APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29 26 121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017), requires a person who asserts a potential health care liability claim to give written pre-suit notice of the claim to each health care provider that will be named a defendant at least sixty days before the complaint is filed. The question we address is whether the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint, after the expiration of the statute of limitations, to substitute as a defendant a health care provider to which the plaintiff had not sent pre-suit notice. The health care provider the plaintiff sought to substitute had knowledge of the claim based on pre-suit notice the plaintiff had mistakenly sent to another potential defendant. We hold that the plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory pre-suit notice provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1) because she did not give written pre suit notice of the potential claim to the health care provider she later sought to substitute as a defendant after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Although the health care provider learned about the claim based on the pre-suit notice the plaintiff sent to another potential defendant, this form of notification did not comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). Because the plaintiff did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1), the 120-day filing extension under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) is not applicable. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03, the filing date of the proposed amended complaint may relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. The plaintiff, however, filed the original complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations. As a result, the plaintiff’s motion to substitute the health care provider is futile because the amended suit would be subject to dismissal based on the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint. We reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

The pro se Petitioner, Jermaine Rashad Carpenter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Defendant, Timothy Wayne Tidwell, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count of arson. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III offender to 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Ernesto Delgadilo Rodriguez, of resisting arrest and assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months for the resisting arrest conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) a jury instruction of the definition of “arrest”; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the admissibility of evidence regarding alcohol and drug use. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Richmond Lebron Madden, Sr., was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about the Defendant’s relationship with his co-defendant and his living arrangements; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which challenged the legality of the stop resulting in the Defendant’s arrest; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence and sentencing him to nine years and six months of incarceration. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

This appeal arises from a modification of a permanent parenting plan established in 2010 in which Mother was designated as the primary residential parent. In December of 2012, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan alleging that Mother’s mental health impeded her ability to properly care for their child. He also alleged that Mother alienated the child from Father due to numerous false allegations that Father abused the child, which resulted in temporary but substantial decreases in his parenting time. Although no evidence was produced indicating that Father abused the child, Mother continued to accuse Father of abuse and to take the child for repeated evaluations and physical exams. Following a three-day trial, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent, established a temporary parenting plan, and ordered Mother to attend counseling until the court was satisfied with her mental health so that it could issue a permanent parenting plan. Mother appealed that order; however, we dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment. On remand, following an assessment of Mother’s compliance with the court-ordered intensive therapy, the trial court entered a final judgment that included a permanent parenting plan from which Mother appeals. Mother contends the trial court erred in holding, inter alia, that there was a substantial and material change in circumstances requiring a modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. She also contends the court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent to Father due, in part, to the fact the court failed to consider factors added to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 pursuant to the 2014 amendment that became law on July 1, 2014. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a premises liability suit filed by a customer of a Goodwill store after the customer sat on an item of furniture that was for sale and it collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodwill, finding no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that Goodwill did not create or have actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged defect. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.     

Appellant sought disqualification of the trial court judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Miko T. Burl, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Appellant, Mario Perkins, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Petitioner, Leopold Mpawinayo, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 convictions for two counts of violating the habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO) law and his effective six-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Nelson Troglin, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence for his 2000 conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 23 years. Defendant contends the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements made during his post-polygraph interview. The trial court found that the statements were voluntary but determined that they were inadmissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 because Defendant would be required to reference the polygraph examination to provide context for Defendant’s statements made during the post-polygraph interview. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the statements, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Quincy Moutry, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for carjacking, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and his effective twenty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Johnson, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which the Petitioner argued that he was never indicted on his convicted offense. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of his petition in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

After entering guilty pleas to four counts of aggravated statutory rape, Defendant, Thomas A. Ryan, was sentenced to four years for each conviction. After a lengthy sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of sixteen years and denied all forms of alternative sentencing. Defendant appeals his sentence to this Court. Because we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of sixteen years, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Danny Anderson, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, James Odell Osborne, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 convictions for three counts of failure to appear, misdemeanor theft, and felony theft and his effective nine-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a malicious prosecution case. The trial court found that the Appellant committed the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Appellant argues that there was no material evidence to support the trial court’s inference of malice. Appellant also questions the trial court’s failure to address the mandatory element of probable cause. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Sibling shareholders, unable to agree on the management of the family business, brought their dispute to court. Eventually, the brothers and sisters agreed that the business should be dissolved and, under the court’s supervision, sold as a going concern. After soliciting bids from the siblings, the court approved the sale of the business’s assets to one brother and two of his sisters. Pending the closing, the court ordered the siblings to continue to operate the business as usual and to preserve the goodwill of the business, including the relationships with employees, suppliers, and customers. The day after the closing, the brother who was not part of the winning bidder group opened a competing business. The winning bidders sought damages from the competing sibling, claiming that he willfully violated court orders, breached his fiduciary duty, and intentionally interfered with business relations. After a bench trial, the court awarded the winning bidders compensatory damages in an aggregate amount for all claims. In the first appeal, this Court reversed, holding that the winning bidders’ claims were derivative, not direct, and thus they lacked standing. In Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, 495 S.W.3d 852, 877 (Tenn. 2016), our supreme court adopted a new standard for determining whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative and, applying that standard, held that the winning bidders had standing to pursue their claim that the competing sibling violated the court’s orders. So our supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to this Court to review the remaining issues that were properly raised but not addressed in the first appeal. Id. at 882-83. We affirm the trial court’s decision to hold the competing sibling in contempt, but we vacate the aggregate award of compensatory damages.  

The Department of Children Services initiated a proceeding to declare the three minor children of Mother and Father dependent and neglected following the discovery of a sexual relationship between two of the children. The Juvenile Court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected, as did the circuit court in a de novo hearing on appeal. Upon our review, we conclude the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the children were dependent and neglected; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.  

Parents appeal the termination of parental rights to their three children. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. The court also found that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude the evidence of the statutory grounds for termination was less than clear and convincing. Thus, we reverse the termination of the parents’ parental rights.

The Defendant, Jennifer Lynn Mosier, entered a nolo contendere plea to DUI in the Madison County Circuit Court and was sentenced to 11 months, 29 days in the county jail, suspended after 48 hours. As a condition of her guilty plea, she attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) regarding the validity of the arrest warrant. Because we agree with the State that the Defendant failed to comply with the strict requirements for properly certifying a question of law, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, John Baskins, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of rape of a child and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, claiming that the trial court erred in the misapplication of an enhancement factor and that the 40-year sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Leonardo Williams, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct an Illegal Sentence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.