APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff, David John Erdly, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing his suit for divorce, dividing the marital estate, awarding plaintiff child custody and support and awarding the defendant, Janene Marie Erdly, alimony for the remainder of her life.

The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain
portions of the opinion. Contrary to the assertions of the petition the opinion does not require the giving of a special “proximate cause” instruction in every homicide case. The opinion requires the giving of a general causation instruction whenever the homicide offense does not itself explicitly or implicitly include a causation instruction. As the State recognizes, some of the homicide offenses include elements that implicitly instruct the jury that a causation finding is necessary. Also without merit is the State’s assertion that the suggested pattern jury instruction set out in footnote 16 conflicts with existing law and relieves the State of its burden of proof. The State’s petition confuses criminal negligence and causation. Both elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, we emphasize that the language in footnote 16 is merely a suggestion which may be accepted, revised, or rejected by the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee. Accordingly, the State’s petition to rehear is DENIED. Costs of this petition are taxed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
 

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest
children. As grounds for termination the trial court found abandonment for failure to
provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume
custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children.
We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Jaselyn Grant, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged her convictions of second degree murder, reckless
endangerment, and aggravated assault, alleging that she was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel at trial. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that she is
entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby
County convictions for two counts of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone and two counts of
possession of 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a
drug-free zone. Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
based upon counsel’s failure to: (1) object to irrelevant and prejudicial text messages
introduced at trial; (2) file a Bruton motion; (3) contest that Petitioner tracked the package
containing the methamphetamine; (4) adequately prepare for trial; (5) object when the State
argued that Petitioner’s silence implied guilt; (6) object when the prosecutor “testified
during closing argument in order to bolster his own credibility”; and (7) object when the
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented evidence during closing argument. Petitioner
further asserts that she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent.

This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile
Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Trent W. (“Father”) to his minor children
Klowii W. and Mariah W. (collectively, “the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile
Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. The Juvenile
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven the grounds of
abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the
permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody. The Juvenile Court also found by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals,
arguing that DCS failed to prove either grounds or best interest. We find that all four
grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by the requisite clear and convincing
evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.