APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant appeals the denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit. Because the order appealed is not final, this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal dismissed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (2) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (3) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Mother’s home. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions that led to the children’s removal from Father’s home. Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because grounds for termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a “preferred service” state employee has a protected property interest in his or her employment and whether due process or specific statutory language requires the State to bear the ultimate burden of proof in a post-termination administrative appeal under section 8-30-318 of the Tennessee Excellence, Accountability, and Management Act of 2012, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-30-101 through -407. The Respondent, David Pressley, was employed by the Petitioner, Tennessee Department of Correction, as a correctional officer at the Morgan County Correctional Complex. Mr. Pressley was dismissed from his employment and challenged his termination pursuant to the TEAM Act’s appeals process. Mr. Pressley’s termination was upheld by the Commissioner of TDOC at Step I of the TEAM Act’s appeals process and at Step II by the Commissioner of Human Resources. At Step III of the appeals process, the Board of Appeals reinstated Mr. Pressley and reduced his discipline to a 14-day suspension. The Board of Appeals also determined that the State bore the ultimate burden of proof in the Step III appeal. The State appealed to chancery court, challenging the assignment of the burden of proof. The chancery court reversed the Board of Appeals’ decision on the burden of proof issue and remanded the matter to the Board of Appeals. Mr. Pressley appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, reversed the chancery court’s decision and determined that “preferred service” state employees have a protected property interest in their employment and that the State bore the ultimate burden of proof in the Step III appeal. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter to the Board of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s suppression of the results of a mandatory blood draw from the Defendant, Chad E. Henry, conducted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(d)(5) (Supp. 2014) (also referred to herein as the mandatory blood draw provision for individuals with a prior conviction for driving under the influence) of the implied consent statute. Henry was arrested and a mandatory blood draw was conducted without a warrant after his car struck the rear of another car. Henry was subsequently indicted by the Chester County Circuit Court for one count of driving under the influence (DUI), one count of third offense DUI, one count of violating the financial responsibility law, and one count of aggravated assault. Following his indictment, Henry moved to suppress the results from the mandatory blood draw, asserting that the warrantless blood test violated his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the blood draw was illegal because the officers failed to advise Henry, pursuant to Code section 55-10-406(c) (Supp. 2014), that his refusal to submit to the test would result in the suspension of his driver’s license. The State filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of the evidence, which the trial court granted, and this court granted the State’s application for a Rule 9 appeal. In this appeal, the State argues (1) Henry’s implied consent to blood testing, by virtue of Tennessee’s implied consent statute, operates as an exception to the warrant requirement, (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as outlined in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016), applies in this case because the officers acted pursuant to the binding authority of State v. Humphreys, 70 S.W.3d 752 (Tenn. 2001), and the implied consent statute when they required Henry to submit to a warrantless blood test, and (3) motorists with prior DUI convictions, like Henry, have a reduced expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment when arrested for a subsequent DUI. Because nonexception to the warrant requirement justifies the warrantless blood draw in this case and because the good-faith exception does not apply, we affirm the trial court’s suppression of the evidence.

The defendant, Anthony L. Moore, moved the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, to correct a clerical error with regard to the reflection of pretrial jail credits on the judgment for his 2000 Madison County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jimmy Williams, of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to fifteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal results from a post-divorce criminal contempt conviction the plaintiff mother received for failing to adhere to a parenting plan that prohibits both parents from making disparaging remarks about the other parent. The trial court held that the plaintiff received sufficient notice under Rule 42(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and that she was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for two separate instances of disparaging remarks made about the father in the presence of their children. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this post-divorce action, Wife filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and Other Relief, including a request to recover her attorney’s fees, alleging Husband violated five provisions in the marital dissolution agreement (MDA). Husband denied the allegations and filed a separate petition to decrease his child support obligation, which Wife opposed. Before trial, but after protracted proceedings, Husband complied with three provisions in the MDA, leaving two to be decided by the court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Husband in civil contempt for violating the remaining MDA provisions, denied Husband’s petition to decrease child support, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. Specifically, the court found that Husband violated the MDA by refusing to transfer to Wife one-half of the “non-retirement” account at T. Rowe Price and by concealing and withholding two paychecks he earned during the marriage that the parties agreed to divide equally. The trial court found that Husband did not offer sufficient proof of his current income to support a reduction in his child support obligation. The trial court also determined that Wife was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to the enforcement provision in the MDA and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) as the attorney’s fees pertained to the child support decree. Husband appealed. We have determined that the MDA provision concerning the “non-retirement” account was not sufficiently clear, specific, and unambiguous to sustain a finding of contempt; therefore, we reverse this finding of contempt. However, we affirm the finding of contempt for concealing and withholding two paychecks. We also affirm the trial court in all other respects, including the award of attorney’s fees incurred by Wife in the trial court and the denial of Husband’s petition to reduce child support. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal, we find she is entitled to recover her fees and remand this issue for the trial court to determine the amount she is entitled to recover. 

This is Father’s second appeal of the termination of his parental rights to the two children he had with his former wife (“Mother”). Father and Mother separated in 2008 when she moved from Alaska to Tennessee with the children, and they were granted a divorce in 2009. Father has not seen nor spoken with the children since 2008, and has not provided any financial support since November 2009. The petition to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and her husband in 2012. In Father’s first appeal, we remanded the case in order to obtain a sufficient record for this court to review on appeal. In re Ian B., No. M2015-01079-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 2865875 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016). On remand, the trial court found that the petitioners had proven grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and support and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. Having determined that the record in this second appeal is sufficient for this court to conduct a proper review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Kwaku Aryel Okraku, the Petitioner, was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect and one count of reckless homicide. He received an effective sentence of sixty years. Trial counsel did not file a timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal, and after filing a petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner was granted a delayed direct appeal. On direct appeal, this court merged the aggravated child neglect convictions but otherwise affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. The Petitioner then renewed his petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he “neglected to use the strongest piece of impeachment evidence available to him—evidence that could have discredited the State’s theory that the cocaine ingested by the victim belonged to [the Petitioner].” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Pro se petitioner, Anthony D. Washington, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Johnson County Criminal Court. In this appeal, the Petitioner makes several claims, all of which are rooted in the duplicitous nature of his indictment. The State asserts that the Petitioner failed to show that his judgment was void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a successful petition for a writ of certiorari involving land use. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after finding that the location approved for the proposed power station violated an applicable zoning ordinance. After the trial court’s decision, the City of Mount Pleasant amended its ordinance to clarify that the zoning ordinance did not apply to public utilities. The City of Mount Pleasant Planning Commission thereafter approved the construction of the power station under the amended ordinance. The petitioners filed no writ of certiorari of the approval under the amended ordinance and therefore ask that this appeal be dismissed as moot. Because this case no longer serves to offer any meaningful relief to the parties and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine are present, we dismiss this appeal as moot. 

Richard W. Shelton, the Defendant, was charged with one count of sale and one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. A Marshall County jury found the Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years with release eligibility after service of forty-five percent of the sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found him guilty of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

David C. Jayne (“Jayne”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against him for breach of contract for failure to pay Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair (“Bass Annie”) for repairs made to his boat. Jayne entered into a contract with Bass Annie for the repair of his damaged boat. Before the agreed-upon repairs were completed, Jayne went to Bass Annie to check on the boat. After inspecting the boat, Jayne instructed Bass Annie to stop the repairs and return the boat to him. An argument ensued, and Jayne alleges he was assaulted by a Bass Annie employee. Both parties filed claims in the general sessions court which were subsequently appealed to circuit court. Following a de novo trial in the circuit court, the trial court dismissed Jayne’s claims and awarded Bass Annie damages for breach of contract for the work completed on the boat. Jayne appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the decision of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (the “Commissioner”) to impose a civil fine and revoke the license of insurance agent Charles E. Cunningham (“Cunningham”), after concluding that Cunningham committed six (6) violations of applicable statutes in connection with his insurance practice.  Cunningham filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the Commissioner. The trial court found that the record supported the Commissioner’s decision and choice of penalty. Cunningham appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The circuit court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion, dismissing Appellant’s petition on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129 and Appellant did not have a sufficient excuse for filing the petition outside the 30 day statutory time period. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a post-divorce matter. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the case appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Defendant, Kevin Watkins, III, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent six-year and three-year sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it applied two enhancement factors to his sentence and when it denied him alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Everett Russ, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Joseph Anthony Saitta, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Warren County Circuit Court conviction for rape of a child. The petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors resulted in the denial of a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Larry McNutt, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for reckless endangerment and aggravated assault. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey King, pleaded guilty to multiple drug and money laundering crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration to be served at 100%. The petitioner attempted to reserve certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether wiretaps used in the investigation of the crime were lawful. This Court determined that the petitioner was not entitled to relief on the basis of the certified questions and affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. King, 437 S.W.3d 856, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). In 2015, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.