APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a sentence of death based on three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (2010 & Supp. 2013). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. On automatic appeal to this Court, we designated the following issues for oral argument: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals committed error by affirming the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s confessions were freely and voluntarily made; and (2) whether under our mandatory review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1), the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid. Having carefully considered the issues raised by the 2 defendant and the mandatory review provisions, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the trial court’s merger of the defendant’s convictions for first degree murder into a single conviction.

We concur fully with all of the Court’s opinion except for Section II(B)(iv) containing the proportionality analysis. After conducting our own independent proportionality analysis, we concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Freeland’s sentence of death is not disproportionate to the sentences imposed on other similar offenders who have committed similar crimes.

The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment and twenty years, to be served consecutively. He filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective in dealing with a State’s witness; in not objecting to certain parts of the State’s closing argument; and in failing to conduct a proper investigation. The post-conviction court found that each claim was without merit, and, following our review, we conclude that the record supports that determination. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying relief.

The State appeals the Campbell County Circuit Court’s grant of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s convictions for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and sexual exploitation of a minor and his effective ten-year sentence. The State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Petitioner relief because he failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the trial court’s decision granting post-conviction relief and conclude that the Petitioner failed to show that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

The petitioner, Devaron Taylor, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and therefore respectfully
dissent from the majority opinion.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael John Stitts, of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve six years in confinement. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Michael John Stitts, W2011-02673-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 257069, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner appeals this denial, maintaining that his attorney was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 2011, the Petitioner, Sonny Lyles, pleaded guilty to multiple charges and received an effective sentence of twelve years and six months at 100%. In accordance with the plea agreement, this sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with a sentence in Arkansas. On February 18, 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in which he alleged that the 2011 judgments were void. He argued that because the state of Arkansas granted him an early release and he was transferred to Tennessee, his Tennessee sentence was now “consecutive” to his Arkansas sentence, which was not contemplated by the plea agreement. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Gary Lilley, pleaded guilty to first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief almost two years after pleading guilty, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from the chancery court’s decision to rescind a transaction for the sale of property. Purchaser gave Seller a check for $18,000 to buy a piece of property. Purchaser later sent a letter to the Seller attempting to rescind the transaction when he discovered Seller did not have title to the property it attempted to sell. Thereafter, Seller came into possession of the deed to the property and attempted to convey it to Purchaser. Purchaser filed suit in chancery court to rescind the transaction. The trial court held the transaction should be rescinded and the purchase price returned to the Purchaser because the Seller did not own the property at the time of the transaction. Seller appeals, asserting that Purchaser should be compelled to accept the after-acquired-title to the property or, alternatively, that it was entitled to specific performance. We have reviewed the record and the relevant legal principles and have determined that the trial court did not err in rescinding the transaction. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher M. Collin, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his judgments of conviction were void because they improperly subjected him to community supervision for life. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricky Allen Hickman, of one count of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty-five years for the rape of a child conviction and twelve years for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions.  The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for a total effective sentence of forty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for rape of a child; and (2) his sentence is excessive and contrary to law.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to remit support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination of each parent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Parents appeal. We reverse the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights for failure to remit child support. We affirm the court’s termination of parental rights in all other respects.

The petitioner, Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and/or petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely.  He asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled in the interest of justice because he did not learn until well after its expiration that his trial counsel simultaneously represented one of the witnesses against him, Henry Young, without his knowledge.  After review, we reverse the summary dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing.   
 

The petitioner, Donna Leigh Pearson, appeals the summary dismissal of her amended petition for post-conviction relief.  Because the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the amended petition as conceded by the State, the case is remanded to that court for an evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of counsel’s handling of the delayed direct appeal.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s grant of a one-year extension of an order of protection. The petitioner/father had initially obtained an ex parte order of protection against the respondent/mother in August 2005. Subsequent to the expiration of that ex parte order, the parties were divorced in January 2007, with the trial court incorporating into the final decree of divorce an agreed permanent parenting plan awarding the parents equal co-parenting time with their two minor children. Five years later under the docket number of the previous order of protection, the father initiated the instant action by filing an ex parte petition for a new order of protection against the mother. The trial court granted an ex parte order and subsequently entered a one-year order of protection to which the parties agreed on August 30, 2012. This order of protection, inter alia, allowed the mother three telephone calls per week with the children but no in-person contact. On October 1, 2012, the father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, utilizing the docket number of the original divorce action. In July 2013, the father filed, again within the divorce action, a motion to consolidate the order of protection and permanent parenting plan proceedings, requesting that the order of protection be extended indefinitely. Following a bench hearing, the trial court granted a one-year extension of the order of protection. The mother appeals. Because we determine that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the father proved the allegation of domestic abuse at the time the extension was granted, we vacate the trial court’s extension of the order.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the Tennessee prison system serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole for first degree murder. The Tennessee Board of Parole declined to recommend the inmate for parole, citing as its reason the seriousness of his offense. The inmate filed a common law writ of certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the Board’s decision to deny him parole. The chancery court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a retaliatory discharge case in which a former police officer filed suit against his department for back pay, front pay, and other compensatory damages. The trial court found that the police officer did not establish the elements of retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act and dismissed his suit. The police officer appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We granted permission to appeal in this premises liability action to address two issues: (1) whether the undisputed facts establish either the accepted work doctrine exception or the nondelegable duty to the public exception to the general rule that property owners are not vicariously liable for the negligence of independent contractors; and (2) whether disputes of material fact remain concerning the property owner’s actual or constructive notice of the defective condition created by the independent contractor’s negligence. We hold that the undisputed facts do not establish either exception to the general rule of non-liability and that the undisputed facts establish that the property owner had neither actual nor constructive notice of the defective condition created by the independent contractor’s negligence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the trial court granting the property owner summary judgment is reinstated.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

For his involvement in the January 2007 murders of the victims C.N. and C.C.,1 appellant, Letalvis Darnell Cobbins, was found guilty of multiple counts of first degree murder, facilitation of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape, for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole plus one hundred years. He appeals his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) whether misconduct of the trial judge constituted structural constitutional error; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for change of venue; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to continue; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning a firearm that appellant had possessed prior to the offense date; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing family members to wear buttons with the victims’ likenesses; and (7) whether the trial court erred in imposing an effective sentence of one hundred years to be served consecutively to his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and discern no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Disciplinary Board of the Turney Center Industrial Complex convicted Petitioner of assault based upon his involvement in a gang stabbing of another inmate, the conviction was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. Petitioner then filed this common law writ of certiorari with the Chancery Court of Hickman County to challenge his conviction. The trial court granted the writ and the administrative record was filed with the trial court. Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the trial court denied relief to Petitioner on the grounds that the record demonstrated that the disciplinary board had not acted illegally,arbitrarily,or exceeded its jurisdiction,and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Finding no error, we affirmed. Petitioner then filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to the Supreme Court, which granted the application and remanded to this court with instructions to address the issue of whether the trial court“ improperly dismissed the writ of certiorari without first disposing of [Petitioner’s] pretrial motions.” After requesting supplemental briefs on the issue, we have concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the writ of certiorari without first disposing of Petitioner’s motions. We reach this decision because we are unable to conclude that the outcome of the petition could not have been affected had the trial court granted some or all of the motions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim against the Madison County Circuit Court for alleged sentencing errors made in Appellant’s criminal case. The Commission dismissed the claim on the ground of judicial immunity. Appellant appeals. Because the Appellant failed to timely file his notice of appeal, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss.