APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A congregation within the Presbyterian Church sought to disaffiliate from its presbytery while retaining ownership of its real property. The presbytery argued that the congregation did not own the real property outright but rather held it in trust for the benefit of the national body of the Presbyterian Church. Following a hearing on competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the congregation owned the property outright. Thus, it denied the presbytery’s motion and granted the congregation’s motion. The presbytery timely appealed to this Court. Following careful review, we reverse.

This appeal concerns a long-running domestic matter. Heather R. Wilder (“Mother”) and
Joseph C. Wilder (“Father”) were issued a final judgment of divorce by the Circuit Court
for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) in 2010. Issues concerning child support have
persisted since then. In the most recent chapter, the Trial Court allowed Mother’s attorney
to withdraw five days before trial but denied her request for a continuance. The Trial Court
subsequently entered its final order. Mother appeals. We find that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in denying Mother a reasonable continuance. We vacate the Trial Court’s
judgment and remand for a new trial to be conducted after Mother has had a reasonable
continuance in which to try to retain counsel or otherwise prepare for trial pro se.

Tenant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant landlord a judgment under a holdover
provision in a commercial lease. Because we conclude that landlord voluntarily
relinquished its claim under the holdover provision, we reverse the trial court’s judgment
of damages, late fees, and attorney’s fees, but affirm the trial court’s decision to deny
tenant’s motion to amend her complaint. We remand this case for the determination of the
sole issue agreed to be heard by the parties.

The State of Tennessee sought the enforcement of a prior administrative order against the Appellant related to the Appellant’s violations of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, requesting civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Appellant sought a continuance based on parallel criminal proceedings. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment to the State. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the chancery court and administrative tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction and that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We conclude that any challenge to personal jurisdiction has been waived and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The trial court found Appellant/Father in civil contempt for alleged failure to comply with discovery propounded by Appellee/Mother. The trial court also dismissed Father’s petition to modify visitation and child support on the ground that Father’s petition constituted an abusive civil lawsuit. We reverse the trial court’s findings of civil contempt and abusive civil lawsuit. However, because the parties’ child has reached majority, we conclude that Father’s petition to modify is moot. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition on the ground of mootness.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal more than thirty days from the date of entry of the
order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not
timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a wrongful-death health care liability action against a skilled nursing facility, the Tennessee State Veterans’ Home in Clarksville (“TSVH-Clarksville”), which is owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. The claimant, Linda Black (“Claimant”), is the surviving spouse of Robert Junious Black, deceased, who was a resident of TSVHClarksville from December 16, 2016, through January 9, 2017. Claimant asserted that TSVH-Clarksville proximately caused Mr. Black’s death by failing to monitor and report his symptoms under the applicable standard of care. In particular, Claimant alleged that the staff at TSVH-Clarksville (1) failed to follow Mr. Black’s care plan for risk of dehydration; (2) failed to prevent Mr. Black from developing a urinary tract infection; (3) failed to notify Mr. Black’s physician of a significant changes in his clinical status; and (4) failed to properly assess Mr. Black. Following a two-day bench trial, the Claims Commissioner found that Claimant failed to establish a health care liability claim because, inter alia, the State complied with the applicable standards of care and Claimant failed to establish causation. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This is an eminent domain case in which the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department
of Transportation (“the State”) condemned two portions of the defendant’s eighteen-acre
property in Shelby County. Prior to a jury trial to determine the fair market value of the
condemned property, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of or reference
to a prior sale of a portion of the defendant’s real property to a neighboring fireworks
business. The State argued that the previous sale was not an arm’s-length transaction or a
comparable sale. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, excluding the prior
sale from the jury’s consideration. The defendant has appealed. Determining that the
defendant has failed to properly cite to the record in its appellate brief or provide us with a
sufficient record on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has waived its challenge to the
trial court’s exclusion of evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

The appellant, Kathy Delores Horton (prospectively D/B/A A-Team Bail Bond Company, LLC), appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to operate a new bail bond company.  The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her petition because she had the requisite two years of experience working as a qualified agent.  The appellant also raises a challenge regarding the en banc panel, the denial of a claim concerning ex parte communications, and an equal protection claim.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s petition, as well as her other claims.

Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his second petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the felony murder indictment under which he was convicted. Petitioner argues on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Randall Murphy, appeals his convictions by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, aggravated assault, criminal impersonation of law enforcement, and domestic assault. The Defendant argues: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it misstated the law and provided its personal opinion on the determinate element of the kidnapping offense; (2) the trial court expressed its personal opinion regarding the testimony of one of the State’s key eyewitnesses; (3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the victim had consumed alcohol with her prescription medications at the time of the alleged offenses; (4) the trial court failed to give any weight to the applicable mitigating factors before imposing the maximum sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction; and (5) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new trial on all counts. 1 After review, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the aggravated kidnapping charge in Count 1 and affirm the remaining counts.

Husband and wife appellants, acting pro se, appeal the trial court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil of husband’s construction company to hold husband individually responsible for the corporation’s breach of contract, as well as the judgment against both husband and wife for contemptuous conduct. We do not reach the merits of the case due to the appellants’ failure to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee and dismiss the appeal.

Before his election to the bench, the probate judge in this interpleader action served as an
expert witness in a 2017 case involving one of the defendants, Watson Burns, PLLC. In
the current case, Watson Burns, PLLC and another law firm defendant moved for the
probate judge’s recusal based on the expert opinions the judge expressed in the 2017 case.
The probate judge denied the motion, and the law firms filed an accelerated interlocutory
appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.
The Court of Appeals reversed, ordered the probate judge’s recusal, and remanded for
assignment of another judge. Two other parties to the interpleader action then filed an
accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court pursuant to Rule 10B, section
2.07. We ordered the parties prevailing in the Court of Appeals to file a response to the
application. Having thoroughly reviewed the Rule 10B application for permission to
appeal, the response, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the Rule 10B
application, dispense with additional briefing and oral argument, and hold that the probate
judge’s denial of the recusal motion was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision

Before his election to the bench, the probate judge in this interpleader action served as an
expert witness in a 2017 case involving one of the defendants, Watson Burns, PLLC. In
the current case, Watson Burns, PLLC and another law firm defendant moved for the
probate judge’s recusal based on the expert opinions the judge expressed in the 2017 case.
The probate judge denied the motion, and the law firms filed an accelerated interlocutory
appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.
The Court of Appeals reversed, ordered the probate judge’s recusal, and remanded for
assignment of another judge. Two other parties to the interpleader action then filed an
accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court pursuant to Rule 10B, section
2.07. We ordered the parties prevailing in the Court of Appeals to file a response to the
application. Having thoroughly reviewed the Rule 10B application for permission to
appeal, the response, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the Rule 10B
application, dispense with additional briefing and oral argument, and hold that the probate
judge’s denial of the recusal motion was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.

A juvenile appeals the decision to re-commit him to DCS custody for treatment and
services. We conclude that this appeal is moot in light of post-judgment facts.

This appeal presents issues similar to those in Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital
Corp., No. M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2023). In that case, I
dissented from the result reached by a majority of the Court, which held that provisions of
the statutory scheme commonly referred to as the Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”)
abrogated the common law vicarious liability principle known as the operation-of-law
exception. I reach the same conclusion here and respectfully dissent from the result
reached by the majority in this case.

“When there is a conflict between the common law and a statute, the provision of the statute must prevail.” Graves v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 148 S.W. 239, 242 (Tenn. 1912). That longstanding rule is the key to resolving this case, which pits a common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims against certain procedural provisions of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The defendant in this case moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under the common-law rule. The trial court granted that motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that application of the common-law rule would conflict with the Act. We agree that the Act necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common-law rule in the circumstances of this case and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.

This case presents a simple issue: Whether the Tennessee Health Care Liability
Act’s statute of limitation extension prevails over the common law rule that a plaintiff
cannot pursue a vicarious liability claim against a principal when the plaintiff’s claim
against the agent is procedurally barred by operation of law before the plaintiff asserts the
vicarious liability claim against the principal. This common law rule is known as the
operation-of-law exception. Here, the Plaintiff filed a vicarious liability suit against the
principal, TriStar Skyline Medical Center, after the one-year statute of limitations had
expired as to Skyline’s agents but within the Act’s 120-day extension of the statute of
limitations as to Skyline. Was the suit timely filed? Yes—the Act’s provisions prevail over
the common law operation-of-law exception.

This appeal arises out of a dog bite incident that occurred at a dog park within an apartment complex. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant who owned the dog that bit her. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff s complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal presents issues similar to those in Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital
Corp., No. M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2023). In that case, I
dissented from the result reached by a majority of the Court, which held that provisions of
the statutory scheme commonly referred to as the Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”)
abrogated the common law vicarious liability principle known as the operation-of-law
exception. I reach the same conclusion here and respectfully dissent from the result
reached by the majority in this case.

This appeal arises out of a third-party complaint asserting claims arising from the sale of real property. The trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the thirdparty defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Afterward, the third-party plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to his remaining claim, which was then dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. The third-party plaintiff appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his ninth petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner argues the habeas corpus court’s order failed to include adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the State’s answer to the habeas corpus petition was insufficient, and the Warden of Petitioner’s penitentiary was not served with process. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

“When there is a conflict between the common law and a statute, the provision of the statute must prevail.” Graves v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 148 S.W. 239, 242 (Tenn. 1912). That longstanding rule is the key to resolving this case, which pits a common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims against certain procedural provisions of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The defendant in this case moved for summary judgment under the common-law rule. The trial court granted that motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that application of the common-law rule would conflict with the Act. We agree that the Act necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common-law rule in the circumstances of this case and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.

This appeal arises from a juvenile court’s determination of a permanent parenting plan, in which the trial court found all best interest factors to be equal between the parents, granted Mother and Father equal parenting time, and designated them as “Joint Primary Residential Parents.” Mother raises several issues. Generally, she contends that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s findings that all applicable best interest factors were equal between Mother and Father and that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting the permanent parenting plan. We find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning two of the best interest factors. We also find that the court erred, as a matter of law, by designating the parties as joint primary residential parents in the absence of an agreement to do so. In accordance with these findings, we designate Mother as primary residential parent, affirm the trial court’s parenting plan in all other respects, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.