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| Cannon vs. Cannon
03A01-9702-CV-00059
|
Blount County | Court of Appeals | 06/27/97 | |
| Jere Rogers, et ux vs. Mark Davis, et al
02A01-9610-CH-00258
Originating Judge:Homer W. Bradberry |
Fayette County | Court of Appeals | 06/27/97 | |
| State vs. Robert Vaughn
01C01-9605-CR-00219
|
Sumner County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Sepulveda
03C01-9402-CR-00069
Originating Judge:Rex Henry Ogle |
Jefferson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| Jessie James House vs. State
01C01-9607-CR-00309
Originating Judge:Ann Lacy Johns |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| Shava Lynn Kendrick vs. Larry Bert Kendrick
M2004-00540-COA-R3-CV
This case involves a father's efforts to protect his children from their mother's sexually abusive relatives. When the mother filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Houston County, she also filed a notice of intent to relocate with the children to the State of New York to be closer to her family, including a stepfather who had sexually abused and raped her when she was a child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced, designated the mother as the primary residential parent, and permitted the mother to move to the State of New York with the parties' children. The father has appealed, arguing first that the trial court's custody and relocation decisions have exposed the children to an unreasonable risk of sexual abuse and second, that the trial court erred by refusing to designate which of the parties should be permitted to claim the children as tax exemptions. We have determined that the trial court erred by allowing the mother and the children to move to the State of New York without sufficient proof regarding their safety. We have also concluded that the court erred by refusing to address the parties' tax exemption issues.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Leonard W. Martin |
Houston County | Court of Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Philip Kevin Cook
01C01-9604-CR-00146
|
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Christopher Barham
02C01-9606-CC-00205
|
Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Ronnie Turner
01C01-9602-CR-00077
Originating Judge:J. Randall Wyatt, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Jimmy Mathis
02C01-9605-CC-00177
|
Hardin County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Dale Nolan
01C01-9511-CC-00387
Originating Judge:Buddy D. Perry |
Sequatchie County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. James Lemacks
01C01-9605-CC-00227
|
Humphreys County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| 01CO1-9606-CC-00280
01CO1-9606-CC-00280
|
Giles County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Steven A. Bush
01C01-9605-CC-00220
Originating Judge:J. Curwood Witt |
Dickson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/26/97 | |
| State vs. Houston
03C01-9608-CR-00297
Originating Judge:Richard R. Baumgartner |
Knox County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/97 | |
| State vs. Weaver
03C01-9607-CC-00263
Originating Judge:James B. Scott, Jr. |
Anderson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/97 | |
| State vs. Wesemann
03C01-9404-CR-00144
Originating Judge:Edgar P. Calhoun |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/97 | |
| State vs. Hayles
03C01-9603-CR-00113
Originating Judge:Ray L. Jenkins |
Knox County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/97 | |
| State vs. Roy Gibson
02C01-9604-CC-00117
Originating Judge:Jon Kerry Blackwood |
Fayette County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/25/97 | |
| Billie Doveta Smithers v. Russell Stover Candies, et al.
01S01-9609-CV-00182
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/97 | |
| State vs. Booker
03C01-9607-CC-00273
|
Anderson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/97 | |
| Luther T. Beckett v. Gaylord Entertainment Company
01S01-9610-CV-00209
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue is whether the defendant should be estopped to plead the bar of the Statute of Limitations. The trial judge ruled that waiver and estoppel were not implicated and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured while working for the Opryland Hotel on May 28, 1994. The defense of the Statute of Limitations was raised by motion for summary judgment, the hearing of which was bifurcated. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was aware of a job-related injury no later than June 8, 1994,1 but conducted a separate hearing on the issue of waiver and estoppel, following which he ruled that the delay in filing suit was the fault of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was employed at the Opryland Hotel in Nashville on May 28, 1994, as a doorman. On the early afternoon of May 28, 1994, he felt a pain in his lower right abdomen, and thought he had pulled a muscle and reported this to the door captain. He then told the bell services manager that he thought he had pulled a muscle and requested permission to go home, which was granted. He returned to work on his next scheduled work day, and continued to work without complaint until he was terminated for an unrelated reason on August 13, 1994. Plaintiff went to see his personal physician, Dr. Jacokes, about this injury on June 8, 1994. After examining the plaintiff, Dr. Jacokes advised him that he had a hernia. Plaintiff knew that his injury had occurred at work, but he made no mention to Opryland of his hernia before leaving his employment. Plaintiff testified that the pain in his lower abdomen worsened in April, 1995, and he sought additional medical treatment. His physician told him that he would need surgery and, as a result, he contacted defendant to file a workers' compensation claim. He was referred to Willis Corroon, the third party administrator of Opryland's workers' compensation claims, and spoke with Ms. Ann Parker, claims adjuster, at Willis Corroon. 1The Complaint was filed July 26, 1995. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Walter C. Kurtz, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/97 | |
| Calsonic Yorozu Corp., et al. v. Sulay Lamin
01S01-9608-CH-00163
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/97 | |
| 02C01-9605-CC-00183
02C01-9605-CC-00183
Originating Judge:Joseph H. Walker, III |
Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/24/97 | |
| Ssi Services, Inc. v. Howard L. Baker
01S01-9609-CV-00191
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action began as one for a declaratory judgment under the workers' compensation laws that the accident suffered by the employee ("hereafter, plaintiff") resulted in minimal impairment only. The plaintiff counterclaimed, alleging that he sustained a job-related rotator cuff tear of his left shoulder with a biceps tendon tear requiring surgical repair on May 2, 1993, and that he aggravated the condition in the Spring of 1994 when further surgery was required. The plaintiff is 59 years old, employed as a painter, with an excellent work ethic. It is not controverted that he suffered the injury as alleged. He returned to full, uninterrupted employment in December, 1994 with restrictions. The trial court found that the plaintiff had sustained a 13 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body, and that the "cap embodied in the 1992 Amendment should apply since the plaintiff has returned to meaningful work activities." The plaintiff appeals, insisting (1) that the award of 13 percent permanent partial disability to the whole body is "contrary to the evidence and the law," and (2) that the plaintiff is "entitled to more than 13 percent permanent partial vocational impairment to the body as a whole." Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where the medical testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., |
Coffee County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/97 |