APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of violating the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor, and was found guilty of driving under the influence (seventh offense), a Class E felony. The trial court found that Defendant violated the implied consent law and revoked his driver’s license for one year. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years to be served on probation after serving one hundred and sixty days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he was driving on a public road at the time of the incident or a finding that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed an action in Chancery Court. He later filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit and immediately refiled his action in Circuit Court. An order dismissing the Chancery Court action was filed several days later. The employer moved to dismiss the Circuit Court action, noting that the Chancery Court action was still pending at the time the Circuit Court action was filed. The Circuit Court granted the motion. Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Edgar Allgood, was indicted in count one of the indictment for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and in count two for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of the charged offenses. The jury found Defendant guilty in count one of the indictment of the lesser included offense of facilitation of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class C felony, and in count two of the lesser included offense of facilitation of attempted possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to concurrent sentences of twelve years for each conviction, for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s sentencing determinations. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant’s dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to deliver into his conviction of facilitation of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and his sentence of twelve years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Larry Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to thirty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also argues that the trial court erred (1) in not redacting certain statements from Defendant’s statement to the police which was introduced as an exhibit at trial; (2) in limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim about her use of drugs and whether she had received any compensation from the Victim’s Compensation Fund; and (3) in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the warrantless search of his residence and adjoining property, the Defendant, Monty Blackwell, was charged by presentment from the Grainger County grand jury with manufacture of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia related to the manufacture of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, and theft of property valued at over five hundred dollars. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the warrantless entry onto his property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

Petitioner, Jason Lee White, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner pled guilty in September of 1996 to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-three and one-half years. On May 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for post-conviction relief on September 8, 2008. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on September 24, 2008, holding that "Blakely violations do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal." Petitioner then filed a "Motion/petition to Vacate Final Order and Judgment" on April 20, 2009, and a notice of appeal on May 11, 2009. We determine that the petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed because it was time-barred and Petitioner failed to show that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
plaintiff, Gloria Kazeleski, was involved in an automobile accident, and sought workers’ compensation benefits from defendant Dixie Motors, Inc. Dixie Motors contended that she was not its employee, but an independent contractor. The trial court ruled that she was an employee, and awarded benefits, including 100% permanent disability of the left arm. The defendant has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiff was its employee. We conclude that she was an independent contractor, and reverse the judgment.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Lia Bonds, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Lia Bonds, No. W2006-01943-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3254711 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 2, 2007). This Court, however, vacated Defendant’s sentence because she was improperly sentenced under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. On remand, Defendant waived her ex post facto rights to be sentenced under the 1989 Sentencing Act, and the trial court sentenced Defendant under the 2005 amendments to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length of her sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in case no. 06-04210. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in case no. 06-04210 consecutively to his effective sentence of thirty-two years in case nos. 06-04209 and 07-01739, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during the crossexamination of a witness for the defense; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the imposition of consecutive sentencing violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Defendant, Kristen A. Wilson, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence per se. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, which sentence was suspended after service of forty-eight hours in confinement. As part of the negotiated plea agreement, the parties purported to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(I) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After review, we conclude that Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and dismiss the appeal.

Property manager CMA sued homeowner’s association Fairway Village when Fairway Village failed to pay money owed to CMA for management fees and property repairs. Fairway Village counter-claimed against CMA and cross-claimed against CMA President Willingham, claiming that both had defrauded Fairway Village. Following protracted litigation, the chancery court dismissed Fairway Village’s claims against CMA and Willingham, finding that it had failed to carry its burden of proof. The chancery court awarded CMA a judgment for fees and repairs, as well as a reduced attorney fee, but it denied CMA’s request for prejudgment interest. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that CMA owed no fiduciary duty to Fairway Village, its exclusion of accountant Hood’s testimony, and its award of attorney fees to CMA. We find that the chancery court’s
judgment was not against the weight of the evidence, and we reverse its denial of prejudgment interest. We award CMA its attorney fees on appeal. This case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of prejudgment interest and appellate attorney fees owed to CMA.

The defendant, Maurice Jones, entered an open plea agreement to one count of Class E felony sexual battery in the Shelby County Criminal Court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years, all suspended to probation but sixty days to be served in the county workhouse. As a special condition of his probationary sentence, the trial court ordered that the defendant is not allowed unsupervised contact with any minor child under eighteen years of age, including his own children. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court exceeded its authority in denying him unsupervised contact with his minor children. Following review of the record, we conclude that the special condition is overbroad as written. Accordingly, the case the remanded to the trial court for imposition of a more defined and less limiting condition.

The petitioner, Dennis Jarrett, proceeding pro se, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In two separate cases, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of the implied consent law, failure to appear, and violation of the open container law. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief. Specifically, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based upon: (1) trial counsel’s failure to properly challenge that the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion in Case No. C07-351; (2) trial counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible hearsay in Case No. 07-385; (2) the judge’s application of enhancement factors not found by the jury; and (3) the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion for attorney’s fees due under the terms of the parties’ contract. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Courtney Anderson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to include a copy of the presentence report, a transcript of the plea submission hearing, and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the record on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Dana Webb, appeals the denial of her request for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by focusing on the need for deterrence while not considering factors in favor of diversion. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of conditions of the probationary term.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ricky Lee Hatchel, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony and originally sentenced to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The jury also imposed a $10,000 fine, which was reduced by the trial court to $5,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court subsequently found that Hatchel qualified for alternate sentencing, and ordered Hatchel to complete one year of community corrections before being transferred to supervised probation. In this appeal, Hatchel claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce photographs of the victim’s injuries. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Metro public works employee was injured when a front end loader operated by a Metro fire department employee made a loud noise, causing the public works employee, fearing for his life, to fall while attempting to jump over a guardrail. The injured plaintiff filed suit against Metro and the defendant front end loader operator. Metro filed a cross-claim against the defendant as well as a counter-claim against the plaintiff seeking a subrogation of lost wages and medical payments recovered from the defendant. The trial court found that the defendant acted negligently and within the scope of his employment, and thus, it found that Metro’s immunity was removed pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiff against Metro, and itdismissed the claims against the defendant. On appeal, Metro argues that the defendant acted intentionally, rather than negligently, and that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment, such that Metro retains its immunity. We affirm.

The petitioner, Szumanski Stroud, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not properly cross-examining the victim about his identification of the petitioner. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Thomas Hall, alleged that he sustained hearing loss due to exposure to noise in the workplace. The employer, TRW Automotive U.S., LLC,
contended that most of the hearing loss occurred after Mr. Hall began wearing hearing protection,
and was therefore not caused by his employment. The trial court awarded 75% permanent partial
disability of the hearing of both ears. TRW has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in that
it failed to apportion the award to the body as a whole, selected an incorrect injury date, declined to
view a video recording of an evidentiary deposition, and made an excessive award of benefits. We
conclude that the award should have been assigned to the body as a whole, and that the trial court
selected an incorrect injury date. The judgment is modified accordingly.1

The Defendant, Darryl Keith Robinson, was indicted for one count of felony murder and one count of premeditated first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. He was also charged with one count of theft of property valued at greater than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105(4). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged of theft, and convicted of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(c). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder and six years for theft of property, for a total effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that:(1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the victim filed for orders of protection against another individual; (2) the trial court erred by allowing testimony that the Defendant had a criminal history; (3) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding a conversation between the victim and the Defendant; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of either second degree murder or theft of property valued at greater than $10,000 but less than $60,000; and (5) the trial court erred in setting the length of the Defendant’s sentence. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder. We vacate the twenty-five year sentence imposed for the second degree murder conviction. We modify the conviction for Class C felony theft to a conviction for Class A misdemeanor theft. We remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Kimberly Wheeler, sustained repetitive trauma injuries to both arms. The injuries were accepted by her employer, Whirlpool Corporation, as compensable. After having surgery on both arms, she returned to work, initially in a light-duty
status, and later to full duty. The product line on which she worked was then shut down and moved to another location. She was offered the option of accepting a voluntary layoff or moving to another product line. She chose the voluntary layoff. Under the terms of her employment contract, she continued to be an employee although she was not working. Eventually, the entire plant closed and Ms. Wheeler was terminated at that time. The trial court found that she had meaningful return to work and voluntarily left her employment. For that reason, it limited its award of permanent partial disability benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B). The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by applying the one and one-half times impairment cap. We agree and modify the judgment.1

The Defendant, George Chisholm, pled guilty in the Bradley County Criminal Court to driving under the influence, eighth offense, a Class E felony, and to two counts of vehicular assault, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years for the DUI to be served consecutively to concurrent four-year sentences for the vehicular assault counts, for a total effective sentence of six years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted some form of alternative sentence in consideration of the condition of his health. Following our review, we affirm the denial of alternative sentencing, but we remand for the correction of the judgments.

The defendant, Willie Price, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of sixty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior burglary and theft convictions, consolidating his indictments for trial, admitting his statements to police, and enhancing his sentences and ordering that they be served consecutively. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant was convicted in the Hickman County Circuit Court of driving under the influence. She was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, to be served on probation. She appeals, asserting she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because both her brief and the record she provided are inadequate under our rules, we affirm.