APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Marvin T. Dickerson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in various matters related to his sentencing. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Terry Bradford Whitaker, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress DNA evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Melvin Terry, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, William Grant Morgan, alias, of first degree premeditated murder and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received concurrent terms of life imprisonment and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s murder conviction, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) whether the trial court failed to ensure that the Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived certain defenses against the advice of his attorneys; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting an autopsy photograph depicting the multiple cuts to the victim’s throat; and (4) whether the trial court committed plain error by admitting evidence that the Defendant invoked his right to remain silent. After our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Byron Alexander, Jr., was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; two counts of vandalism valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor; and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-14-408 (2018) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading); 39-14-406 (2018) (aggravated criminal trespass); 39-13-111 (2018) (domestic assault). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction and to six years for aggravated assault. The court ordered concurrent service of the misdemeanor sentences and consecutive service with the six-year sentence, for an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The court, likewise, ordered the Defendant to serve his effective sentence consecutively to a six-year sentence imposed in an unrelated drug case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Brandon D. Theus, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights cases. The trial court terminated Appellant mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (3) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to removal of the children; (5) severe child abuse; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellants, mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their respective parental rights to the two minor children. The court terminated mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plans; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal. The trial court terminated father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (3) severe child abuse. The trial court also found that termination of appellants’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a legal malpractice suit. Previously, the defendants represented the plaintiff in a federal failure to hire case. In the federal case, the jury rendered a defense verdict. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued her attorneys, alleging legal malpractice. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they exercised the required standard of care in representing the plaintiff. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted their own affidavits and an affidavit of a third-party attorney who was retained as a testifying expert. In response, the plaintiff did not provide expert proof on whether the defendants met the appropriate standard of care. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand.

The Petitioner, Howard Brackson Carrier, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After thorough review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Patrick Carmody, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of life and twenty-two years, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the only evidence against him was that of co-conspirators and accomplices and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence about his ownership of a gun. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Husband appeals the denial of his motion for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Husband argues that a divorce decree and marital dissolution agreement should be set aside for his lack of capacity to understand the agreement and advocate for himself. Separately, he claims the agreement itself is unconscionable. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Ashley Donielle Wright, entered guilty pleas to five counts of identity theft and one count of misdemeanor theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she was to receive an effective sentence of two years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced Defendant to serve forty-eight hours in confinement and the remainder of the agreedupon sentence on supervised probation. Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in denying diversion and in ordering confinement. Because the record reflects that the trial court did not make necessary factual finding or indicate on the record the sentencing considerations that warranted imposition of the sentence, we reverse the judgments and remand for the trial court to make adequate factual findings, engage in the requisite legal analysis, and impose judgments in accordance with the mandated statutory and common law considerations and in conformity with the plea agreement.

This is a post-custody contempt case. We do not reach the substantive issues because the order appealed is not final. As such, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3.

The Petitioner, Joey Lee, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the victim’s identification of the Petitioner after she sat next to him in court at a suppression hearing without recognizing that he was one of the men who robbed her and in failing to challenge the prosecutor’s actions, in suggesting to the victim that she was sitting next to her aggressor, as prosecutorial misconduct. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) decision denying Husband credit for premarital payments he made on certain marital assets; (2) division of certain marital assets and debts; (3) award of transitional alimony to Wife; (4) award of alimony in solido to Wife; and (5) calculation of the amount of child support. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Monterio Funzie, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for sexual battery by an authority figure and sexual battery. According to the judgment, Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual battery, and the remaining charge was dismissed on motion of the State. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a multiple offender to three years to be served in a workhouse. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for judicial diversion and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, we do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court’s order is not compliant with the findings and conclusions requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k); thus, this Court is unable to conduct its review.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights to three children. The trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate on multiple grounds and that termination is in the best interest of the children. Only the mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights and remand.

The Father appeals the imposition of a retroactive child support obligation for more than five years, contending that the Mother did not show good cause for imposing the obligation, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-311(a)(11)(G)(i); he also contends that the calculation of his income was erroneous. Upon our review, we affirm the imposition of the retroactive child support obligation in excess of five years; we vacate that portion of the order establishing the amount of Father’s obligation and remand for the trial court to recalculate the same.

An employee filed a workers' compensation claim alleging he suffered permanent hearing loss in the course and scope of his employment. The trial court ruled that the employee's hearing loss was compensable and, based on an anatomical impairment rating of 14.1 percent, awarded the employee 56.4 percent vocational disability for loss of hearing in both ears. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to compensability but find that the award of vocational disability was excessive. We modify the award of vocational disability to thirty percent for loss of hearing in both ears.

A tenant evicted from her home filed a de novo appeal in circuit court from a general sessions judgment for back rent and dismissal of her counterclaim. The circuit court refused to hear any evidence from the pro se tenant as to her counterclaim based on a local court rule requiring litigants to submit a witness list and exhibits ten days prior to trial. Because of the absence of a transcript and the discretion of trial courts to apply local rules, this court must affirm.

Brian Bowling (“Employee”) was employed as a laborer for Potter South East (“Employer”). During his employment with Employer, he was constantly exposed to loud noise from jackhammers, sledgehammers, power drivers and heavy equipment. Employee initially developed hearing loss in 2010 or 2011. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment raising the one-year statute of limitations. The motion was supported by the evaluating physician’s C-32 report. The trial court granted Employer’s motion and entered an order dismissing Employee’s claim. Employee has appealed from that order. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Ferderic Lamont Byrd, pled guilty to attempted possession of less than 15 grams of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell. As a condition of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), challenging the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless traffic stop of the vehicle he was driving. Upon our review, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgement of the trial court.

This case is before us for the second time. In the first appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the case after determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing. After the mandate issued, the plaintiffs moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion. In this second appeal, the plaintiffs claim the trial court abused its discretion in denying their requested relief. We affirm. We also conclude the appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages.