Father. The trial court granted the State’s motion, increasing the amount of the arrearage judgment owed by Father. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the State relief under Rule 60.02.

Raymond Watison, Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”), claiming newly discovered evidence. The State moved to dismiss the Petition. The trial court found that the Petition failed to state a colorable claim and that it was not timely filed and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm.

Defendant, Christopher W. Gadsden, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 24 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with 100 percent release eligibility. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; 2) the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs into evidence; 3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a prior bad act by the victim; and 4) his sentence is excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deterrio Harrison, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, for which he received a twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, a sister contests the sale of her deceased brother’s interest in real estate they inherited from their mother to satisfy an outstanding judgment lien against the brother. Because the sister waives her right to appellate review of most of her arguments and we discern no error in the circuit court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the circuit court.

The defendant, Justin W. Walkington, appeals his Giles County Circuit Court jury conviction of child abuse of a child under the age of eight, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that child abuse was a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, that the trial court’s child abuse instruction actually charged the elements of child neglect, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant any form of alternative sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that child abuse was a lesser included offense in this case because the evidence was legally insufficient to support that charge. Additionally, the trial court’s instruction on the offense of child abuse erroneously included the elements of child neglect, which charge was also unsupported by the evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of either child abuse or child neglect but was sufficient to support a conviction of simple assault by offensive touching, we reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction of child abuse and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the offense of Class B misdemeanor assault and the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the new conviction offense and sentence.

Ramell Martez Jackson, Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of theft of property, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in a drug free zone, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant received an effective sentence of five years. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves a maternal grandmother’s objection to the denial of her petition for custody of her minor grandchild and his adoption by his foster parents. We affirm.

The defendant, John Edward Wilson, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated burglary and indecent exposure for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ confinement. The defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of diversion and other forms of alternative sentencing, claiming the trial court erred in failing to properly analyze the diversion factors and failing to apply the correct legal standard when ordering confinement rather than probation. The State contends the defendant failed to show he was a favorable candidate for diversion, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering confinement. Upon our review of the applicable law, the record, and the arguments of the parties, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

A husband sought relief from a final decree of divorce nine years after its entry. He argued that the decree was void because the trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the husband’s motion. We affirm. 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Ricky Boyd, of attempted second degree murder, aggravated rape, and rape. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the aggravated rape and rape convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to quash the Appellant’s subpoena duces tecum seeking “the District Attorney’s records concerning the time that [the Appellant’s] case was presented” to the grand jury; (3) the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s request to review the victim’s mental health records; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim regarding her history of audio and visual hallucinations and her refusal to take medication to treat her condition; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the case or give a Ferguson instruction based upon the State’s failure to preserve evidence that might play a significant role in the defense; (6) the State’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (7) “the trial court erred by considering a prior charged offense during its deliberations as to sentencing even though the [Appellant] [pled] guilty to a lesser charge of aggravated assault and no factual basis surrounding the negotiated plea [was] entered into evidence.” Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Demonica Gore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to defense counsel’s question during voir dire concerning the juror’s views on police confessions; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence of twelve-years’ imprisonment. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental right to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (3) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit and support. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  

The petitioner was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. Since his conviction in 1994, the petitioner has filed numerous post-judgment motions seeking relief. The petitioner now appeals from the denial of his most recent motion seeking relief pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60.02. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Lee Carter, pleaded guilty to evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture; and he received an effective sentence of eight years on probation. A revocation warrant was issued, and following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of theRules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal arises out of a dispute concerning an express, ingress and egress easement across the defendant’s property. The principal issue is whether the plaintiff abandoned the easement by failing to maintain the easement in a condition permitting it to be used for access and/or by acquiescing in the acts of others that reduced the utility of the easement. Following a bench trial, the court determined the defendant failed to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings by the trial court, we affirm. 

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from a judgment entered against him in the Knox County General Sessions Court. Appellant’s Rule 60.02 motion was filed approximately 8 years after the judgment was entered, and the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction based on the expiration of the 10-day time period set out in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 16-15- 727(b). Appellant’s motion was premised on his contention that he was never served with process in the general sessions court and, as such, the judgment was void ab initio. We conclude that the 10-day statutory time period does not preclude the trial court’s jurisdiction to address Rule 60.02 motions based on a void judgment. However, we do not reach the ultimate question of whether Appellant is entitled to such relief because there is a dispute of fact regarding whether proper service was achieved. This dispute must be resolved by the trial court in order to determine whether Rule 60.02(3) relief is warranted. Vacated and remanded.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2); (2) mental incompetence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

A Tipton County jury convicted Petitioner, Angela Brewer, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed her conviction and sentence. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on her claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to consult with Petitioner regarding the evidence and to secure a firearms expert to testify for the defense. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s order setting aside his transfer of real property as a fraudulent conveyance. We do not reach the substantive issue because Appellant’s notice of appeal is untimely, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Dismissed.

Defendant, Kenneth Lamar Bugg, appeals the order of the Giles County Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Defendant arguesthat the trial court erred by consideringevidenceof “non-adjudicated charges”that were pending against him,as a basis to revoke his probation. Hefurther contends that the trial court’s decision to fully revoke his probation was “too great a punishment for a first violation of probation.” Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrance Milam, entered a best interest plea to two counts of rape of a child, involving two separate victims, and the trial court sentenced him to serve forty years, at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to inform him of his right to appeal and to request that the trial court appoint appellate counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed his petition, and the Petitioner timely appealed. After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for the appointment of counsel, entry of a certified question of law, and grant of a delayed appeal.

The Defendant, Carl R. Greene, was convicted upon his guilty plea of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103(a) (2018); 39-14-105(a)(5) (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft).The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to split confinement consisting of one year in jail followed by eight years on community corrections. The court ordered the Defendant to pay restitution of $83,457.60. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by imposing a nine-year, split confinement sentence and by failing to consider the Defendant’s ability to pay the restitution amount. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.