APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Deandre Bonds, aka Israel El-Elyon, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and one count of evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors, for which he received a total effective sentence of six months. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the judgments of conviction incorrectly note the convictions are Class B misdemeanors; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court only for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the offenses are Class A misdemeanors. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Gary E. Floyd, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the lesserincluded offense of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-210. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (2) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; (4) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense; and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Reggie Horton, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, and simple assault, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated kidnapping. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, David Von Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by one having a prior felony conviction, Class D felonies; and felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the two drug convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years on that conviction; the court merged the four various possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions and imposed a sentence of five years on that conviction; and the court imposed a sentence of five years on the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The court ordered that the sentence for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for a total effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in not considering any mitigating factors in determining his sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over a fatal cycling accident. Carolyn Crisp (“Plaintiff”), surviving spouse of William Andrew Crisp (“Decedent”), sued Michael Nelms (“Nelms”) and George Long (“Long”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for negligence. Decedent and four others, including Nelms and Long, were riding as part of a “paceline” group when a crash occurred. Nelms asserted comparative fault, stating that Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line. Long denied he slowed down suddenly. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court held, among other things, that paceline cycling inherently is dangerous and that Decedent was at least 50% at fault for his accident. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line and whether a reasonable jury could find Decedent less than 50% at fault in his accident. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the case to proceed.

The Defendant, Derek Cullen Lee, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court “did not sufficiently weigh all the [required] factors . . . in deciding suitability for diversion”; and (2) that the trial court’s decision to deny his request for judicial diversion was based on the offense that he was convicted of rather than the applicable factors. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Brandon Lacy Franklin, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and imposition of an increased sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Over twelve years ago, Petitioner, Ronnie Henry, was convicted at a jury trial of several counts of robbery involving multiple victims in Shelby County. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2006-00344-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 450459, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). After resentencing, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s effective seventy-year sentence. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2009-00089- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2009), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Ronnie Henry v. State, No. W2014-01786-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1402951, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Now, Petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Individual members of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly and the 110th Tennessee General Assembly appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) denying their motion to intervene in this suit involving the divorce of a same-sex couple and specifically involving the issue of whether the spouse who has no biological or other recognized legal relationship to the parties’ minor child may be considered a parent under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306 (2013). We find and hold that because all of the issues in the divorce now are final the case has been rendered moot as it has lost its justicability and no longer involves a present, ongoing controversy. We further find and hold that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. As the case is moot, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Quanya Revell Prewitt, appeals the denial of her petition for postconviction relief from her conviction for possession of dihydrocodeinone in a school zone with intent to sell. She argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Jeffery A. Jones, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to DUI .08 % or greater, reserving as a certified question of law whether the results of his forced blood draw should have been suppressed because the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained reckless falsities and the form nature of the search warrant and affidavit prevented the magistrate from making an informed judgment as to probable cause. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Unmarried father filed a petition to establish parentage and a residential parenting schedule. After father’s parentage was established, the juvenile court set a residential parenting schedule that awarded equal parenting time and ordered the child’s surname changed to a hyphenated version of both parents’ surnames. Mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in fashioning the parenting schedule and in ordering a change of the child’s surname. Upon review, we affirm the residential parenting schedule but vacate that portion of the order directing a change in the child’s surname.

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., concurring. I agree with the majority that the defendant was searched without reasonable suspicion, that the evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court,1 and that the judgment of conviction must be vacated and the case dismissed.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Adam Davis, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent term of eight years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher James Kirkland, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Blount County Circuit Court conviction of the delivery of a controlled substance. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Calvin Lyndell Dibrell, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver within a prohibited zone, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle and that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions. Because the evidence obtained from the defendant’s vehicle was the result of an illegal search and seizure, the judgments of the trial court are vacated, and the case is dismissed.

The Petitioner, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as having been untimely filed and for failing to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review, we agree with the coram nobis court that the Petitioner is attempting to relitigate the denial of his pretrial suppression motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Thomas Louis Moore, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and order of incarceration for the remainder of his ten-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a final decree of divorce. Mother appeals, contending the trial court erred in designating Father as the Primary Residential Parent and awarding the majority of parenting time to Father; she also challenges the division of the martial property. Because the trial court made no findings of fact and the statement of the evidence is inadequate, we have determined that we cannot conduct an appropriate appellate review of the issues raised. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded for the trial court to, inter alia, comply with the mandate in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, which states that “the [trial] court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”

The plaintiff, a former firefighter with the City of McMinnville Fire Department, brought this retaliatory discharge claim against his previous employer under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff was unable to prove that the City’s proffered reason for the discharge was pretextual. Finding no genuine dispute, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

This case involves an order by the trial court directing the personal representative of the Estate of James Hood Nichols (the Estate) to sell a portion of the real property of the Estate. James Hood Nichols (the deceased) died testate. He bequeathed annuities to his daughters, Connie Jane Nichols Cinder and Nan Nichols Jones (the beneficiaries). In the will, the deceased gave a $75,000 annuity to Connie Jane Nichols Cinder and a $50,000 annuity to Nan Nichols Jones. According to the final settlement filed by Richard N. Swanson and Earl Wayne Campbell (the co-executors), the net distributable probate estate is $8,712.01. The co-executors proposed to distribute that amount to the beneficiaries in proportion to the amount left to each beneficiary. The beneficiaries filed an objection to the proposed final settlement, asking the court to order the sale of a portion of the deceased’s real property in order to fund the annuities. Finding that the bequests to the beneficiaries are higher priority than other bequests and devises in the will, the trial court ordered the personal representative to sell a portion of the deceased’s real property sufficient to fund the annuities. The trial court also awarded the beneficiaries their attorney’s fees. The co-executors appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Cory Lynn White, was convicted by a jury of making a false report or statement, and he received a three-year spilt confinement sentence for this conviction. The Defendant appeals, arguing (1) that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.1 Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jenna Sims, pled guilty to multiple driving and drug offenses, for which she received an agreed-upon sentence of one-year, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Defendant was later placed on probation. During her probation, the Defendant left a residential treatment program and failed to return to jail, so a probation violation warrant was filed and she was charged with failure to appear. She pled guilty to the failure to appear charge and received an agreed-upon sentence of one year to be served consecutively to the remainder of her probationary sentence. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered her to serve her one year sentence for failure to appear in confinement. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation and by denying her alternative sentencing. We disagree. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

After a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Allen Fleming, of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fourth offense, and three counts of aggravated vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years in confinement. At the motion for new trial hearing, the parties agreed that the Defendant’s DUI fourth offense conviction should have merged into his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide conviction, reducing his sentence to an effective sentence of forty years. No amended judgment appears in the record. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the blood draw evidence; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted the results from the blood draw because the evidence was not authenticated and the chain of custody was not established; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted autopsy photographs of the victims; (4) the State violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (5) the trial court erred when it found that Trooper James Fillers was an expert witness; (6) the trial court erred when it admitted the written report of expert Dr. Davis because the report contained hearsay; (7) the trial court erred when it sentenced him; (8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (9) the cumulative errors by the trial court constitute reversible error. After review and for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. We also remand the case for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the Defendant’s DUI fourth offense conviction is merged with one of his aggravated vehicular homicide convictions.

The Petitioner, Timothy Evans, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to have the Petitioner “evaluated in order to present an insanity or diminished capacity defense”; (2) for failing to call “a psychological expert” to support the Petitioner’s duress defense; (3) for failing to “adequately prepare” the Petitioner to testify on cross-examination; and (4) for “depriving [the] Petitioner of a review of his duress [defense] by the appellate courts” by failing to include portions of the trial transcript in the appellate record. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.