APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a saving statute case, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s third product-liability case, which was filed within one year of the dismissal of her second lawsuit, but more than one year after the entry of the initial nonsuit in Appellant’s first lawsuit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Joseph Floyd, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his DUI and reckless driving convictions, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition based on a lack of jurisdiction because his probation had expired. The State concedes that the court erroneously dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition.

The Defendant, Ethan Alexander Self, was found guilty by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, (2) the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror for a race-based reason, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (4) the court erred in denying the Defendant's motions for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to disclose evidence, (5) the court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based upon the State's eliciting evidence in violation of the court's pretrial evidentiary rulings, (6) the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to preserve alarm clocks from the victim's bedroom, (7) the court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant and the victim's good relationship and lack of abuse, (8) the court erred in the procedure by which the jury inspected the gun used in the victim's homicide, (9) prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the State's rebuttal argument, (10) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, (11) cumulative trial error necessitates a new trial, and (12) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. We conclude that there is no reversible error, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after Dr. Brietstein testified that, in his opinion, the shooting was not accidental. As the majority notes, this testimony was elicited by the prosecutor in violation of the court’s earlier ruling which prohibited Dr. Brietstein from testifying to any opinion that the shooting was accidental or intentional.

This is a termination of parental rights case. M.L. (Mother) and M.O. (Stepfather) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of L.D.D. (Father) to his child, E.S.L. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of two grounds supporting termination. The court also found, by the same standard of evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.R.S. (Mother) and J.R.S.1 (Father) with respect to their child, D.R.S. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination of the rights of each parent. The court also found, by the same standard of evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm as modified.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Lillian D. (“the Child”). On October 7, 2013, the Knox County Juvenile Court granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s biological mother, Penelope D. (“Mother”), in the Knox County Juvenile Court on January 26, 2015.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was mentally incompetent to care for the Child and that the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A law firm sued a former client for unpaid attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded the firm a judgment. The former client appealed but provided no transcript or statement of the evidence. Consequently, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Keith Ward, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a child rapist to 32.5 years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a finding of criminal contempt in a child support matter. Dawn Veronica Brown (“Mother”) filed a petition for contempt against her ex-husband Tadd Timothy Brown (“Father”) in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”). In her petition, Mother alleged numerous violations by Father of the parenting plan and marital dissolution agreement, including that Father had failed to pay child support toward their minor child (“the Child”). After a trial, the Trial Court found Father guilty on twelve counts of criminal contempt. Father appeals. We find and hold that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Father’s convictions for failure to pay child support. However, we reverse the count found against Father for his refusal to turn the Child over to maternal relatives rather than Mother over one specific summer week, and modify his sentence accordingly. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, James Daniel Vaughn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Angela Christina Best (“Best”) appeals the decision of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”) and awarding SunTrust a judgment against Best in the amount of $379.60 plus post-judgment interest and attorney fees. Best raises issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in exercising jurisdiction after finding that the contract at issue in this case contained an arbitration clause, whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment both on SunTrust’s complaint and on Best’s counterclaim, and whether the Trial Court erred in granting SunTrust’s attorney’s fees allegedly in excess of those allowed under the contract. We find and hold that the arbitration clause in the contract never was triggered, that SunTrust made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, that Best failed to show any genuine disputed issues of material fact, and that SunTrust was entitled to summary judgment both on the complaint and on Best’s counterclaim. We further find and hold that the attorney’s fees awarded were in excess of those allowed under the contract. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment and modify the award of attorney’s fees to comply with the contract.

The defendant, James Ray Bartlett, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion on the grounds that his sentence had expired.  Because Rule 36.1 cannot avail the defendant of meaningful relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Lee Anne Frazier (Wife) in the parties' divorce proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Wife, as well as the answer in opposition filed by Arron Wesley Frazier (Husband), we conclude that the Trial Court should have granted the motion because the unique circumstances of this case create an appearance of bias on the part of the Trial Court Judge that required his recusal. We therefore reverse the order of the Trial Court and remand the case for reassignment to a different judge.

The Petitioner, David G. Skipper, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of thirty-one years.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by not treating his petition for post-conviction relief as a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Thomas E. Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1989 conviction of escape.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an obligor’s petition to terminate his $1,500 monthly alimony obligation due to his retirement from overseas contractual government employment. The trial court held that a substantial and material change in circumstances occurred when the obligor elected to not renew his employment contract due to a change in his work schedule and reduced the alimony payments to $900 per month. The recipient appeals. We hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s factual findings. Based on our review of the evidence, the obligor failed to demonstrate that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred such that a modification of his spousal support obligation was warranted. We reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate the previous alimony award, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Douglas Curtis, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony.  On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that a portion of the victim’s testimony violated his right to a fair trial.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Organizations representing property owners in close proximity to a proposed subdivision filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the regional planning commission’s approval of the proposed subdivision. The planning commission and parties with an interest in the proposed subdivision filed motions to dismiss. After determining that the petition was untimely and the petitioning organizations lacked standing, the chancery court granted the motions to dismiss. The court also determined that the planning commission had acted legally in approving the subdivision. The petitioning organizations appealed. Following our review, we conclude that the statutory period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari began to run from approval of the preliminary plat for the proposed subdivision. Because the petition was filed more than sixty days after the preliminary plat was approved, the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition. Therefore, we affirm the chancery court’s dismissal of the petition.  

Defendant, Anthony Robinson, filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that he was incorrectly sentenced as a Range II offender when he should have been sentenced as a Range I offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Guary L. Wallace, was convicted in the Crockett County Circuit Court of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated assault, all under a theory of criminal responsibility. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant received the following sentences of incarceration: 40 years for attempted first degree murder; 40 years for especially aggravated robbery; 20 years for each aggravated robbery conviction; and ten years for each especially aggravated assault conviction. His 40-year sentences were ordered to run concurrently, and his remaining sentences were ordered to run consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of 100 years. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences and argues: 1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions on a theory of criminal responsibility; 2) that the trial court failed to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror; 3) that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on criminal responsibility; 4) that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and 5) that his sentences amount to cruel and unusual punishment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Brandon Ray Rust, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to burglary and was granted judicial diversion with the requirement that he complete three years on probation.  Subsequently, the trial court revoked probation and ordered that the appellant serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant acknowledges that he violated probation but contends that the trial court should have ordered a sentence that included an alternative to confinement.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an involuntary dismissal after the close of plaintiff’s proof under Rule 41.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The pro se plaintiff submitted a statement of the evidence, and the defendants objected, requesting that the statement of the evidence be excluded from the record. The trial court sustained the objection and excluded the statement of the evidence from the record. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact. Because the trial court was required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to approve a statement of the evidence, we also remand for supplementation of the record.    

Defendant, Michael Holmes, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated robbery, three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count each of facilitation of a felony and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant of two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years for each count of aggravated robbery, to be served concurrently. The trial court merged Defendant's three convictions for first degree murder into one conviction and imposed a sentence of life, to be served consecutively to the sentences in Defendant's other convictions. In addition to the sentence for the aggravated robberies, the trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years for attempted first degree murder and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by not ruling that Devin Herndon was an accomplice whose testimony required independent corroboration. Following a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Bryant Long, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed a video recording of the victim’s interview to be admitted without satisfying the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.