Opinions
Toby Dunn v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, through counsel, has filed a “Notice of Appeal” seeking review of the post-conviction court’s order denying a motion for recusal. The one-page pleading informs the court that on February 13, 2026, the post-conviction court “declined to recuse but granted permission to appeal for an interlocutory order.” The pleading further indicates that the “[a]ppeal herein is taken under TRAP 9 and under TRAP 10B (2.01).” The appellate court clerk entered the pleading as an application for interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Following our review of the Petitioner’s pleading, we have determined that a response from the State is not necessary and summarily deny relief. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Marvin M. Green
The Defendant, Marvin M. Green, has filed a pro se application for extraordinary |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Gregory Ryan Webb v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gregory Ryan Webb, has filed a Motion for Appointment of |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Bridget Mathis v. Jason Mathis
Husband/Appellant failed to answer Wife/Appellee’s complaint for divorce. On Wife’s motion, the trial court granted default judgment against Husband. Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Clint Johnson v. Airtight Resources Inc. et al.
As permitted by statute, the plaintiff in a personal injury action amended his complaint to add a nonparty as a new defendant based on the original defendant’s allegations of comparative fault in an amended answer. The new defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims against him because the original defendant lacked permission to file the amended answer. The trial court struck the amended answer and dismissed the claims against the new defendant on statute of limitations grounds. Because the original defendant had written consent to file the amended answer, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony D. Dean, Jr.
Defendant, Anthony D. Dean, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County jury of possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, (count two) and possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a Schedule V controlled substance (Gabapentin), a Class E felony (count five), along with other charges not at issue in this appeal. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting prior convictions involving possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, and the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify as both a fact witness and an expert witness. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
CONTRACK WATTS, INC. v. RELYANT GLOBAL, LLC
Because the orders from which the appellant has filed an appeal do not constitute a final, appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rimon Abdou v. Marcy McCool et al.
The trial court entered an agreed order dismissing some of Appellant’s claims with prejudice, an order granting Appellant’s voluntary dismissal of all of his claims in two consolidated cases without prejudice, and an order awarding discretionary costs to Appellees. Appellant later sought relief from each of these orders pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In litigating the Rule 60 motion, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify Appellees’ counsel and a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas he issued against his own prior counsel, and the parties filed cross-motions for sanctions. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion, motion to disqualify, and motion to compel. The trial court also denied both motions for sanctions; however, Appellant was awarded his attorney’s fees in opposing Appellees’ motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Appellees are also awarded their attorney’s fees for defending this frivolous appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tinsley Properties, LLC et al. v. Grundy County, Tennessee
This appeal focuses on whether a Grundy County Resolution that regulates the location of quarries is, in effect, a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of Tennessee’s County Zoning Act (“the CZA”). The Plaintiffs claim the Resolution is invalid because Grundy County did not comply with the procedural requirements for passing a zoning ordinance as mandated by the CZA. The Plaintiffs further contend that the County could not utilize its police powers to regulate the location of quarries because the Resolution was preempted by state law. Grundy County argues that the Resolution was not a zoning ordinance, but rather a valid exercise of the County’s police powers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Grundy County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Tinsley Props., LLC v. Grundy Cnty., No. M2022-01562-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 495700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 27, 2024). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that Grundy County enacted what amounts to a zoning ordinance without complying with the statutory requirements contained in the CZA. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Grundy County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Grundy | Supreme Court | |
Wendolyn Lee v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Wendolyn Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the remainder of his claims were either waived or previously determined. The State argues that the post-conviction court lacked the authority to consider Petitioner’s claims because a properly verified post-conviction petition was never filed and that Petitioner has otherwise waived consideration of his issues by failing to prepare an adequate brief. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court had authority to consider Petitioner’s claims, but Petitioner has waived consideration of his claims in this court. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. State of Tennessee
This appeal concerns a health care liability lawsuit. Pamela Moses (“Moses”) sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”) in the Claims Commission after receiving dental treatment from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center (“UTHSC”). Moses alleged that her root canal was botched, leaving her injured. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss on multiple independent grounds including that Moses failed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. Moses appeals. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Demonte Isom
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Demonte Isom, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Bledsoe v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends he is entitled to relief due to a defective indictment for his underlying charge of aggravated rape. However, as pointed out by the State, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed late. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner’s explanation for the late filing is based upon a misunderstanding of the “prison mailbox rule,” see Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g), and the nature of his defective indictment issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Ortiz v. State of Tennessee, et al.
The Petitioner, Carlos Ortiz, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Johnson v. David A. LeFeve et al.
This case stems from an alleged oral promise by the owner of two companies to pay the chief financial officer of one company a bonus of ten percent of the “profits” of both companies for work performed for the companies, including related to the sale of certain real property by one company. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, the companies and their owner, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were barred by the parties’ written contract and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendant as to their defense under the real estate broker statute. Both parties appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and unjust enrichment but reverse as to the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. We also reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on their defense under the real estate broker statute. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Leann Linder v. Garry Phillip Linder
A husband appeals from a Final Order of Absolute Divorce. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal with the Appellate Court Clerk within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Adrian Delk v. ATV Powersports, et al.
Appellant, Adrian Delk, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, James Hawkins, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert D. Rollings
Defendant, Robert D. Rollings, pled guilty to second degree murder in 2012 in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment form reflecting the agreement. Nearly thirteen years later, in 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he was falsely imprisoned based on a judgment form that was not file-stamped by the trial court clerk. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion, insisting that the lack of a file-stamp on his judgment form rendered his conviction not final and illegal. Because we find that Defendant has failed to file a timely notice of appeal and that the interest of justice does not support waiver, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re John W. et al.
The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRIS GREEN
The Defendant, Chris Green, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
This is a premises liability case brought by a sales representative for a product vendor who was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision based upon the conclusion that Tractor Supply was the statutory employer of the sales representative under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and was, therefore, shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, concluded that Tractor Supply was not the sales representative’s statutory employer, and remanded the case to this Court to consider the pretermitted issues. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the issue of whether Tractor Supply owed a duty of care to the sales representative. We vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Skylar K. et al.
A circuit court found four children dependent and neglected because they were suffering from abuse or neglect. It also determined that the children’s father committed severe child abuse. Upon review, we conclude that the court’s severe child abuse finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. So we reverse that finding and affirm the lower court’s decision as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Carla Novak
In this interlocutory recusal appeal, Appellant argues that in addition to the grounds for recusal relied upon in the trial court, the trial judge’s failure to promptly rule on his motion constitutes an additional basis for recusal. Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marty Allison Hobdy, Jr.
The Defendant, Marty Allison Hobdy, Jr., was convicted of aggravated assault and placed on probation for seven years. While on probation, he was charged with a second assault but was acquitted by a jury. After the acquittal, the State sought to revoke the Defendant’s suspended sentence based on the same alleged conduct. At the revocation hearing, the State presented no proof and instead urged the trial court to rely on its memory of testimony and credibility assessments from the prior trial. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation on that basis. On appeal, the Defendant contends, among other things, that the State’s procedure caused the trial court to cease functioning as a neutral and detached decisionmaker. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the order revoking the Defendant’s suspended sentence and remand the case for a new hearing. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals |