APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a state prisoner's efforts to obtain judicial review of the length of his incarceration. The prisoner contends that he is entitled to the benefit of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act’s lesser sentence for armed robbery rather than the sentence imposed upon him at the time of his conviction in 1985. He also contends he is entitled, as a matter of law, to certain sentence reduction credits. Finally, he contends that, taken together, the downward adjustments of his sentence on the basis of these two contentions would entitle him to be immediately released from custody. He filed a Petition for Declaratory Order with the Department of Correction, and the Department denied him relief. Thereafter, the prisoner filed a pro se "Petition for Judicial Review and/or Petition for a Declaratory Judgment and/or Petition for Common-law Writ of Certiorari" in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court granted the Department's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the dismissal of the prisoner's petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This case involves allegations of promissory fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of contract, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a woman’s failure to inform her partner that she had stopped taking birth control pills, her subsequent 1In another appeal currently before this Court, Henson appeals the paternity ruling of the juvenile court and challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Paternity Statute. 2 pregnancy, and the birth of a child. The plaintiff, Larry Aubrey Henson (Henson), appeals the trial court’s judgment for the defendant, Elizabeth Sorrell (Sorrell), after a trial on the merits.

I write separately only to indicate disagreement with an inference that may be drawn from the majority opinion. The last sentence in the opinion states that a party such as Henson may recover damages immediately flowing from the wrongful conduct, as in Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987). As noted in the majority opinion, the plaintiff mother in Smith was permitted to recover in a medical malpractice action for damages immediately related to pregnancy and childbirth.

The Defendant, Craig Bryant, appeals as of right from a Shelby County jury verdict convicting him of aggravated assault and attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to consecutive sentences of three years for aggravated assault and ten years for attempted second degree murder. The Defendant now appeals pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. W e affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a nuisance action by one neighbor against another. The plaintiff alleged in her lawsuit that the defendant took action to cause flooding on the plaintiff’s property. The trial court found that the defendant had taken actions that resulted in flooding and enjoined further such actions, but found the evidence insufficient to award the plaintiff monetary damages for alleged damage to her home. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was an illegal entry into the defendant’s home. Because I believe the entry into the residence and the seizure of property were proper, I further disagree that the matter should be remanded for further proceedings to determine the admissibility of the written confession. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant Phillip Wright, Jr. (“Wright” or” Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the trial court which awarded Plaintiff Andrea D. Bryant (“Bryant” or “Appellee”) the sum of $9,919.80 for breach of contract.

This interlocutory appeal involves an action by a setling tortfeasor for contribution from an alleged joint tortfeasor. Defendant/cross-plaintiff, Methodist Hospital of Memphis (Methodist), appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing its cross-complaint for contribution against defendant/cross-defendant, Keith G. Anderson, M.D. Apparently, Smith reluctantly included Anderson as a defendant and chose not to prosecute her claim against him. In a Motion in Limine filed April 18, 1997, Smith stated that she would not seek to produce expert testimony in her case against Anderson, and he agreed not to seek a directed verdict because of absence of expert proof.

Plaintiffs Mildred and Gary Johnson appeal an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Charles T. and Patricia Cantrell. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Plaintiff Sarah May Anderson appeals the trial court’s order enforcing the final divorce decree which was previously entered by the court in December 1981. The trial court enforced the decree’s provision relative to the division of the parties’ former marital home by requiring Defendant/Appellee William Travis Harrison, Sr., to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $12,084.36 for her interest in the property. The trial court enforced the decree’s provision requiring the Defendant to pay a reasonable amount of child support to the Plaintiff by ordering the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $2250 for nine months of child support; however, the court ruledthat all other claims for child support were barred by the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on judgments and decrees. Based on our conclusion that both of these rulings were in error, we modify in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant Jimmie Howard (Husband) appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to set aside the final divorce decree previously entered by the court. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the Husband’s motion to set aside.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b).

I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation