APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant Raymond D. Lane appeals a jury verdict awarding $297,000.00 to Plaintiff Pamela L. Schenk for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident occurring between Lane and Schenk. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in all respects.

Mark Crites appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He challenges both the propriety of that revocation and his resentencing, arguing that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence; (2) the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors and that his sentences are, therefore, excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. After careful review of the record and arguments of counsel, we conclude the trial court relied upon improper evidence in revoking the community corrections sentence. We remand for another revocation hearing.

This appeal involves an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, John and Frankie Belcher (Belcher), appeal the decision of the trial court granting the plaintiffs, Gordon Carroll (Carroll) and Ora Hall (Hall), the right to widen an easement running over their property.

The defendant, Roy D. Nelson, stands convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and possession of marijuana as a result of his efforts to blow up his ex-wife's home. Nelson received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Washington County Criminal Court. A Range III offender, Nelson is presently serving an effective 62-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crimes. In this direct appeal, Nelson claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated arson because he, rather than another person, suffered the serious bodily injury relied upon to elevate the offense from arson to aggravated arson. Having reviewed the appellate record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gary June Caughron, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial. He was convicted in 1990 for the first degree murder of Ann Robertson Jones and received the death penalty. He was also convicted of first degree burglary and assault with the intent to commit rape for which he received consecutive ten-year sentences. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993).

We have reviewed the Petition to Rehear filed on behalf of the Attorney General and conclude that the Petition should be denied for the following reasons.

This is an appeal from a memorandum and order of the chancellor affirming and adopting the Special Master's report pursuant to Rule 53 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue is whether the lower court erred in this action. Our review is de novo upon the record accompanied by a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact by the chancellor. Tenn.R.App.P.13(d).

In this divorce case, Glenda Benning (wife) challenges the trial court's award of permanent alimony to James Benning (husband). After the file filed for divorce and the parties separated, the hisband moved into the same apartment with one Jaylene Deen. On appeal, the wife argues that the tril court erred in finding that the statutory presumption fond at  T.C .A . § 36 - 5 - 10 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) had been rebutted by the evidence presented by the husband. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a judgment. Defendant/cross-plaintiff,Charles Campbell (Campbell), appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding money damages to The day of trial, Prince filed a motion to amend the complaint to reduce the amount requested as damages from $97,000 to $77,000. There is no record as to the trial court’s action plaintiff/cross-defendant, James Prince (Prince). This case arose from a contract entered into between the parties in April 1995 in which Campbell agreed to transfer a limousine from his business to Prince in exchange for the opportunity to run Prince’s “World Famous Stagecoach Lounge.” Prince filed suit against Campbell for breach of contract and fraud in August 1995 alleging that Campbell failed to make lease payments on the property and refused to transfer the limousine agreed upon in the contract. Campbell’s answer denied the material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for conversion, fraud, and breach of contract.

The trial court granted the motion of defendant First National Bank of Boston (“First National”) for summary judgment, which the plaintiff (“Lipman”] appeals, insisting that there are genuine issues of material fact.

I concur with the court’s opinion. Insurance companies have the right to assume that the risk they undertake will not later be enlarged by the courts. See Schultz v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 465, 474, 404 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1966). Accordingly, the courts are not at liberty to rewrite policies of insurance to provide coverage where no coverage was intended. See Spears v. Commercial Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 544, 548(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Dr. Johnson did not contract for prior acts coverage when he purchased his UPI insurance policy. Accordingly, UPI never provided coverage for claims such as Blendora Ann Echols.

The child of these parties, who were never married to each other, was born March 11, 1996. The paternity issue was determined in June, 1996 by the Juvenile Court, which also directed the payment of child support. The appellant questioned his liability for support because the child was conceived without his consent. He did not prevail.

These parties were divorced in Arkansas on April 17, 1996. A Property Settlement Agreement was incorporated in the judgment which awarded custody of two children to Mother.

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief from convictions based upon guilty pleas. The Defendant entered guilty pleas, with sentencing left to the discretion of the trial judge, to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and four counts of armed robbery. At the sentencing hearing conducted on April 3, 1989, he received a total effective sentence of 150 years. This Court affirmed his sentences on direct appeal.1 The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in December of 1991; and following appointment of counsel, he filed a supplemental petition in June of 1997. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the petition in July of 1997. The Defendant now appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm, but we grant D efendant relie f in the form of a delayed appeal.

Robert Lee Dickinson, Jr., appeals the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee at Chattanooga, insisting that the Juvenile Court erred in its determination of Mr. Dickinson’s Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from child support payments based upon evidence that he is not the father of the child he has been supporting. The Juvenile Court ruled that Mr. Dickinson’s motion was barred by res judicata; therefore, Mr. Dickinson is still obligated to pay current and past due child support payments.

This is a medical malpractice case brought by an inmate at a state correctional facility. The
plaintiff brought the lawsuit against various prison officials and the prison doctor alleging federal
constitutional violations as well as medical malpractice. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and remand for further
discovery. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remainder of the claims.

Defendant Todd Frederick Brooks (Father) appeals, and Plaintiff Linda Faye Carter (Mother) cross-appeals, the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded the parties joint custody of their three minor children, designated the Father as the primary custodial parent, ordered the Father to pay child support to the Mother, and distributed the parties’ property. We affirm the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, with one modification, but we reverse the court’s custody decision and we remand for the court to recalculate the Father’s child support obligation pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines.
 

Following the denial of his mo tion to suppress evidence, the Defendant, Timmy Beavers, entered a best-interest plea to second degree murder, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. An agreed upon sentence of thirty (30) years was entered by the trial court.

We granted this appeal to address whether a trial court can consider prior grants of diversion or previously expunged offenses in determining a defendant's suitability for diversion. In the case now before us, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion because the defendant had previously been placed on diversion on two different occasions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's application for judicial diversion. Upon review, we hold that evidence of prior diversions may be considered in determining whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for diversion.

This appeal involves the fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the Tennessee Board of Paroles to revoke the parole of a person accused of committing child sexual abuse. The Board revoked the parole based solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements made by his alleged victim. The parolee filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision-making process. After the trial court denied the petition, the parolee appealed to this court. We have determined that the Board’s hearing officer acted arbitrarily and illegally by applying an incorrect standard to determine whether good cause existed for not allowing the parolee to confront or to cross-examine his only accuser.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the parolee’s petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the Board either to conduct a proper parole revocation hearing forthwith or to return the parolee to parole status.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Petitioners-Appellants, Robert 1 Sandra Lynn Todd Bryant, wife of Respondent and mother of the minor children involved, joined the Petitioners in the petition to terminate the Respondent’s parental rights. In the petition, she consents to the termination of her parental rights. 2 Respondent’s wife subsequently left the couple’s home in Colorado to pursue job training in Florida. Upon completion of the two month job training course in Florida, she moved to Utah while Respondent continued his military career in Colorado. 2 Leland Bryant and Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant,1 appeal the trial court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Appellee, James Ashley Bryant, with respect to his minor children, Megan Rae Bryant, born December 13, 1991, and Devon Michael Bryant, born December 30, 1993.

The appellee, Robby McCurry, filed a second motion to rehear on December 28, 1998, petitioning this Court to reconsider our decision in the above styled case. The appellee filed this petition without first seeking permission from this Court as prescribed in Rule 39(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not well taken.