APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Mahlon Johnson, of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to merge the sexual battery convictions; (3) the Defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy protections; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. The State agrees that there is insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s sexual battery convictions, and it asks us to reverse those convictions and dismiss the indictments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists in the record sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court did not err when it did not merge those convictions. We further conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant. We, therefore, affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentence.

On December 12, 2011, the petitioner, Gary S. Mayes, filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence related to the Knox County Criminal Court’s 2008 denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The coram nobis court summarily denied relief. We affirm the denial of relief.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied Defendant Darrick Eugene McAllister’s motion to suppress all evidence seized in a warrantless search. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea, and according to the amended judgment in the record, Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of eight (8) years as a Range II multiple offender. The amended judgment and the negotiated plea agreement documents show that Defendant reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not in the record. After a review of the record, we affirm the amended judgment of the trial court. We note, however, that the negotiated plea agreement documents reflect that Defendant was going to plead guilty to the Class C felony offense of attempted possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug free zone (a park). However, we did not have jurisdiction in this case to do anything but affirm the amended judgment (which we do) or reverse the amended judgment and dismiss the charges. The trial court, however, may review the entire record and take appropriate measures, if any, to correct the amended judgment.

In this appeal from a divorce decree, husband asserts that the trial court erred in its property division and award of alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in awarding almost all of the marital property to wife and, therefore, modify the property division to award the 401k to husband. We further modify the trial court’s decision in order to change the alimony in futuro to transitional alimony and to reduce the monthly amount.

The appellant (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the trial court entered on November 27, 2012, which granted the counter-petition to alter or amend the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan and to relocate to Indiana filed by the appellee (“Father”). The November 27, 2012 order stated that “[a]ll other issues raised” in Mother’s response in opposition to the petition to relocate and counter-petition to modify custody as well as Mother’s initial Motion for Contempt were “reserved for further hearing.” It is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Frederick Alexander Avery, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and attempted second degree murder. As a violent offender, he received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for severance and a motion for a speedy trial and for advising the petitioner to not testify at trial. The post-conviction court denied relief, holding that the petitioner failed to establish that counsel was ineffective. However, because trial counsel had miscalculated the date for filing an appeal to the supreme court, the post-conviction court granted the petitioner a Rule 11 delayed appeal. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 28, § 9(D)(1)(b). The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly granted the petitioner a delayed appeal. However, the post-conviction court erred by not staying the post-conviction proceeding pending the disposition of the delayed appeal.

The appellant, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr., was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of selling less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Ryan Stephenson, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a burglary case for which he was on probation at the time of the homicide. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s request to remove a juror on the second day of trial; (2) allowing the State to impeach his credibility with his prior convictions for theft and burglary; (3) issuing a jury instruction on the impeachment of a witness after the testimony of a defense witness but not after the testimony of a State witness; and (4) failing to apply any mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Bobby Duane Parker, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to four counts of theft, two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of evading arrest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the appellant challenges imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a boundary line dispute. On appeal, the landowners argue that the trial court erred in finding that the disputed property was owned by their adjoining landowner. The landowners further argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their thirdparty complaint against the individuals that sold them the property, and for refusing to award them an abatement in the purchase price based on the deficiency in acreage. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This appeal involves post-trial motions in a divorce case. Several years after the divorce decree was entered, the father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to seek more parenting time, and he filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The father later filed a motion asking the trial court to alter or amend the original divorce decree’s child support provision in order to reduce his child support obligation retroactive to the date of the decree, and the arrearage that he had accrued over the years. The trial court modified the parenting plan, found the mother in contempt, and altered the portion of the original divorce decree pertaining to child support, thereby reducing the father’s child support arrearage. The mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Justin Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that: (1) it was error for his case to be transferred to circuit court; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court’s jury instruction on criminal responsibility was erroneous. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry R. Porterfield, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the Grundy County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a term of four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges the manner of service of his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant, Eddie Hoof, for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and especially aggravated burglary. A jury found him guilty of two counts of second degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the two convictions of second degree murder and sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment form for especially aggravated burglary to reflect a consecutive sentence.

Plaintiff was awarded a $100,000 judgment against Defendant in the trial court. In a prior appeal, this Court reversed the damage award, and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the parties entered into an Agreed Order for a $100,000 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Ten years after entry of the Agreed Order, Plaintiff moved to renew the unsatisfied judgment, and Defendant claimed that the renewal motion was untimely. The trial court granted the motion to renew the judgment, and we affirm.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Mother and Father’s rights were terminated on grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Steven Ray Kennedy, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Decedent’s spouse brought an action to recover HHL benefits for the death of her firefighter husband. The City of Memphis denied her claim and decedent’s spouse appealed to an ALJ. The ALJ, likewise, denied the claim for benefits finding that the City of Memphis had rebutted the statutory presumption of causation and that decedent’s spouse had then failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that decedent’s cardiac condition was caused by his employment. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the chancery court.

The Petitioner, Donnell Levon Robinson, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Timothy B. Lenarduzzi ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. In his plea agreement, he agreed to a sentencing range of "[e]ight to [t]welve years at one hundred percent on each count to run concurrent," leaving the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years for each aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction and eleven years for each sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the length of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a tort suit filed after a workplace injury. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was a statutory employer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113, and therefore, it was immune from the tort claim asserted on behalf of the injured worker. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The Mt. Juliet Beer Board suspended the beer permit of a restaurant, and the restaurant owner appealed the suspension to the chancery court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The City did not file an answer within the requisite time period because it did not believe Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-108, which governs appeals of beer board decisions, required this. The City actively participated in the case in other ways by filing a motion to set the case for trial, filing a comprehensive pre-trial brief, and responding to discovery requests. The restaurant owner moved for default judgment based on the City’s failure to answer the petition, after which the City filed an answer. On the day set for trial, the trial court awarded the restaurant owner a default judgment based on the City’s failure to file an answer in a timely fashion and its failure to seek leave to file a late answer. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, April Nicole Cromwell, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $10,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years with one year to serve and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to sentence her to community corrections or probation and (2) denying her request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell and struck his head in March of 2000 in the course and scope of his employment, resulting in a complex scalp laceration, post-concussion syndrome and dysfunction of the trigeminal nerve. He filed this workers’ compensation action in February of 2001, seeking temporary total disability and permanent disability benefits and medical expenses. After many delays the case was heard in September of 2011. The employee’s medical expert testified that he had a 21% permanent impairment and was temporarily disabled until 2009. The employer’s expert testified that he had a 5% impairment, had reached maximum medical improvement and was able to work at the time of his examination in 2007. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits from 2000 to 2007, a total of 369.98 weeks, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability, a total of 240 weeks, for a grand total of 609.98 weeks. The employer has appealed, contending that the court erred in awarding more than a total of 400 weeks, in awarding temporary total disability benefits without proper medical proof of inability to work and in awarding 60% permanent partial disability without defining the specific anatomical impairment rating. We reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part.

The Defendant, Candice Stinson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of fourteen counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202 (2010). For each count, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in jail, and a $200 fine, all to be served concurrently. The court also ordered her to pay $4824 in restitution to the City of Memphis Animal Services and prohibited her from owning animals for ten years and from owning animals for commercial purposes for life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her full probation and requiring her to serve seventy-five percent of her sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.