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Rust vs. Rust
01A01-9608-CH-00361
Originating Judge:Robert E. Corlew, III |
Rutherford County | Court of Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
State vs. Daryl Conner
02C01-9512-CR-00358
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
01CO1-9605-CC-00218
01CO1-9605-CC-00218
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Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Francine Kuntz
01S01-9609-CH-00187
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal presents us with an issue involving venue in a workers' compensation case. As discussed below, the panel concludes the judgment of the trial court, dismissing the case for improper venue, should be affirmed. The employer's insurer, Yasuda, commenced this action in Davidson County where, according to the complaint, its principal place of business is located. The employee moved, without supporting affidavits, to dismiss for improper venue. The trial court granted the motion without an evidential hearing.1 The relevant facts are undisputed. The employee is a resident of Robertson County; the corporate employer has its principal office in Sumner County, where the injury occurred; and the employer's insurer has its principal office in Davidson County. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for improper venue because, according to the employee's brief, the employee "may not have a different residence than (sic) the employer for the purpose of determining proper venue under the Workers' Compensation Law of Tennessee." Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). In a significant number of past cases, our Supreme Court held that a workers' compensation action was a transitory one and that venue was to be determined by considering both the provision of the Workers' Compensation Act with respect to venue and the general rules relating to transitory actions. Those cases were overturned by that court's opinion in Five Star Express, Inc. v Davis, 866 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. 1993), wherein it said in conclusion, ".... we now hold that venue in workers' compensation actions is to be determined solely by the workers' compensation venue statute -- section 5-6-225(c)(1) -- and any other authority indicating otherwise is hereby expressly overruled." The section provides as follows: (c)(1) The party filing the petition may, at such party's option, instead of filing the same before the county judge or chair, file the same as an original petition in either the circuit, criminal or chancery 1 The employee has filed a separate action for benefits in Robertson County. 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/21/97 | |
Patterson vs. Amos, et. ux.
01A01-9609-CH-00410
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Perry County | Court of Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
01CO1-9605-CC-00225
01CO1-9605-CC-00225
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Coffee County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
Cunningham vs. Dept. of Saftey
01A01-9509-CH-00411
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 05/21/97 | |
Randy Pertuset v. Pargo's, Inc.
01S01-9609-CH-00189
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's petition for workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff raises the following issues: I. The trial court erred in finding that the altercation between the plaintiff and Thomas Wilson, a co-employee, was not an "accident" sufficient to justify an award of workers' compensation benefits. II. The trial court erred in finding that the medical evidence was insufficient to justify an award based on a mental or nervous disorder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff in the case was employed as a supervisor at Pargo's, Inc., a restaurant. On January 27, 1994, during the lunch hour, the plaintiff became involved in an exchange with a cook over an order. The evidence shows the plaintiff entered the kitchen to reprimand the cook. The plaintiff pointed his finger at the cook's face as he spoke to him. There is a dispute between the plaintiff and the other witnesses about what then occurred. The plaintiff testified the cook struck him on the neck with his arm, and that he fell to the floor as a result of the blow. The plaintiff was the only witness to give this history of the confrontation. The other witnesses testified the cook placed his hand on the plaintiff's face and pushed him away. All of these witnesses testified the plaintiff did not fall. The day following the incident, the plaintiff became emotionally upset and had to leave work. Basically, the plaintiff was never successfully employed after this time because his mental condition seemed to deteriorate. The Chancellor's memorandum stated in its most pertinent part as follows: The Court finds that the altercation on January 27, 1994 between the plaintiff and Mr. Wilson did not amount to an "accident" sufficient to justify an award. While the plaintiff claims that the plaintiff assaulted him with such force sufficient to cause him to fall to the floor and suffer from neck stiffness, evidence in the record and testimony at trial do not support such a conclusion. Testimony at trial by co-workers who witnessed the altercation reports that the plaintiff began the altercation by verbally 2
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/21/97 | |
Kay E. Blackwood, Jr. v. The Berkline Corp., et al.
01S01-9609-CV-00190
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants contend (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive, (2) it was error for the trial judge to become a witness in the case and (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by commuting permanent partial benefits to a lump sum. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be modified and, as modified, paid in a lump sum, and the evidential remarks of the trial judge were harmless in light of our modification. The claimant, Kay Eugene Blackwood, Jr., is thirty-nine years old with a high school education and vocational training as an automobile mechanic and some college training as a minister of the gospel. He gradually developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome from the repetitive use of his hands at work for employer, Berkline. The employer referred him to Dr. James B. Talmage. The doctor diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and prescribed braces for both wrists. He restricted the claimant from repetitive work with his right hand and recommended wearing the braces while sleeping. The claimant was totally disabled for several weeks. The doctor assigned zero percent permanent impairment, but acknowledged some loss of grip strength and conceded that, on the basis of lost grip strength, the AMA Guidelines provided twenty percent permanent impairment to the right arm and ten percent to the left, using a method the doctor considered inappropriate. Dr. Talmage did not concede the loss of grip strength was permanent. Dr. Randy Gaw, a neurologist, diagnosed mild right carpal tunnel syndrome but found no evidence of "left median nerve mononeuropathy" or "generalized neuropathic or myopathic process involving the upper extremities." The claimant returned to work for the employer. Dr. S. M. Smith, who did not treat the claimant but evaluated him, diagnosed moderate carpal tunnel syndrome on the right and mild carpal tunnel syndrome on the left. He assigned twenty percent permanent impairment to the right hand and ten percent to the left. The trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on fifty percent to each arm, commuted to a lump sum. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John A. Turnbull, |
Clay County | Workers Compensation Panel | 05/21/97 | |
Tommye Johnson vs. Edward Johnson, Sr.
02A01-9609-Cv-00217
Originating Judge:George H. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 05/20/97 | |
Marilyn Morgan vs. Velma McCrory
02A01-9604-CV-00072
Originating Judge:Robert A. Lanier |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 05/20/97 | |
Deborah Tuggle vs. Shelby Co. Government, et al
02A01-9606-CV-00147
Originating Judge:George H. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 05/20/97 | |
02C01-9509-CC-00259
02C01-9509-CC-00259
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Lauderdale County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/20/97 | |
State vs. Teague
03C01-9601-CC-00027
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Blount County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
Stein vs. Davidson Hotel Company
01S01-9610-CV-00202
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 05/19/97 | |
Kite vs. Kite
03S01-9610-CH-00099
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Supreme Court | 05/19/97 | ||
03C01-9311-CR-00363
03C01-9311-CR-00363
Originating Judge:Edgar P. Calhoun |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Maurice Garner
02C01-9508-CR-00223
Originating Judge:Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Nail
03C01-9406-CR-00197
Originating Judge:Paul A. Swafford |
Rhea County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Johnson
03C01-9606-CC-00214
Originating Judge:E. Eugene Eblen |
Loudon County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Beeler
03C01-9607-CC-00264
Originating Judge:Frank L. Slaughter |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Lowery
03C01-9604-CC-00146
Originating Judge:William R. Holt |
Jefferson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Henry Eugene Hodges
01S01-9505-CR-00080
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 05/19/97 | |
State vs. Christopher Prentiss
02C01-9604-CR-00112
Originating Judge:Joseph B. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 05/19/97 |