APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, David Parr, appeals the Stewart County Circuit Court’s imposition of a fully-incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of methamphetamine and fentanyl with intent to sell or deliver, asking this court to remand to the trial court for consideration of Community Corrections under Code section 40-36- 106(2)(c). Because the superseding indictments violated the principles of double jeopardy and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the plea submission hearing, the judgments entered on the superseding indictments are void, and we dismiss the appeal.

This case concerns the validity of a county resolution prohibiting quarries and rock crushers “within five thousand (5,000) feet of a residence, school, licensed daycare facility, park, recreation center, church, retail, commercial, professional or industrial establishment.” The plaintiff landowners argued that the county failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee’s county zoning statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to -115. In the alternative, they argued that state law expressly preempted local regulation of quarries. However, the county argued that it was exercising its authority to protect its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare under the county powers statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-118. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that it had no comprehensive zoning plan. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Appellant filed this declaratory judgment action against his sister, seeking to enforce a contract concerning property owned by the siblings’ parents at their deaths. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the contract was unenforceable, as there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake of fact. The trial court further found that a conveyance of real property was barred by the statute of frauds. Because Appellant has failed to supply this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at trial, we must affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake.

This is an appeal from two orders entered by the trial court in this post-divorce action. In
the first order, the trial court found the mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt,
upon a petition filed by the father, for scheduling and taking the parties’ minor child to two
doctor’s appointments and a walk-in clinic in violation of the parties’ permanent parenting
plan. The parenting plan granted to the father exclusive decision-making authority over all
non-emergency medical decisions for the children. In the second order, the trial court sua
sponte modified the parties’ parenting plan, granting the father “tie-breaking authority” to
schedule non-school-related extracurricular activities during the mother’s co-parenting
time on the condition that if the mother did not agree to a particular activity, the father
would pay for and provide transportation to the activities. Neither party had filed a petition
seeking to modify the parenting plan. The mother appeals this modification on the grounds
that no material change in circumstance existed to justify modification of the parenting
plan and argues further that the modification was not in the best interest of the children
because it would likely create more disputes between the parties going forward. With
regard to the criminal contempt determinations, the mother argues on appeal that her
actions in scheduling the two doctor’s visits were not “willful” as required for a finding of
criminal contempt and that her action in taking the child to the walk-in clinic was
precipitated by a medical emergency, a situation over which the parenting plan did not
grant the father exclusive control. Upon thorough review, we discern no reversible error
in the trial court’s determination that the mother was guilty of three counts of criminal
contempt for violating the permanent parenting plan and accordingly affirm that order in
its entirety. Regarding the second order, we find as a threshold matter that the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parties’ parenting plan in the absence
of a petition to modify or motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the
trial court’s order modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan.

The Petitioner, Jimmiko Driskell, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction
relief from her second degree murder conviction, arguing that she received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and was denied due process of law because she lacked the
knowledge to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea. Based on our review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marcus Green, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first
degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, employing a
firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, he received a sentence of life plus one hundred
five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by refusing to bifurcate the
charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the remaining charges, and that
his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Christopher Bolden, of especially aggravated
robbery, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal,
Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for
severance of his case from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred in “curtailing
[Defendant’s] questions in jury selection”; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s
request to cross-examine the victim about “potential bias” related to cases that the State
dismissed against the victim while Defendant awaited trial; (5) the trial court erred in
admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for robbery “without engaging in the required
analysis”; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask questions about “an irrelevant
and prejudicial rap music video”; (7) the trial court erred by refusing to fully bifurcate a
charged count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm from all other counts; and (8)
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we
affirm Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

The mother in this action filed for divorce and sought to relocate to North Carolina with the parties’ son. Following settlement of all issues aside from the matters of parenting time and child support, the trial court designated the mother primary residential parent and allowed her to move back to her home state. The father appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ginny Elizabeth Parker, was convicted following a bench trial of five counts of forgery, for which she received an effective six-year sentence to serve. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her forgery convictions, specifically regarding whether she acted without authorization; (2) the trial court shifted the burden of service of medical records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-122(c) from the State to the Defendant; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted proof of a PayPal account that was linked to the victims’ bank account; (4) she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) her sentence is grossly disproportionate to her offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employer terminated an employee after she requested unpaid commissions pursuant to
her contract. The employee sued her former employer claiming breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, retaliatory discharge, and intentional misrepresentation. She also sought
punitive damages. The jury found in the employee’s favor on all claims and awarded
damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory discharge as well as
awarding punitive damages. The former employer sought post-trial relief, arguing the
jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and that the jury’s punitive damages award was in error
and excessive. The trial court concluded the verdicts were consistent but did reduce, while
not eliminating, the punitive damages award. The former employer appeals, challenging
the compensatory and punitive damage awards. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Omari Davis, pled guilty to possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to serve a term of eighteen years. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to seek a competency evaluation. At the hearing, the Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The post-conviction court denied relief as to the competency evaluation but did not address the continuance issue. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider whether the District Attorney General’s
Office should have been disqualified from prosecuting this case because the District
Attorney General previously served as counsel for the accused in a separate case. Second,
we consider the propriety of conducting a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory
that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. David Wayne Eady was
charged in one indictment with committing multiple robberies in Nashville over the course
of a month. Mr. Eady moved to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, primarily
because the District Attorney General had represented him in a criminal matter
approximately thirty years earlier. The prior matter resulted in a conviction that the State
sought to use in this case to qualify Mr. Eady as a repeat violent offender for sentencing
purposes. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify, noting the limited nature of the
District Attorney General’s involvement in this case and the “mandatory nature of the
repeat violent offender statute.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(g) (2019). Mr. Eady
also moved to sever the offenses, which the trial court denied upon finding that the crimes
were parts of a common scheme or plan and that the evidence of one offense would be
admissible in the trial of the others. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). Mr. Eady ultimately
was convicted as charged of eleven counts of aggravated robbery, two of which later were
merged, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. Upon Mr. Eady’s appeal as of
right, a divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Eady, No.
M2021-00388-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 7835823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2022),
perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2023). The intermediate appellate court was unanimous
in rejecting the challenge to prosecution of the case by the District Attorney General’s
Office. Id. at *34–35. After noting that there was “no real dispute between the parties that
[the District Attorney General] had an actual conflict of interest disqualifying him from
participating in [Mr. Eady’s] prosecution,” the court seemed to proceed on the assumption
that an actual conflict of interest existed but nevertheless held that this conflict did not
require disqualification of the entire office. Id. at *34. In addition, a majority of the court
upheld the denial of a severance. Id. at *28–30. One judge dissented, however, concluding
that the offenses should have been severed because the evidence did not reflect that the
offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Id. at *38–42 (McMullen, J., dissenting
in part). We granted Mr. Eady’s appeal to address both issues. As for the motion to
disqualify, we agree with the State’s argument before this Court that the circumstances do
not establish an actual conflict of interest for the District Attorney General, and we
conclude that the trial court correctly denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney
General’s Office. As for the motion to sever, we have determined that the record does not
establish that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Thus, we conclude that
the trial court erred in denying a severance. However, we find the error harmless as to all
convictions except the one in count eight. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals in part, reverse it in part, and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Ahmed G. Mohd Alkhatib, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to vacate his 2006 guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of facilitation of the delivery of marijuana, for which he received an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence.  The post-conviction court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition after determining it was untimely.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Father appeals the denial of his petition in opposition to a proposed relocation by Mother
and his petition to change custody of the children. After considering the testimony of over
ten witnesses, the trial court ruled that the children’s best interests were served by allowing
Mother to relocate and by her remaining the children’s primary residential parent. The trial
court also awarded Mother considerable attorney’s fees, including fees incurred in
defending against a dependency and neglect action that had eventually been dismissed,
with the related visitation and custody issues transferred to the trial court. Discerning no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions, we affirm. We deny, however, Mother’s
request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Defendant, Jennifer May Mahaffey, pled guilty to alternate counts of sale of
methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams” and delivery of methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams”1
in three cases, 20-027-2, 20-028-2, and 20-029-2. The trial court sentenced Defendant to
ten years imprisonment on each count, merged the alternate counts in each case, and ran
the ten-year sentences in two of the cases concurrently with each other, and the ten-year
sentence in the third case consecutively to the first two, for a total effective sentence of
twenty years confinement. The trial court also imposed fines totaling $6,100, and ordered
restitution in the amount of $563. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in
ordering restitution to the Henderson County Sheriff’s Department, in imposing fines and
restitution without determining her present and future ability to pay, and in imposing partial
consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the
applicable law, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s imposition of partial
consecutive sentences, but we determine the order of restitution was in error. Therefore,
we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court, vacate the orders of restitution, and
remand for entry of corrected judgments.

Defendant, Shundarius Turner, was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, especially
aggravated robbery, aggravated criminal trespass, aggravated assault, and reckless
endangerment. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years, eleven months,
and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in excluding a
photographic lineup where he was not identified by one of the victims, the evidence was
insufficient to support his felony convictions, the trial court’s sentencing decision violated
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the trial court erred in excluding a witness from
testifying on his behalf, the trial court erred in denying his right to strike a juror for cause,
and the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of
the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

A Shelby County Jury convicted William Heath, Petitioner, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgments of the trial court, and the Tennessee Supreme Court declined discretionary review. Petitioner then petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. While Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was pending, he moved for DNA analysis and post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby Marable II, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury
of aggravated kidnapping involving bodily injury, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault
by strangulation, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective thirty-five year
sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304(a)(4) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping involving bodily
injury), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2015) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault
involving strangulation or attempted strangulation), -(e)(1)(A)(ii) (classifying aggravated
assault involving strangulation as a Class C felony). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the trial court
erred in its jury instructions on aggravated kidnapping, (3) the court erred in allowing the
State to impeach the Defendant with his prior convictions under Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 609, (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the court’s errors,
and (5) the court erred in classifying him as a Range III, persistent offender for his
aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the trial court’s
judgment for aggravated kidnapping, and we remand the case with instructions for the trial
court to correct the Defendant’s aggravated assault judgment to reflect a ten-year sentence
as a Range II, multiple offender.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found
by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that
termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appealed. On appeal, the
Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” three of the grounds that the trial
court concluded were established. We reverse these three grounds. Of the three remaining
grounds, which DCS maintains were sufficiently proven, we conclude that the ground of
substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing
evidence. We further find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
children. However, due to insufficiencies in the trial court’s findings, we vacate the
grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility against the mother. We reverse in part, with respect to three grounds for termination, and vacate in part, with respect to two grounds for termination, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Kinney Louis Spears, was indicted by the Houston County Grand Jury for the first degree murder of his wife, Mia Donnita Spears. The Houston County Circuit Court granted Defendant’s motion for a change of venue and transferred the case to the Dickson County Circuit Court. A Dickson County jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years’ confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that several improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument constitute plain error, and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2000, the Scott County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Hubert Glenn Sexton, Jr.,
for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, and the Defendant was convicted of
both counts and was sentenced to death for each offense. State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d
371, 378 (Tenn. 2012). Thereafter, this court granted the Defendant post-conviction
relief from these convictions and remanded his case for a new trial. Sexton v. State, No.
E2018-01864-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 6320518, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25,
2019). On retrial, the Defendant was again convicted of two counts of first degree
premeditated murder and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without parole.
In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred (1) by denying his constitutional
right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee State Constitution, and (2) by allowing several
witnesses to testify about allegations that the Defendant had sexually abused his stepdaughter
prior to the killings in this case. After review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
An attorney negotiated a settlement on behalf of a client in litigation over the
administration of an estate. The same attorney subsequently assisted his client in the prior
litigation in filing a related suit in which the party obtained default judgment. The Plaintiff
in the present case is seeking to set aside that default judgment and to obtain other relief,
asserting the Defendant acted unscrupulously in filing a suit on matters which had
previously been settled. The trial judge reported the attorney, who is no longer the attorney
representing the Defendant, to the Board of Professional Responsibility based on the filing
of the suit which resulted in the default judgment. The Defendant seeks recusal of the trial
judge, asserting that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The judge
denied the motion for recusal, finding that he could be fair and impartial, had not prejudged
any matters, and that a person of ordinary prudence would find no reasonable basis
for questioning his impartiality. We affirm.

In 2013, the Defendant, Jordan Isaiah Mosby, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree
murder, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence suspended to supervised probation.
In 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant
had absconded. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated his
probation by absconding to Florida. The trial court ordered him to serve his ten-year
sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking to modify
the revocation order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On
appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence
in confinement, by not granting him credit for time he successfully served on probation,
and by ruling that the Defendant’s custody in the Tennessee Department of Correction
prevented the court from modifying the sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a suit brought by a homeowner’s association to enforce a property
restriction contained in its declarations against a resident subject to the declarations. After
the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the homeowner’s association, the
trial court granted it relief and entered an injunction against the homeowner. The
homeowner appealed. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the homeowner’s
association’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirm the trial court’s judgment.