APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by defendants Dave Allen Webb and wife Debbie Lynn Webb, from the trial court's judgment setting aside a foreclosure sale and, in effect, putting the parties in the same position they were in before the foreclosure.

This is an action for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result  of misrepresentations made to them in their purchase of a residence.

Pursuant to Rule 11, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the trial court sanctioned the appellants and their attorneys. The appellants argue on appeal that they cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11 because they did not sign the offending pleading and that the facts do not establish a violation of the rule. We hold that a party may be sanctioned under Rule 11 without actually signing the pleadings, but we find that the facts of this case do not justify a Rule 11 sanction and that the proof fails to show any expenses incurred as a result of the alleged violation. Therefore we reverse the judgment against the appellants for sanctions.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Juvenile Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this court is of the opinion that there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal is taken from the trial court’s order of June 7, 1995, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Service Merchandise Company, Inc. (hereinafter, “Service Merchandise”). Specifically, the trial court found that there was no proof of a dangerous condition created by Service Merchandise and no proof that Service Merchandise had either actual or constructive notice that a dangerous condition existed. Upon consideration of the record before us, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

The majority holds that the plaintiff cannot establish constructive notice. I am constrained to agree. However, I invite our Supreme Court to revisit this area of law.

The Juvenile Court of Davidson County terminated Barbara Gatlin’s parental rights respecting her ten year old daughter, Felicia. Because we find that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, we reverse.

This is an adoption case. Petitioners, Amanda Croslin and Phyllis Croslin Baker, the adoptive child’s mother and maternal grandmother respectively, filed a petition to set aside the adoption of the child, Danna Elisabeth Croslin, by the maternal grandfather, Danny Keith Croslin, and his wife, Betty Jean Croslin. Also named as a defendant in the petition is Stanley Gardner Haskins, the adoptive child’s natural father. From the order of the trial court nullifying and setting aside the adoption, Danny Keith Croslin has appealed. Mr. Haskins did not file any pleading in the trial court and is not a party to this appeal.

The purpose of this litigation was to establish the boundary line between property owned by the Plaintiff, Bradley Mark Butler, and the defendants, Prince E. Spradlin and Sylvia S. Spradlin. Each party presented several witnesses and exhibits including the testimony of their respective surveyors. Upon completion of the evidence, the chancellor made findings of fact including a finding that the plaintiff had established his title by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The court accepted the survey of Eddie Coleman, the surveyor who testified in behalf of the plaintiff, and established the property line according to the Coleman survey.

In this divorce case Dorothy H. Long (“Wife”) filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from David G. Long (“Husband”) alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Husband filed an answer and a cross-complaint. The parties stipulated that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The chancellor entered an order awarding Wife a divorce on these grounds.
The chancellor at the same time appointed a Special Master and assigned him the responsibility of ascertaining if either party had dissipated or secreted marital assets during the marriage, determining the value of certain marital property and the current ownership of same and recommending to the court an appropriate division of marital assets, along with alimony, if any, as well as the assessment of costs and fees. After several hearings, the Special Master filed his final report to the chancellor covering the scope of his assignment. The chancellor affirmed the findings of the Special Master and included the Master’s findings in his final decree.

Georgeanne M. Hofer (“Wife”) filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against James P. Hofer (“Husband”) seeking a divorce, division of marital property and alimony. Following a bench trial the chancellor awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. In addition, he awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years, ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido and divided the m arital property between the parties.

This is an action for damages for personal injury and the negligent, mailicious, and wrongful destruction of real and personal property of the plaintiff, Harry Gray Smith. Plaintiff filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County alleging that the defendant destroyed three pieces of his property, located at 1417 Magnolia Avenue, 1421 Magnoli Avenue, and 400 Winona Street North, without preper notice. Plaintiff claimed that, not withstanding a "No Trepassing" sign he had erected on the premises, employees of the City destroyed the structure without service of any final condemnation or demlition notice. He further asserts that the defendant refused to allow him to remove medical equipment from one of the structures in which he was living. He further alleged that as a result of the demolition and verbal threats of bodily harm which he claims were made by agents of the defendant, laintiff suffered a heart attack necessitating hospitilization.

Appellant, Reginald Fentress (Fentress), appeals from the summaryjudgment entered
by the trial court in favor of the appellee, Memphis Housing Authority (MHA). The issue before us is whether the trial court was correct in doing so upon finding, as a matter of law, that Fentress was not entitled to a grievance hearing prior to his termination of employment with MHA. For the reasons expressed hereafter, we affirm.

This case originated i the trial court as a boundary line dispute. Before we examine the merits of the issues raised on appeal, however, it is necessary for us to address a preliminary issue, i.e., was a notice of appeal timely filed. If a notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. See Rule 4, Tennessee Rule s of Appellate Procedur e .

This action was instituted by the plaintiffs to recover a prorata share of monies they were required to pay on a guaranty agreement where in the defendants were co-guarantors. The trial court found that  there were three co-guarantors, Mr. Squibb, James H. Widener and Ted C. Smith (defendant).  He apportioned liabilit y equally among the three.  The court found that the purported signature of Ms. Smith on the guaranty agreement was not her signature.  The case was dismissed as to the defendant, Rose E. Smith.  No appeal was taken from the action of the court dismissing the case as to Ms. Smith.  Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs, John P. Squibb and wife Martha Jo Squibb, in the amount of $45, 402.04 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from April 10, 1991 to April 9, 1996, in the amount of $22, 701.02 for a total judgment of $68, 103.06.  A like judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Widener.  From these judgments, the defendant appeals.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellants to this action are either current or retired firemen for the Division of Fire Services of Memphis, Tennessee (Division).1 They appeal from a judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellees, City of Memphis, Tennessee (City), the Division, Dr. W. W. Herenton, Mayor, Westelle Florez, Director of the Division of Personnel, and Charles Smith, Director of the Division, on their action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the appellees’ method of computing pension benefits for those firefighters employed by the City for 30 or more years. After review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We set forth our reasons below.