APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On February 6, 2014, defendant Judy Goodwin, principal of Barfield Elementary School, received an anonymous telephone call. The caller said she was a nurse and the grandparent of a child that she had just picked up at the school. The caller reported that she had seen a teacher, as it turned out, plaintiff Jerretta Certain, who appeared to the caller to be in an altered state. The caller said Ms. Certain was putting children in danger. Principal Goodwin decided to investigate the caller’s claim. She asked Ms. Certain, school nurse Jessica Floyd, and Student Resource Officer Ward Bates, to come to Ms. Certain’s classroom. All three observed Ms. Certain. Generally speaking, each considered her to be in an altered state. They described her as appearing drowsy, slow, and walking with difficulty. They discovered in her bags seven bottles of medications, all prescribed for Ms. Certain, in properly-marked childproof containers. Ms. Certain alleges that Principal Goodwin stated, “I believe what we’re looking at is an addiction to prescription drugs.” The principal asked Nurse Floyd, “would you want your child in her classroom next year knowing that she’s addicted to prescriptions like this?” Ms. Certain brought this action against Principal Goodwin for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Principal Goodwin summary judgment on all claims, holding as a matter of law that Ms. Certain could not establish the following essential elements: (1) actual malice; (2) that the alleged statements were defamatory; and (3) that the statements were published. Ms. Certain appeals. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This case deals with the issue of whether a personal representative of an estate can obtain additional attorney’s fees incurred in connection with an appeal−an appeal that occurred after the personal representative had disbursed all the estate funds other than those belonging to the estate beneficiary who pursued the appeal. That individual−Donnie Culp (Culp)−appealed the sale of his late mother’s real and personal property by Dianne Rich (the personal representative), executor of his late mother’s estate. Prior to Culp’s appeal, the personal representative obtained a court order closing the estate and awarding her $43,256.37 in attorney’s fees. These attorney’s fees included an estimated 40 hours for an appeal. After paying all estate debts, including her compensation and attorney’s fees, the personal representative disbursed all remaining estate funds, other than Culp’s share, to the other beneficiaries. The personal representative now seeks $17,500 in additional attorney’s fees for the over 70 hours that her attorney spent on the appeal. The trial court denied the personal representative’s request for additional attorney’s fees, holding that it would be inappropriate to award them to her out of Culp’s share of the estate. The court noted that the personal representative should have raised the issue before distributing the rest of the estate. We hold that the personal representative’s attorney was fully compensated by the initial award of attorney’s fees for her attorney’s services on appeal. We further hold that no estate funds remain from which the personal representative could obtain additional attorney’s fees because she distributed all funds other than Culp’s share. Additionally, we hold that Culp lacks standing to ask this Court to determine whether the personal representative should be individually liable for her attorney’s fees. The personal representative appeals. We affirm.  

The Petitioner, Brandon Leon Forbes, was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. Subsequently, his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Brandon Leon Forbes, No. W2014-02073-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5813434, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2015). He then filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm that order.

This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s order establishing paternity and retroactive child support, for a child who was born in 1996 and reached majority during the course of these proceedings. In 2014, with the assistance of a Tennessee Department of Human Services Title IV-D Staff Attorney, the child’s mother filed a UIFSA petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County to establish paternity and an initial child support order and to recover retroactive child support for her son. Genetic testing confirmed Father’s parentage, and the trial court ordered Father to pay retroactive child support in the amount of $127,530.00. Father timely appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

I concur in the majority’s decision in all respects but one. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to “vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the calculation of retroactive child support and remand so that child support may be calculated based on the actual number of days Father exercised parenting time.”

This case focuses on a service contract between R.B.E,PLLC (RBE) and Emergency Coverage Corporation pursuant to which Dr. Robert Bruce Evans and his company were to provide medical services in emergency rooms. The issue before us is whether the subject contract obligates Emergency Coverage to schedule Dr. Evans for a minimum number of hours. Dr. Evans and RBE filed a breach of contract action alleging that Emergency Coverage failed to pay the required minimum monthly amounts due under the contract. Emergency Coverage filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the contract contains a minimum availability requirement for Dr. Evans but no obligation on the part of Emergency Coverage to use Dr. Evans for a guaranteed number of hours. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm

The Defendant, Eric Todd Whitaker, Jr., entered nolo contendere pleas to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2014) (aggravated burglary), 39-14-103 (2014) (theft of property). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of four years and six months for aggravated burglary and four years for theft of property. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deshan Sanders, received a five-year suspended sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, but that sentence was later fully revoked after a hearing. The Defendant then filed a motion to reduce his sentence, asking the trial court to reconsider its revocation decision. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Henderson County Circuit Court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order concerning retroactive child support.  Because the trial court’s order lacks the findings of facts and conclusions of law required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-2-311(a)(11), we vacate the order as to retroactive child support. The order is otherwise affirmed.

In this post-divorce parenting dispute, the mother appeals the trial court’s judgment modifying the residential co-parenting schedule and reducing the number of co-parenting days allotted to the mother from that provided in the prior permanent parenting plan. Having determined that the order appealed fails to resolve the issue of a corresponding modification in child support, we conclude that it is not a final order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”) commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Erie has no duty to defend its insureds in a separate action because the policies of insurance issued to its insureds provided no coverage for the claims asserted in that action. The insureds are the defendants in a separate action in which the buyers of the insureds’ home allege that the insureds made negligent misrepresentations concerning the property’s propensity to flood. The buyers sought to recover damages they sustained from flooding that occurred after the sale. Following discovery, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the “negligence” and “negligent misrepresentation” claims asserted against its insureds do not contain any allegations that constitute an “occurrence” as that term is defined in the policies; therefore, there is no coverage and no duty to defend the insureds. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We have determined that the “negligence” and “negligent misrepresentation” claims asserted against Erie’s insureds do not arise from an “occurrence” as that term is defined in the insurance policies; therefore, there is no coverage, and Erie has no duty to defend the insureds in the other action. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Erie.

The trial court denied mother’s petition to make her the primary residential parent of the parties’ three children. Based upon this court’s review of the facts, we have concluded that the trial court erred in assessing the best interest of the children and reverse the decision of the trial court.

A purchaser bought real property at a delinquent tax sale in Rutherford County, Tennessee. The delinquent taxpayer who owned the property at the time of the sale moved to redeem the property within one year of confirmation of the sale. After moving to redeem the property, the delinquent taxpayer conveyed it to a third party. The tax sale purchaser contested the redemption and, alternatively, requested reimbursement for expenses paid to preserve the value of the property during the redemption period. The trial court confirmed the redemption, divested title from the tax sale purchaser, vested title in the third party, and found that the tax sale purchaser was only entitled to reimbursement for property taxes paid on the property. The tax sale purchaser appealed. We affirm as modified.

Defendant, John David Smartt, was indicted for five counts of rape of a child, (Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9); one count of rape (Count 12); three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a child, (Counts 4, 7, and 10); and three counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a child (Counts 5, 8, and 11). Following a second jury trial, after the first trial ended in a mistrial, Defendant was convicted as charged on all twelve counts. The trial court imposed and effective sentence of 153 years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding a recorded phone call by the victim to Defendant; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence Defendant's wife's journal; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's convictions; 4) this court should overturn prior case law, so that the testimony of a victim regarding the content of sexually explicit material must be corroborated; and 5) his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In two separate cases, the Petitioner, Marcus A. Parram, pled guilty to domestic assault, stalking, harassment, and three counts of violation of an order of protection. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years, suspended to probation. In his timely petition for post-conviction relief, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining recordings of his jailhouse telephone conversations with the victim and for not securing a certain police officer or a child of the victim to testify on his behalf. It appears that he also claims that his pleas of guilty were involuntary. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm that denial.

In this post-divorce litigation, Father, who had been designated primary residential parent of the parties’ two children, filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, citing his military reassignment from Fort Campbell, Tennessee, to Huntsville, Alabama. Mother filed a counter petition, seeking to be named the primary residential parent. The parties reached agreement as to the parenting schedule but could not agree on which of them would be the primary residential parent. The trial court held a hearing and determined that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to be named the primary residential parent. Father appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Anthony Hatley, pled guilty to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement, which the Defendant now challenges. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Kenneth Krasovic, of reckless vehicular homicide and five counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon after he decided to pass a truck on a hill and collided with both the truck and an oncoming vehicle. The Petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney presented inadequate expert testimony and advised the Petitioner not to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This appeal arises from an action for partition of undeveloped real property located in Stewart County, Tennessee. The property consists of three non-contiguous tracts and is owned by three people ─ two brothers and their aunt. The brothers (“Plaintiffs”) seek partition of all of the property by sale. Their aunt (“Defendant”) seeks partition in kind. Pursuant to an agreed order of reference, the trial court referred the case to a special master to determine the ownership interests of the parties, whether the property could be partitioned in kind, and whether there were any encumbrances. Prior to the completion of the master’s report, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The court delayed ruling on the motion until after the master’s report was completed. Thereafter, the special master filed a report in which he found that Defendant owned a one-half undivided interest, and each Plaintiff owned an undivided one-fourth interest. The master also concluded that the overall value of the property would be reduced if the property was partitioned in kind among the three parties. Defendant filed eight exceptions to the report. After reviewing the report and evidence presented at the master’s hearing, the trial court concurred with all but one of the master’s findings. As for that one issue, the court ordered a partial partition in kind of one tract, awarded that parcel to Defendant, and ordered her to pay $195,948 to Plaintiffs for the value of that parcel. The remaining property was to be sold with the proceeds divided according to the parties’ respective interests. The court also denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred by (1) delaying its ruling on her summary judgment motion; (2) determining that Plaintiffs each owned an undivided one-fourth interest; (3) ruling that the entire property could not be partitioned in kind; and (4) valuing the parcel awarded to her in kind based on incompetent evidence. We affirm the trial court on all issues except for the value assigned to the parcel awarded to Defendant, and modify the judgment in that respect only.

Defendant, Randy Joe Richards, was convicted of theft of property valued over $10,000 but less than $60,000, vandalism less than $500, and driving on a revoked license.  As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence.  After a review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to fifteen years in incarceration.

The Petitioner, Eric Demond McCathern, was convicted after a jury trial of possession of twenty-six or more grams of a substance containing cocaine within one thousand feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and aggravated burglary committed with the intent to commit possession of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After this court denied relief on direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel performed deficiently in advising him to plead guilty to aggravated burglary during trial because the plea essentially conceded elements of the contested drug charge. The Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a severance or move to suppress evidence. The post-conviction court denied relief. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established prejudice, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Melvin L. Horne, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on a note on the court file from the original guilty plea hearing.  The State responds that the note is not properly included in the record, that Defendant waived consideration of the issue by failing to object during the hearing, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Julia Sanford, was indicted for failure to maintain her lane, violation of the financial responsibility law, driving under the influence, and driving under the influence per se with a blood alcohol content of .20 or higher. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of her vehicle. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jewell Wayne Smith, Jr., appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 best interest guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a thirteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his guilty plea was involuntary and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, pled guilty on January 12, 2015, to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, on September 22, 2016, he filed an untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging as newly discovered evidence that the victim was taking medication for oppositional defiant disorder, which, he believed, raised questions as to whether her responses were true or, simply, impulsive responses. Not knowing the victim was taking this medication meant that the Petitioner’s pleas of guilty were unknowing and involuntary, according to his argument. Additionally, he asserts that the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), violates his right to due process, which, in his view, tolls the one-year statute of limitations for filing his claim. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, finding that, pursuant to the holding in Frazier, the relief the Petitioner sought was not available because he had entered pleas of guilty. Further, the coram nobis court determined that the Petitioner had been aware that the victim was undergoing “some possible mental health treatment.” Accordingly, the coram nobis court denied relief, and we affirm that determination pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.