APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff real estate developer appeals the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on claims of tortious interference with a contract, inducement of breach of contract, and promissory fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to construct any argument responsive to the stated basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we affirm. 

Defendant, Richard Lee Diviney, Sr., contends that his guilty plea should be set aside because the fee provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-420(h)-(j) is unconstitutional and that the trial court erred by not “actually” applying a mitigating factor during sentencing. After a thorough review, we determine that Defendant’s challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-420(h)-(j) was resolved by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Decosimo, 555 S.W.3d 494 (Tenn. 2018). Additionally, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion when sentencing Defendant. Thus, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for entry of corrected judgments that properly indicate the merger of Counts Two and Three into Count One.

A trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of conditions. The father appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that it was not in the child’s best interest for his rights to be terminated. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights based on persistence of conditions because the child was not removed from the father’s home by an order of the court, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The petitioner, Terrence Justin Feaster, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Quinton Dujaun Primm, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, and received consecutive sentences of twenty-five and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a lay witness to testify about what the witness heard on an audiotape, that the trial court erred by refusing to declare a mistrial when a witness revealed that the Appellant had been incarcerated previously, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Edwin Millan, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of filing a false or fraudulent insurance claim, initiating a false police report, and tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to correct false testimony offered by a State’s witness, that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that certain witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law, that the trial court erred by permitting a witness to testify as an expert, that the trial court erred by permitting certain testimony, that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the evidence tampering charge, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Randall Wallace Kidd, pleaded guilty to filing a false police report; he later filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, which the trial court denied. While released on bond, the Petitioner failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and was indicted and convicted at trial for failure to appear. The trial court imposed a nine-year sentence for the false police report conviction and a consecutive three-year sentence for the failure to appear conviction. In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily due to intoxication and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing and at trial. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, David Englebert, entered guilty pleas to aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault pursuant to a plea agreement, in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years to be served with an eighty-five percent release eligibility date. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was never informed of the elements of the offense of aggravated robbery. The post-conviction court denied his claim without making any findings of fact, and the Petitioner appeals. We conclude that the Petitioner has not established prejudice with regard to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying that claim. Because there is inconsistent evidence regarding whether the Petitioner was informed about the elements of the offense, we remand for the post-conviction court to make factual findings and credibility determinations relevant to the claim that the Petitioner’s pleas were not knowing and voluntary.

This appeal involves a contract between an aspiring country music artist and a record company owner for promotion of the artist’s songs. After the record company owner died, the artist demanded an accounting from the owner’s widow and filed this lawsuit alleging that the record company and its owner breached the promotion agreement executed by the parties. The trial court found that the record company owner breached the contract by failing “to adequately promote” the artist’s singles and awarded the artist a judgment for $223,069.89. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Edward Dewayne Shelton, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his “motion to dismiss the indictment and motion to withdraw guilty plea and motion to correct illegal sentence.” The Appellant contends (1) that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was timely filed because there was no file stamp date on the judgment form; (2) that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel; (3) that the charging indictment was void because it “was only signed by the foreman of the grand jury”; and (4) that his sentence was illegal because he was classified as a Range II, multiple offender rather than a Range I, standard offender. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on the post-conviction court’s finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his pro se petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing, and the State concedes that the post-conviction court erred. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary hearing.

Father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

The Petitioner, Michael J. McCann, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that a probation revocation involving certain 1994 drug convictions was in error and that the erroneous probation revocation led to an incorrect calculation of his pretrial jail credits. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the habeas corpus court did not commit error, and we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

Petitioner, Raymond Arthur Klein, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After thorough review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the conclusion that the Circuit Court for Davidson County correctly denied the petition of Ms. Nancy Maureen Jarman to increase her alimony.  But I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Jarman.  I share the view of Franklin N. Jarman that the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney’s fees in this instance.

This case involves a petition to modify a parenting plan to change the primary residential parent. The father sought to be designated as the primary residential parent, citing to the children’s excessive absenteeism from school while in the mother’s care. The trial court agreed and found that, while the children were doing well in school, they could be doing better and would be less stressed without the problem of their excessive absenteeism. We reverse, finding that the mother had remedied the children’s excessive absenteeism from school prior to trial and that the prior absenteeism does not rise to the level of a material change in circumstance warranting a modification of the parenting plan so as to change the designation of the primary residential parent from mother to father.

After the plaintiff’s father was killed by an armed security guard, she filed a wrongful death action against the security guard’s employer. The complaint alleged both vicarious and direct liability and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The employer maintained that the guard acted in self-defense. After the first trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But the trial court ordered a new trial based on errors in the calculation of damages. A second jury verdict apportioned the greater proportion of fault to the decedent, resulting in a defense judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court made numerous errors in the conduct of the second trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error. So we affirm.  

Declaratory judgment action in which lessee of real property on which it had constructed a retirement facility sought a declaration (1) of its right pursuant to the lease agreement to obtain a mortgage loan insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to finance repairs and improvements to the facility and (2) absent an express right, a declaration that what it asserted was a “settlement agreement” with the lessor gave it that right. After considering the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the lessor’s motion. Lessee appeals; we affirm the judgment.

Employee, a commercial van driver, suffered an impact injury in April 2011 to her neck after assisting a passenger into Employer’s van. Employee continued to work for three months. Employee timely provided notice to Employer. Employee was diagnosed as suffering from a condition called torticollis. Employee received temporary total disability benefits from July 2011 until May 2016. Employee reached Maximum Medical Improvement in November 2015. Trial was held in February 2017 to determine the existence and extent of Employee’s permanent disability. Based on Employee’s medical treatment history, testimony by medical experts, and Employee’s testimony regarding her ability to function day-to-day, the chancery court found that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Deaundra Donnell Smith, sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel after his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery were affirmed on direct appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, H.C. Brown, Jr., with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault by strangulation, false imprisonment, and violation of an order of protection. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault by strangulation and violation of an order of protection, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Georgette McCroskey alleged her deceased husband, Marcus McCroskey (“Employee”), died from pancreatic cancer on June 15, 2012, as the result of work-related exposure to coal tar pitch while employed by Alcoa, Inc. (“Employer”). Following the trial, the trial court held Mrs. McCroskey had not carried her burden of proof on the issue of whether or not Employee’s pancreatic cancer was caused by his work-related exposure to coal tar pitch. Mrs. McCroskey appeals the decision, arguing the preponderance of evidence supports the conclusion Employee’s work-related exposure was a substantial contributing factor in his development of pancreatic cancer and death. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Dale Samuel Waggoner, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.