APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a four-day trial in this divorce case, the trial court entered an order naming the Mother primary residential parent and permitting her to relocate to Arkansas with the parties’ minor child. The Father appeals. Because the trial court failed to provide any reason for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review on appeal. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order that contains the findings and conclusions mandated by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

Mother and Father entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan for their two minor children. Mother subsequently injected Father with a chemical used to euthanize animals. She pleaded guilty to the attempted second degree murder of Father and was sentenced to twelve years incarceration. Mother and Father entered into an amended parenting plan that provided for the children’s visitation with their maternal grandmother and with Mother in prison. The amended parenting plan also provided for the resumption of the original parenting plan after Mother’s release from prison. Father remarried while Mother was incarcerated. Father and Stepmother filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and a petition for adoption by Stepmother. The trial court found that there was a statutory ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court subsequently amended its order, concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the best interests of the children and denying the petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights. Father and Stepmother appealed, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the original order. We conclude that Father and Stepmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the amended order of the trial court.

This case involves the status of a road as public or private, as well as Plaintiff’s right to access such. We find that the roadway was a public road prior to 1960, but that it has since been abandoned. Finding no necessity, we further conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to a private easement over the road to access her property. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

The Criminal Court for Campbell County sentenced the Defendant, Kevin C. Potter, to fifteen years of probation for multiple offenses that occurred between 2009 and 2011. In late 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit seeking a probation violation warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends he was denied a fair hearing on the probation violation warrant and that the trial court erred because it failed to make specific findings of fact. The State agrees, and it asks us to reverse the case and remand it to the trial court for an order containing specific factual findings based upon the proof adduced at the revocation hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order that sets forth specific factual findings for the revocation of probation.

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This appeal involves a petition for post-conviction relief based on multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court for Knox County of two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of setting fire to personal property. His convictions were affirmed and his sentences were modified on direct appeal. State v. Mobley, No. E2006-00469-CCAR3-CD, 2007 WL 1670195 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2007). Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on numerous instances of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance and on several instances of alleged trial court errors. Following a two-day hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the petitioner’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial after determining that the petitioner’s trial counsel had been ineffective with regard to limitations placed on the ability of a defense expert to testify that the petitioner’s mental condition rendered him unable to premeditate. Mobley v. State, No. E2010-00379-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3652535 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2011). We granted the State’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief based on the manner in which his trial counsel dealt with the limitations placed on the defense’s expert witness. However, we have also determined that the record does not permit the reviewing courts to determine whether the performance of the petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient with regard to the requirement that the petitioner wear a stun belt during the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts denying post-conviction relief based on the alleged errors of the trial court and on all the ineffective assistance of counsel claims except the claims based on the testimony of the defense’s mental health expert and the use of the stun belt during the trial. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to elicit a specific opinion from the defense’s mental health expert. We also reverse the judgment of the lower courts denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to trial counsel’s failure to object to the use of a stun belt during the trial and remand that issue alone to the post-conviction court for a new hearing.
 

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser following a bench trial. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Gross, of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary and theft of property. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to concurrent terms of four years and eight years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that, if the Defendant chose to testify, the State could use his prior conviction for burglary of an automobile to impeach his testimony under Rule 609 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the State could impeach the Defendant with his prior conviction for burglary of an automobile. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Harvey Taylor, pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Antwain Green, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder of Anthony Fizer and Carrie Searcy, Class B felonies, and three counts of aggravated assaults on, Fizer, Searcy and Laura Dykes, Class C felonies. The aggravated assault convictions of Fizer and Searcy merged with the two attempted second degree murder convictions. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eighteen- year terms for each attempted murder conviction and a nine- year term for the aggravated assault conviction of Dykes, to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of forty-five years. The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, asserting that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions, that a witness was improperly permitted to testify regarding one victim’s identification of the defendant, and that his sentences are improper and excessive. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, that the error in admitting the testimony regarding identification was harmless, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of convictions and sentences of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim filed to recover real property and personalty that was allegedly misappropriated from Decedent prior to his death. Decedent died at the age of 89, leaving Wife and Son as his survivors. Prior to his death, Decedent transferred the majority of his monetary assets and real estate to Wife. Following his death, Son brought this action, alleging that Decedent did not have the mental capacity to execute the transfers and that the transfers were a result of undue influence exercised by Wife, who exploited her confidential relationship with Decedent and also committed fraud to complete the unlawful conversion of the entirety of the estate. The trial court dismissed Son’s claims and awarded any remaining personalty to Wife. Son appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment prohibiting Defendants from restricting the use of Marcum Creek Road. Defendants denied that Plaintiffs ever had a right of access to Marcum Creek Road and asserted that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a separate motion for a temporary injunction. The trial court consolidated the hearing on the injunction motion with a trial on the merits and issued a declaratory judgment, providing that Marcum Creek Road was a public road and that the public should have uninterrupted use of the right-of-way. Defendants appeal, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating the motion hearing with a trial on the merits. Defendants request remand of this case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonio D. Vaughn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to adequately communicate with him. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Bobby Lee Johnson, pled guilty to one count of possession of morphine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; one count of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, 55-10-401, 39-14-403. Following a sentencing hearing, appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court’s sentence.

Plaintiff filed suit against Vanderbilt University Medical Center for injuries she sustained during an MRI scan. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim for medical malpractice and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff appeals, asserting the complaint sounded in common law negligence and, alternatively, that the documents she filed complied with the TMMA. We affirm the trial court.
 

A Cocke County jury convicted the Petitioner, Billy Joe Carter, of first degree murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to life in the Department of Correction without the possibility of parole for the two first degree murder convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to 40 years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On direct appeal, this Court ordered the trial court to merge the two first degree murder convictions, and we affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions in all other respects. State v. Billy Joe Carter, No. E2005-01282-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1515010 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a pre-trial mental evaluation of him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

A healthy, living tree located in neighbor A’s yard was knocked over during a storm and fell into neighbor B’s yard. The trial court found that neighbor A was not liable to neighbor B for the resulting damage. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce case. Appellee Wife and Appellant Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. The agreement provided for transitional alimony payments, which would “self-terminate” upon the occurrence of certain conditions, including cohabitation. Husband developed a belief that Wife was cohabitating and, relying on the self-termination clause, ceased payment of spousal support without court intervention. Wife subsequently filed a petition for civil contempt, seeking a monetary judgment in the amount of alimony arrears and attorney’s fees. The trial court determined that Husband was not in contempt, but awarded alimony arrears and attorney’s fees in favor of Wife. Husband appeals. Affirmed and remanded.

The Defendant, Leia Mellott, challenges her jury conviction for filing a false report, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that the Defendant made a knowingly false statement to law enforcement to obstruct their apprehension of a fugitive and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death action predicated on premises liability. The lawsuit arose out of a fight in the parking lot of a bowling alley owned by the defendants. After the plaintiffs’ 19-year-old son punched a member of a rival gang, another member of the rival gang drove up and shot the plaintiffs’ son in the chest, killing him. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendant bowling alley owners for the wrongful death of their son; they asserted that the defendants acted negligently or recklessly in failing to provide adequate security on their premises. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on two bases: (1) the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs’ son to protect  him from the criminal acts of others, and (2) the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ son was at least 50% at fault for his death. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company has not been met in this case.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Mousen Yisak Aden, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant, Mark Zane Gibson, was indicted by the Monroe County Grand Jury for one count each of aggravated sexual battery, rape, and incest. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of attempted aggravated sexual battery and rape. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences by not applying any mitigating factors and in denying his request for alternative sentencing. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. With regard to his sentence, Appellant committed the crime between July 1, 1982, and June 7, 2005. Therefore, the prior sentencing law should apply to his sentence unless Appellant executed an ex post facto waiver. There is no such waiver in the record, and it appears that the trial court applied the new sentencing act when sentencing Appellant. Therefore, Appellant’s sentence must be reversed and a new sentencing hearing must be held. For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and reverse his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Abisai U. Maldonado, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that he received an illegal, one-year sentence for a misdemeanor conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize my reasoning in concluding that an ambiguity exists, in direct contradiction to our earlier decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3–CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) (perm. app. denied Dec. 12, 2012).