APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The issues before the Court and sufficiency of the evidence and comparative propottionality of the sentence of death. I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of premeditation, that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of torture (i.e. the "infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the victim while he or she remains conscious"), and the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances. However, I would find that the sentence of death is disproportionate.

The defendant, Dmitri Johnson, appeals as of right from the twenty-year sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for his conviction upon a guilty plea for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly relied upon facts not in evidence in its sentencing decision. He also contends that the trial court improperly applied three enhancement factors and refused to apply two additional mitigating factors. We believe that the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The State of Tennessee (state) appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court suppressing evidence seized by law enforcement officers from the person of Norman Curtis without a search warrant, and the residences of the Chamberses and Curtis under color of a search warrant. Two issues are presented for review. The state contends there were exigent circumstances which permitted officers executing the search warrant at the Chamberses’ residence to enter the dwelling without complying with the “knock and announce” requirement. The state further contends the search of Norman Curtis’s person when he arrived at the Chamberses’ residence while the officers were executing the search warrant was reasonable. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The State of Tennessee has failed to illustrate why the evidence contained in the record preponderates against the findings made by the trial court.

The appellant, Ryan Moran (defendant), was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant entered a no contest plea to attempted first degree murder and guilty pleas to the remaining charges. The trial court found the defendant was a standard offender and sentenced the defendant to the following Range I sentences: for attempted first degree murder, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, for especially aggravated robbery, twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction, and for assault, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days. The trial court ordered that the sentences for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery should be served consecutively. The sentence for assault is to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The effective sentence is confinement for seventy-five (75) years in the Department of Correction.

I concur, in principle, with Justice Reid’s dissent. I would, however, increase the pool of similar cases to include all cases in which a trial judge’s report is required by Supreme Court
Rule 12.1 The majority chose to exclude from the proportionality review pool all cases in which the State did not seek the death penalty and all cases in which no capital sentencing hearing was
held. In my view, this exclusion discourages a more meaningful proportionality analysis.

In this capital case, the defendant, Andre S. Bland, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder.1 In the sentencing hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance: “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(I)(5) (1991 Repl. & 1996 Supp.). Finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution.