APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants, Derrell F. Nunn, Sr. and Jamila Nunn, appeal from their convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County for aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years to be served at one hundred percent for each Defendant. On appeal, the Defendants contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict them and that the trial court erred in not granting their motions for judgment of acquittal. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

This is a breach of contract case. When the plaintiff employee was hired as a department manager for the defendant employer, his employment contract provided that he would receive a bonus based on the net profit of the department. During the plaintiff’s term of employment, he received bonus payments; however, the parties had disagreements about how the department’s profit was calculated and thus about the amount of the bonus. After the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, the employee filed this lawsuit against the employer, alleging that the employer breached the contract by failing to pay the proper bonus amounts. The employer denied the allegation and asserted a counterclaim for excess amounts allegedly paid to the employee. The trial court referred issues on the plaintiff’s claim and the employer’s counterclaim to a special master. After conducting a hearing, the special master found that neither party carried its burden of proof and recommended that both the complaint and the counterclaim be dismissed. After considering the employee’s objection to the special master’s report, the trial court adopted the special master’s recommendations and dismissed the claims. The employee now appeals. We affirm, finding that there is material evidence to support the trial court’s concurrence.

The Defendant, Jessica Patton Parks, pled guilty to aggravated domestic assault in exchange for a three-year suspended sentence to be served on supervised probation. Following the filing of a revocation warrant and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the conditions of her probation and ordered her to serve her sentence in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to express the views (1) that the statutes proscribing child abuse and child neglect are needlessly complex and (2) that our controlling case law does not invite helpful application of the child abuse statute by applying the “knowing” scienter to “treating a child in an abusive manner.” (Emphasis added.)

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant common carrier, finding that Defendant had no notice that Decedent was mentally incapacitated and holding that Defendant had no duty to assess or probe Decedent in order to discover a latent or non-apparent psychological condition. We affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Bernard Braswell, of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, both Class A felonies. The Defendant appeals, arguing that  (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) he was prejudiced by the manner in which a transcript of one of the Defendant’s interviews with police—a transcript which was admitted into evidence for identification only—was redacted. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for possession of contraband. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the decision of the administrative disciplinary board was not illegal or arbitrary, and that it was supported by substantial and material evidence and had a rational basis. The petitioner prisoner now appeals. We affirm.

This is a claim for unemployment benefits. The claimant was denied unemployment benefits based on a finding that she falsified company records and therefore was discharged for misconduct connected with her employment. The claimant appealed the administrative decision to the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court reversed the administrative decision, finding that there was not substantial and material evidence to support the decision. Upon reviewing the record, we find that the administrative record contains substantial and material evidence to support the finding that the claimant falsified company records. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves competing class action lawsuits. The plaintiff/appellant filed a lawsuit in Tennessee on behalf of similarly situated consumers in Tennessee, asserting antitrust claims against various urethane manufacturers. Meanwhile, a separate class action was filed in Florida against some of the same manufacturers, asserting similar misconduct throughout the United States. The class in the Florida lawsuit included consumers in twenty-five states, including Tennessee. The Florida litigation settled, and the Florida court approved a plan to provide notice of the pending settlement to all class members. The notice plan did not include individual notice to the Tennessee plaintiff. The Florida notice plan was implemented. The Florida court then entered an order approving the settlement, finding that the notice plan satisfied the requirements of due process and gave class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Subsequently, in the instant Tennessee proceedings, the manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the doctrine of res judicata prohibited relitigation of the matters settled in the Florida case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers. The plaintiff/appellant appeals, arguing that the Florida notice was insufficient because he did not receive individual actual notice. We affirm, finding that the Tennessee lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights. Finding that the termination was contested and that the trial court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand.

The petitioner, Bernardo Lane, appeals the denial of relief from his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He was convicted of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and four counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that he has received newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit signed by a codefendant, which purports to exonerate the petitioner from all wrongdoing. After careful review, we affirm the denial of error coram nobis relief.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Everett Daniel Meador, III, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant appeals, contending that because the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his arrest. The Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial, which was based upon the results of his breathalyzer test, that were submitted to the jury after the trial court ruled that the results were inadmissible. After determining that a mistrial should have been declared, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for a new trial.

Wife filed a divorce complaint in Judge Robilio’s court, which she later voluntarily dismissed. Wife then filed a complaint in the Court of the Judiciary against Judge Robilio. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the matter was set in Judge Robilio’s court. Wife filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process of Husband’s divorce complaint, which was denied after the process server identified Wife as the person he had served.

This zoning appeal involves Tennessee’s Open Meetings Act. A municipal legislative body began considering legislation to implement a conservation zoning overlay in a neighborhood within the municipality. The ordinance adopting the zoning change passed on the first and second reading. Prior to the final meeting on the subject, members of the legislative body sent numerous emails to each other discussing the proposed zoning change. In addition, prior to the final meeting, some members viewed information on the zoning issue in a non-public conference room in the legislative body’s office. The legislative body then adopted the zoning change at a public meeting. Thereafter, residents of the neighborhood who opposed the zoning change filed the instant lawsuit seeking a writ of certiorari to review the adoption of the ordinance. The petitioner residents argued, inter alia, that the email correspondence and the non-public meeting violated the Open Meetings Act, that the enabling statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that the enactment of the ordinance violated due process and was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court determined that the legislative body’s actions did not violate the Open Meetings Act, and rejected the other challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The neighborhood residents appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part, finding among other things that while the email correspondence constitutes a violation of the Open Meetings Act, the legislative body engaged in a “new and substantial reconsideration” of the issues in the final meeting so as to cure the violation.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendants, David Anthony Avery and Frederick Alexander
(“Alex”) Avery , of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced David Avery to a forty-nine year effective sentence and Frederick Avery, a violent offender, to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, David Avery contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentences; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered his sentences run consecutively. On appeal, Frederick Avery contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a violent offender. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee had several compensable work injuries, the last of which was carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial court awarded benefits for permanent total disability (“PTD”). Liability was apportioned 90% to the Second Injury Fund (“The Fund”) and 10% to the employer. The Fund has appealed, contending, inter alia, that Employee’s claims as to it are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly.

Appellants granted a sewer line easement to the City. The City hired a sub-contractor to install the sewer line and to restore the property following construction. Appellants, who were dissatisfied with the sub-contractor’s restoration, filed suit against the City and the sub-contractor. The sub-contractor subsequently went out of business, and the trial court entered a judgment against the City for $13,070.00, representing the value of Appellants’ land plus the cost to repair a fence. Appellants appeal, claiming the proper measure of damages is the cost to restore their property–$137,779.62. On appeal, the City contends that Appellants may not sue the City, that Appellants breached the contract by refusing the sub-contractor access to their property, and that the trial court’s award should be reduced by $132.00. The proper measure of damages in this case is the lesser of the cost to restore Appellants’ property or the difference in reasonable market value of the premises immediately prior to and immediately after the injury. Although neither party presented evidence regarding the property’s diminished value, we find that the trial court considered the appropriate factors in setting the amount of damages. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Cortez Griffin, and two co-defendants, Marquette Milan and Preston Deener, broke into a rooming house to rob the victim, Lannie McMillan, who was fatally shot. A grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of first degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated  robbery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment and a concurrent sentence of twenty years for his conviction of especially aggravated robbery. The defendant has appealed   raising issues which we summarize as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements which he asserts were not voluntary, were not made subsequent to a intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of rights, were not recorded and were obtained subsequent to unlawful arrests; (2) whether the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after a police officer testified regarding the content of a co-defendant’s statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony murder charge; and (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a police officer that it was common for a defendant to minimize his or her role in a crime. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves a variety of claims arising from the construction of a residence in Williamson County. A homeowner, James Laughlin, entered into a cost plus contract with Forrest Construction Company, LLC to construct a home for he and his wife. Prior to the home being completed, Forrest Construction stopped work, filed a lien on the residence, and thereafter filed a breach of contract action against Mr. Laughlin and an action to recover damages based on the doctrine of quantum meruit against Mrs. Laughlin. Forrest Construction claimed that Mr. Laughlin was in breach of the contract for failure to pay according to the contract. Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin filed a counter-claim for negligent construction, gross negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Mr. Laughlin had materially breached the contract by failing to pay according to the terms of the contract, and awarded damages to Forrest Construction. Conversely, the trial court found for the Laughlins on their claim of negligent construction and awarded damages against Forrest Construction. Both parties appeal. Forrest Construction contends that the trial court erred in holding it liable for alleged defects because Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and failed to give Forrest Construction notice and the opportunity to cure the alleged defects. Mr. Laughlin contends the trial court erred in finding that he committed the first material breach. The Laughlins also contend the trial court erred in reducing the cost of the repairs to their residence and in failing to pierce the corporate veil. We find that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract by submitting requests for draws that were not properly supported by records of its costs and expenses as required by the contract, including submitting draws which erroneously included charges for work done on its other projects, and by failing to complete construction of the home. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s determination that Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and hold that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the Laughlins were excused from the duty to give notice of the alleged defects and an opportunity to cure; thus, the Laughlins are entitled to recover damages due to the negligent construction by Forrest. As for the trial court’s substantial reduction of the damages requested by the Laughlins for the cost to repair the yet unrepaired defects to their home, we are unable to determine whether the trial court considered or overlooked $55,000 of the estimated cost to repair the defects; therefore, we remand this issue to afford the trial court the opportunity to either restate its previous ruling or to increase the award of damages, if it so determines, based on the evidence presently in the record. As for the issue of piercing the corporate veil, we remand that issue for further proceedings.

On November 8, 2007, a Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Hall, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, the defendant submits that the trial court erred in (1) admitting prior convictions for aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes and (2) denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This is a negligence case filed by a student’s mother against the city, as operator of the city school system, due to an alleged assault on the student by another student. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding the assault unforeseeable as a matter of law. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant based on the statute of limitations in this will contest action. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. Employee injured her ankle as a result of a fall. At the time the injury occurred, she was between two portions of a split work shift. She had undertaken a personal errand at a building adjacent to her workplace, and intended to return to an employee break room at her workplace to await the second half of her shift. The fall occurred on property owned by her employer, but the property was leased to an unrelated third party. The trial court held that the injury was compensable. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of the employee’s employment. We agree with Employer, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the Court’s decision but write separately to clarify my view of the evidence as it relates to S.R. I believe that the evidence would support a finding by the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that any visitation with Father would result in harm to S.R. However, because the trial court did not make the required finding of harm, I agree with the decision to remand the case on the issue of visitation.