APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case involving an almost nine-year-old child, who was removed from his parents’ custody after allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and a violation of the prior visitation order. On June 26, 2015, the Stewart County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an order, finding the child dependent and neglected as to both parents. The father filed a notice of appeal from the adjudicatory hearing order, which appeal was still pending during trial in this matter. On September 1, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to the child upon the grounds that (1) prior to incarceration, the father had abandoned the child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, (2) the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the parents’ custody persisted, and (3) he had committed severe abuse against a half-sibling of the child. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The trial court declined to terminate the mother’s parental rights after finding that said termination was not in the best interest of the child. The father has appealed. Having determined that there was not a final adjudicatory hearing order for purposes of res judicata due to a pending appeal, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the statutory ground of persistence of conditions. We conclude that the trial court erred by including in its decision portions of evidence from the adjudicatory hearing order, which was pending on appeal, but we determine this error to be harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights to the child. 

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her four children. Mother, who did not attend the final hearing, stipulated through counsel that a statutory ground existed for termination of her parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on her stipulation and the proof offered by DCS. Despite the stipulation, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination but not for the finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Thus, we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remand for entry of a judgment dismissing the petition.

The Petitioner, Marlon Duane Kiser, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 first degree murder conviction and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the postconviction court should have granted post-conviction relief based upon allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the original trial judge’s failure to recuse himself for an inappropriate relationship with a victimwitness coordinator, the perjured testimony of a witness, and newly-discovered evidence raising doubt as to his guilt. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Aaron Jermaine Clark (“the Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and imposition of his sentences, claiming that he should have been granted an alternative sentence so that he could continue his course of drug rehabilitation. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The petitioner, Shaun Taliaferro, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Haywood County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 44 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Torry Holland, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his convictions of drug and firearms possession. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order of summary dismissal. Although we affirm the order dismissing the defendant’s motion, we do notice a clerical error in the judgment form for count 3 in case number 12-00532 that requires entry of a corrected judgment in that count.

The parents in this action challenge inter alia, the juvenile court’s decisions regarding calculation of the parents’ income for child support purposes and the modification of the final co-parenting order. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a combined judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort. After awarding the husband a divorce, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property. The court also granted the husband a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages arising from an intentional tort committed by the wife. The wife raises numerous issues on appeal, including the classification of marital property, the equitable division of the marital estate, and the amount of the damages award. Because the court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its division of the marital estate or the amount of punitive damages awarded, we vacate those portions of the court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In all other respects, we affirm.

In this action, the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Department”) sought to collect unpaid franchise and excise taxes owed by a dissolved corporation from its former shareholder. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the shareholder, determining that the Department could not collect on the assessments originally issued in 2008 and 2009 due to the six-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1429. The trial court also determined that the shareholder was not a “person” or “taxpayer” subject to franchise and excise taxes because those taxes are assessed solely against entities such as corporations. Finally, the trial court determined that the shareholder had no personal liability for the taxes owed by the dissolved corporation absent proof of a fraudulent conveyance. The Department timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its construction and application of the applicable tax statutes, we reverse the judgment in favor of the shareholder.

The Defendant, Kyle J. Dodd, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, - 402(a)(2). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with fifty days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the investigating officer and “all evidence derived from” his statements because the officer did not properly inform him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, our review of the record reveals that the Defendant failed to raise this issue in a timely motion for new trial; thereby, waiving full appellate review. Additionally, we conclude that plain error review of the issue is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the dismissal, on the basis of res judicata, of the plaintiff Danny Gilliam’s breach of contract case against the defendant Frances Blankenbecler. In an earlier case involving the same parties, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint based upon his failure to comply with the court’s order to provide discovery responses. The order of dismissal in that first case did not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. After the plaintiff refiled the same case, the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Travis Steed (“the Petitioner”) petitioned for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, felony reckless endangerment, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and attempted second degree murder. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to interview and call certain witnesses that the Petitioner contends were critical to his defense. After a thorough review of the appellate record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a custody case involving the minor children of unmarried parties. C.W.H. (hereinafter “Father”) and L.A.S. (hereinafter “Mother”) agreed to a modification of an existing parenting plan in 2013. Subsequently, Father learned information to which he was not privy during the settlement conference, namely, that Mother had relocated from her state of residence (Ohio) to Nevada with the parties’ minor children, where she was employed as a prostitute. Father filed a motion for an emergency temporary custody order and a temporary restraining order. Father prevailed in a hearing before the juvenile court magistrate and was designated as the primary residential parent. Mother requested a hearing before the juvenile court. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found a material change in circumstances and upheld the magistrate’s determination. Mother appealed to the Court of Appeals, which vacated and remanded the case for the juvenile court to conduct a best interest analysis. On remand, the juvenile court affirmed its earlier findings regarding a material change in circumstances and, in addition, concluded that changing the primary residential parent from Mother to Father was in the best interest of the children. Mother again appealed to the Court of Appeals, which concluded “that the evidence preponderate[d], in part but significantly, against the juvenile court’s factual findings,” reversed the juvenile court, and mandated that its order be carried out within twenty days. We granted Father’s application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to decide, as set forth in Father’s application, whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in reversing the [juvenile court] and awarding Mother custody of the minor children” and whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in ordering the change in custody prior to an opportunity for the Father to appeal to this Court?” We answer both questions in the affirmative, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The Petitioner, James Clark, Jr., appeals pro se from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He contends that the coram nobis court erred in dismissing the petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A member of a limited-liability company withdrew from the company with a deficit in his capital account. The company filed suit against the withdrawing member on the ground that he had an obligation to repay the deficit amount. The withdrawing member filed a counter-complaint arguing that the company was estopped from collecting the debt because the debt had been forgiven. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the withdrawing member’s motion and granted the company’s motion, finding that the withdrawing member failed to prove that the company forgave the debt. The withdrawing member appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of a zoning variance. Earl Scott Moore and Joetta Moore (“the Moores,” collectively) applied for a variance in order to build a carport at their home. The Moores’ neighbors, Michael Cobble and Lora Cobble (“the Cobbles,” collectively) opposed the requested variance. The Greene County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) rejected the Moores’ application. The Moores submitted a second application, this time reducing their request by seven feet so as not to protrude into a public right-of-way. The BZA granted the Moores’ application for a variance. The Cobbles filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that material evidence supported the BZA’s decision to grant the variance and dismissed the Cobbles’ petition. The Cobbles appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to hold that res judicata barred the Moores’ second application for a variance. We hold further that, because the Moore property is not distinguishable in any meaningful way, the BZA’s decision to grant a variance was not supported by material evidence. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, J.W. Causey, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An advanced practice nurse worked at three different testosterone clinics in the Memphis area and was charged with violating portions of the Nursing Practice Act and the rules and regulations governing nurses. The Tennessee Board of Nursing (the “Board”) held a hearing and determined that the evidence supported many of the alleged offenses. The Board revoked the nurse’s certificate to practice as an advanced practice nurse, revoked the nurse’s license to practice as a registered nurse in Tennessee and the multistate privilege to practice in any other party state, and assessed civil penalties against her that totaled $7,200. The nurse sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The nurse then appealed the Board’s decision to this court. Concluding that substantial and material facts support the Board’s findings, we affirm the Board’s decision.

The Defendant, Kevin Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued a physician, alleging that the physician’s handshake caused her injuries and that the physician failed to properly document her medical records. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Health Care Liability Act. We conclude that the claim of failure to properly document plaintiff’s medical records relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of that claim for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act’s procedural requirements. But we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injuries allegedly caused by the physician’s handshake. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Guy Len Biggs, pled guilty to aggravated perjury and fabrication of evidence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-16-703 and 39-16-503. For his respective crimes, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four and five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the effective five-year sentence to run consecutively to a prior, twelve-year sentence for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his present sentences to run consecutively to his prior sentence. The defendant also vaguely challenges the length and manner of service of his sentences for aggravated perjury and fabrication of evidence. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s four and five-year sentences to be served in confinement, consecutively to the twelve-year sentence for attempted second degree murder.

This is a child custody case. Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that Father should be designated as the child’s primary residential parent. Father requests attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. This Court deems the appeal frivolous and remands this matter to the juvenile court to determine attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Father.

The defendant, Jeffrey Glynn McCoy, appeals the total effective sentence of 12 years imposed for his Gibson County guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing terms of 12 years and by ordering that he serve the effective sentence consecutively to a sentence previously imposed in South Carolina. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 allows a trial court to set aside a final judgment under certain circumstances, including when the judgment is void or “for any other reason justifying relief.” Here, a decedent’s mother, in her capacity as her unmarried son’s next of kin, filed a lawsuit seeking damages for his wrongful death. The case was settled and dismissed. Nearly twenty months later, the decedent’s alleged minor child filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal and to be substituted as the plaintiff. The motion asserted that the child was the decedent’s next of kin and the proper party to pursue the wrongful death claim, based on the decedent’s execution of an acknowledgment of paternity and a Mississippi trial court order for support. The trial court denied the motion, finding it was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling, holding that the Rule 60.02 motion was not ripe for adjudication until the trial court conclusively established the child’s paternity. We find the Court of Appeals erred by focusing on issues surrounding the child’s paternity rather than reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 60.02 motion. We hold that the trial court properly denied relief under Rule 60.02. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.