APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an Order of Protection initially issued in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County, Tennessee based on the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant, her mother, assaulted her “by hitting her with her car.” In the appeal to the Circuit Court, that court ordered that all provisions in the order of protection in the General Sessions Court remain in effect until further order of the Circuit Court. Following numerous filings and motions, one of which sought a psychological mental health assessment of the plaintiff, the Circuit Court denied all pending motions and dismissed the order of protection. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for permission to appeal concerns whether portions of a trial court order and a transcript, both of which reference Plaintiff Jane Doe’s medical history, should be placed under seal. Pursuant to an October 2, 2018 order of remand from this court in Appeal No. M2018-01611-COA-R10-CV1, the trial court determined that portions of the documents should be redacted but that certain portions of the transcript and order which include references to Jane Doe’s medical history should not be placed under seal. The trial court subsequently granted Jane Doe and John Doe permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, because the application and answer fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits of the appeal in order to save the parties additional time and expense.

The defendant, Ricky Dee May, pled guilty to the manufacture of marijuana and felony possession of drug paraphernalia and received an effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each offense. After our review, we affirm the trial court’s sentence pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in denying Rader Bonding Company’s motion for exoneration and in denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment of forfeiture.

The petitioner, Brandon Washington, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel upon the entry of his guilty plea which he argues was entered involuntarily and unknowingly. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and conclude the petitioner has waived any challenge to the entrance of his plea.

The petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Within the context of his post-conviction claims, the petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State asking the victim to compare her pain level as a result of the petitioner’s assault to the pain she experienced at other points in her life. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Humphreys County grand jury charged the defendant, Lance Loveless, with theft of property between $1000.00 and $10,000.00. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted theft of property between $1000.00 and $10,000.00. On appeal, the defendant contends: the State failed to prove attempt, so the proof was insufficient to support the guilty verdict, and the trial court erred when denying his request for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A claim was filed against an estate by the former employer of the decedent. The clerk of court did not send notice to the representative of the estate as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 30-2-313(a). The estate did not file an exception to the claim until after the time for filing exceptions had run. The trial court accordingly ruled that the exception was time barred. The estate appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns the proper method of invoking a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a proceeding to modify a permanent parenting plan. About one year after the parties’ divorce, Travis Freeman (father) filed a petition to modify the court-ordered custody arrangement and attached a proposed permanent parenting plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a) (2017). Wendy Freeman (mother) opposed the requested modification. The trial court subsequently entered two orders gradually expanding father’s co-parenting time. Later, father filed another motion seeking greater expansion of his co-parenting time and/or designation as the primary residential parent. Father did not attach a new proposed parenting plan to this motion. Ultimately, the trial court ordered a new permanent parenting plan that retained mother as the primary residential parent but granted father additional co-parenting time. Mother appeals. She argues that father did not properly invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction because father did not attach a new proposed parenting plan to his most recent motion to modify the custody arrangement. We agree with mother that father was statutorily required to submit a new proposed parenting plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a); nevertheless, we hold that father’s petition to modify the parenting plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm

This appeal concerns a debt owed to the plaintiff by her deceased husband. The trial court awarded the plaintiff certain secured real property that she argues does not provide her the full value of her claim against the decedent. We affirm.

This action, which involves payment of a promissory note, was previously appealed to this Court and subsequently remanded to the trial court due to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding the disputed issue of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees paid. Determining that the amount of fees paid was reasonable, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Joseph Weinstein, the note holder and the appellee herein. Dr. Stevan Himmelstein, one of the parties found to be liable on the note, has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of Allison T. (“Mother”) to the children, Mason C. and Nathan C. (“the Children”), and the parental rights of Jeffrey M. (“Father”) to Nathan C. On November 14, 2016, the maternal grandparents, Patricia T. and Robert T. (“Grandparents”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to their respective Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Nathan upon its determination that the parents had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to support them and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Because the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017).

The Defendant, Arvester Brown, appeals his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial due to the behavior of one of the State’s witnesses; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim had agreed to carry out a “hit” on the Defendant; and (3) the State made improper statements during closing arguments. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Proffitt, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of employing a firearm during the attempted murders. He received an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his convictions for attempted second degree murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Appellant, Carl Allen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s granting a motion filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) to intervene in this case and the court’s vacating a portion of a previous order in which the court determined that the Appellant was required to register as a sexual offender as opposed to a violent sexual offender in the TBI’s sexual offender registry (SOR). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the guaranty agreement Appellant executed was enforceable. At the time Appellant executed the guaranty, Choctaw II, LLC (“Choctaw”), a company of which Appellant was a member, owed approximately $275,000.00 to Appellee on an open credit line, which was guaranteed by William Carrier, another owner of Choctaw. Mr. Carrier filed bankruptcy, and Appellee closed the open credit line for lack of guaranty. In an effort to continue to purchase materials from Appellee, Appellant signed a guaranty. After Appellant signed the guaranty, Appellee sold an additional $75,000 worth of goods to Choctaw, and Choctaw paid Appellee approximately $79,000 after Appellant signed the guaranty. Appellee applied these payments to the $275,000 balance and then sought payment for the $75,000 in goods from Appellant. The trial court held that Appellee properly applied the payments to the older debt. We hold that the guaranty agreement is enforceable. However, as to the application of the payments, we hold that Appellee was required to apply the $79,000 to the debt guaranteed by Appellant. Because the payments were sufficient to pay off the $75,000 in goods, Appellant owes nothing to Appellee under the guaranty and is entitled to summary judgment. Reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant.

The parties dispute whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-710, the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by service of process when no proof of service was returned to the court as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-902(a). Under the holding in Fair v. Cochran, 418 S.W.3d 542 (Tenn. 2013), we conclude, as did the trial court, that Appellee’s failure to make return to the court did not, ipso facto, constitute a lack of service of process such that the statute of limitations expired. Affirmed and remanded.

Plaintiff/Appellant Nationwide appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendant/Appellee’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant’s motion was based on the argument that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 did not allow Plaintiff to timely add Defendant to the suit. Because we conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied Tennessee’s comparative fault statute, we reverse.

Petitioner, Joan Elizabeth Hall, appeals the denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis based upon newly discovered evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the error coram nobis court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Domnick Doria, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) original counsel forced the Petitioner to participate in a television interview prior to trial that caused the State to “cut off” plea negotiations; and (2) trial counsel failed to call the Petitioner’s mother and his ex-wife to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court.

The Defendant, Donald Lyndon Madewell, was convicted by a jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that he lacked common authority over the hotel room and could not provide valid consent to search. He also alleges that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Bruce Elliott, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Jacob Erwin Branch, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of twenty-eight years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his child rape convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we note the verdict forms indicate the jury found the Defendant not guilty on the charges of rape and aggravated sexual battery, but the judgment forms indicate those charges were dismissed. We therefore remand for entry of corrected judgment forms as to these charges.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied petitioner parole, citing the seriousness of the offense, the substantial risk that petitioner would not conform to the conditions of his release, the adverse effect his release would have on institutional discipline, and his need to complete therapeutic community. Petitioner appealed the Board’s decision by petition for writ of certiorari. The petition was dismissed by the trial court, which found that the petitioner had failed to present any facts that would support a claim that the Board acted illegally, fraudulently, arbitrarily, or in excess of their jurisdiction. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Westley Albright, with the trial court’s consent, entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge of solicitation of a minor without being required to admit his guilt. The trial court granted Albright judicial diversion with one year of probation. Albright complied with all the stated conditions of his diversion. He attended and participated in all scheduled treatment group meetings, paid for sex offender treatment, and underwent an assessment. Albright even took a lie-detector test. Yet the trial court revoked Albright’s diversion, convicted him of solicitation of a minor, and extended his probation by six months, because of his noncompliance with an unstated condition of diversion. This unstated condition was that Albright had to admit during treatment that he was guilty of solicitation. Because he would not or could not make this forced admission, Albright’s therapist discharged him from the treatment program, and the trial court revoked his diversion.