APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Jamie Lynn Moore, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated kidnapping and violation of an order of protection, see T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304, -113, for which he received an effective sentence of nine years in confinement. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Specifically, the Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that he substantially interfered with the victim’s liberty. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellants appeal the grant of summary judgment to defendants title company and legal professionals on claims related to a real estate transaction that occurred in 2004. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to Appellants’ legal malpractice claim based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. Based upon agreement of the parties, we also affirm the dismissal of Counts I through VII against the title company. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the title company as to all remaining claims is vacated.

This cause of action originated when Thomas Yeager (“Employee”) sustained an on the job injury when he slipped and fell while performing duties in the course and scope of his employment with Steak N Shake (“Employer”). Employee was originally treated at Hendersonville Medical Center in the Hendersonville Medical Center Emergency Department. Employee was treated for acute neck and back pains and was released on said day with limiting instructions as well as various prescriptions. On October 21, 2012, Employee returned to the emergency department with abdominal pain. It was determined that Employee had a gastrointestinal bleed. Employer maintained that neither the abdominal pain nor gastrointestinal bleed and resulting medical treatment were related to the work injury. After a request for assistance and based on medical records then available, the Department of Labor ordered Employer to pay medical expenses arising from said gastrointestinal condition. Employer brought this action, seeking recovery of payments made pursuant to the Department of Labor Order. Employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court. After certain stipulations were entered, a trial was had on the merits at which time the trial court found that Employee’s gastrointestinal bleeding and accompanying treatment was caused by medications prescribed to treat the initial work-related injury. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the trial court judgment.  

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim, arguing that the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant attorney were waived. Because we conclude that the defendant attorney’s affirmative defenses were not waived, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Landowners appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their petition seeking a declaratory judgment that the requirement in the Metropolitan Nashville zoning ordinance that alternative financial services providers be located 1,320 feet apart violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Appellant, Carl Thomas Grosse, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary and received consecutive sentences of eight years and three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. In this delayed appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This cause of action originated when Thomas Yeager (“Employee”) sustained an on the job injury when he slipped and fell while performing duties in the course and scope of his employment with Steak N Shake (“Employer”). Employee was originally treated at Hendersonville Medical Center in the Hendersonville Medical Center Emergency Department. Employee was treated for acute neck and back pains and was released on said day with limiting instructions as well as various prescriptions. On October 21, 2012, Employee returned to the emergency department with abdominal pain. It was determined that Employee had a gastrointestinal bleed. Employer maintained that neither the abdominal pain nor gastrointestinal bleed and resulting medical treatment were related to the work injury. After a request for assistance and based on medical records then available, the Department of Labor ordered Employer to pay medical expenses arising from said gastrointestinal condition. Employer brought this action, seeking recovery of payments made pursuant to the Department of Labor Order. Employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court. After certain stipulations were entered, a trial was had on the merits at which time the trial court found that Employee’s gastrointestinal bleeding and accompanying treatment was caused by medications prescribed to treat the initial work-related injury. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the trial court judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Melody I. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Savanna I. (“the Child”), who was eight months old at the time of trial. Shortly after the Child’s birth, the Knox County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on November 28, 2017, finding that the Child was dependent and neglected due in part to Mother’s prenatal drug use, incarceration, and severe abuse of the Child. The trial court relieved DCS from making reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with the Child. Also on November 28, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had severely abused the Child, (2) Mother had abandoned the Child by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare, and (3) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support, to visit, and to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

The defendant, Adam Lee Ipock, appeals his Fentress County Circuit Court jury convictions of vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and simple possession of methadone, claiming that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred by permitting the State to question him about the facts underlying his prior convictions and that the charges of vehicular assault and DUI must be dismissed because the State relied on a blood toxicology report obtained in violation of his right to due process. The prosecutor improperly inquired into the facts underlying the defendant’s prior convictions, and the error was not harmless when viewed in light of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of vehicular assault and DUI. In consequence, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of simple possession but reverse the convictions of vehicular assault and DUI and remand those charges for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Eliot Russell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in (1) excluding expert testimony and (2) denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Steven E. Warrick, Sr. and Cindy Heffernan (petitioners) filed this action to enforce a settlement agreement and partition a parcel of real property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-101 (2012) et seq. Penny Mullins (respondent) filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court, relying on the terms of the settlement agreement filed as an exhibit to the petition, granted the motion. We hold that the agreement conclusively establishes that petitioners have no present ownership interest in the property, and thus have no standing to ask the court for partition. We consequently affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Roy Thomas Rogers, Jr., was convicted by a Gibson County jury of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possessing drug paraphernalia, and criminal impersonation, see T.C.A. §§ 39-16-301(a)(1); 39-17-425(a)(1), -433(a)(1), -435(a), for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years. Thereafter, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed an untimely motion for new trial, which was denied, and an untimely notice of appeal. On direct appeal, this court held that the Petitioner had waived his issue regarding the admissibility of certain evidence because trial counsel failed to file a timely motion for new trial and then dismissed the appeal without addressing the insufficiency of the evidence claim because the interest of justice did not warrant waiver of the requirement for timely filing of a notice of appeal. State v. Roy Thomas Rogers, No. W2015-00988-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1045352, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016). The Petitioner, following his unsuccessful direct appeal, then filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely motion for new trial and notice of appeal and in failing to challenge the admission of illegal evidence at trial. After conducting a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered a written order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal and giving the Petitioner “30 days from the entry of this order to file a notice of appeal with the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals based on the Motion for New Trial previously filed in this cause.” The Petitioner subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to this court, arguing (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After conducting a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not follow the post-conviction procedures prior to granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order granting a delayed appeal and remand the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 5 reflecting an indicted and conviction offense of criminal impersonation in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-301(a)(1).

This is a health care liability case filed against a dentist and the dental practice that employed him. Before filing the complaint, the plaintiff gave written notice to the two potential defendants of her health care liability claims against them. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the health care provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with the statute, as the defendants alleged that the HIPAA authorizations provided by the plaintiff did not contain all of the required information and were therefore invalid. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the authorizations provided by the plaintiff were not HIPAA compliant and therefore the plaintiff did not substantially comply with the statute. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, James Allen Jenkins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, and theft of property $1,000 or less, for which he received an effective sentence of eleven years. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402, -102; 39-14-103; 39-17-1307(c)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the Defendant regarding his prior convictions because the parties had previously entered a stipulation as to his status as a convicted felon; (3) the trial court erroneously permitted the testimony of a forensic expert regarding a Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) “hit” as inadmissible hearsay; and (4) whether his aggravated robbery and theft convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon our review, we merge the Defendant’s theft conviction and remand for entry of amended judgments reflecting merger of the theft conviction into the Defendant’s aggravated robbery conviction. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Defendant-Appellant is not entitled to relief from his convictions. However, I write separately to address the admission of evidence during Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Agent Michael Turbyville’s testimony related to CODIS and DNA profiles contained in CODIS. I conclude that the evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to establish the presence of the Defendant-Appellant’s DNA on the cigarette butt found at the scene. Agent Turbyville’s testimony, in addition to other witness testimony, regarding CODIS and DNA profiles was offered to explain why the investigating officers obtained a sample of the Defendant- Appellant’s DNA, which, upon analysis by Agent Turbyville, matched the DNA profile on the cigarette butt.

This appeal involves the termination of a county employee for insubordination and intentional failure to carry out instructions. The employee appealed to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, which upheld his termination after a hearing. The employee then sought review in chancery court, and again his termination was upheld. He now seeks review before this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Charles P. Maxwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his conviction for driving while his license was suspended and his thirty-day sentence, which was suspended to probation after twenty-four hours in confinement. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Frederick E. Braxton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his attempted second degree murder conviction, for which he received a nineteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This case involves a custody dispute between M.J.L. and J.L. (paternal grandparents) and B.G. and M.N. (maternal grandparents) with respect to their grandchild, E.W.N. Paternal grandparents initiated a dependency and neglect action in juvenile court. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and awarded full custody to paternal grandparents. Soon thereafter, maternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene, seeking custody or joint custody of the child. The juvenile court entered a final order that granted all grandparents joint legal custody of the child. The court’s order further provided that during the school year paternal grandparents would have primary physical custody and that during the summer maternal grandparents would have primary physical custody. Both sets of grandparents were also awarded visitation. Maternal grandparents appealed the decision of the juvenile court to the circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court ordered a custody arrangement essentially identical to the one ordered by the juvenile court. Maternal grandparents appeal. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. Defendant-lessee operated a motel pursuant to a lease with plaintiffs-lessors, which contained two options to renew for two additional 25-year terms that allowed the renewal options to be exercised if there had been no breaches of the lease terms. When defendant attempted to exercise the option for the second additional 25-year term, plaintiffs-lessors refused and subsequently brought suit, alleging defendant had breached several provisions of the lease. The chancery court agreed with plaintiffs, assigning to defendant six breaches of the terms of the lease and holding that, as a result, defendant could not exercise the renewal option. Finding all of the alleged breaches to be either de minimis or non-issues to the case, we reverse.

In this post-divorce matter, the trial court determined that the father’s child support obligation should be increased due to the father’s significant increase in income subsequent to the parties’ divorce. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation amount, however, the trial court included the children’s private school expenses, which the father had previously agreed to bear, as a “work-related childcare” expense for the father on the respective child support worksheet, thereby reducing the father’s child support obligation. The mother has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s modifications to the parties’ permanent parenting plan and its calculation of child support, including its inclusion of private school tuition and health insurance premiums paid by a stepparent on the child support worksheet. We remand the child support issue to the trial court for recalculation of the father’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion. We also vacate the trial court’s partial award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for determination of a reasonable award of all attorney’s fees incurred by the mother concerning her petition to increase the father’s child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. In addition, we grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Doles, appeals from the revocation of supervised probation by the Hardeman County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a jury verdict in a personal injury action. The defendant alleged the comparative fault of a nonparty who was potentially immune from liability under Tennessee’s agritourism statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 43-39-101 to -103 (Supp. 2018). Before trial, the defendant asked the court to exclude all evidence and argument before the jury regarding statutory immunity as irrelevant and prejudicial. The court excluded argument and evidence of immunity but allowed the parties to present evidence on whether the nonparty had complied with the statute. At the conclusion of the trial, the court permitted the jury to apportion a percentage of fault to the nonparty without considering the nonparty’s compliance with the agritourism statute. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to allocate fault to the nonparty because the agritourism statute provided immunity from fault as well as liability. We conclude that nothing in the agritourism statute precludes the allocation of fault to a nonparty agritourism professional in a negligence action. So we affirm.

About a year after the parties’ divorce, the mother, who had been named primary residential parent, decided to move to Murfreesboro.  Alleging that her move constituted a material change in circumstance, she filed a petition in the divorce court requesting a change in the residential parenting schedule.  Because she planned to move less than fifty miles, the mother asserted that the parental relocation statute did not apply.  But, in case the court disagreed, the mother also asked the court to approve the move.  In response, the father filed a counter-petition seeking to change either the primary residential parent designation or the parenting schedule.  After a hearing, the trial court denied both modification petitions.  And although the court agreed that the parental relocation statute did not apply, the court ordered the mother to remain in Sumner County, Tennessee.  The mother has appealed the court’s restriction on her ability to move.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had no legal basis for prohibiting the mother from moving.  So we reverse that part of the court’s order.