State of Tennessee v. Love T. Anderson
Defendant, Love T. Anderson, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of one count of aggravated child abuse, one count of aggravated child neglect, and two counts of aggravated child endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin R. Newman
Defendant, Kevin R. Newman, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leslie K. Jones v. Tennessee State University
Leslie K. Jones (“Mr. Jones”), an at-will support staff employee of Tennessee State University (“TSU”), appeals the termination of his employment. His at-will employment agreement provided for fourteen days-notice prior to termination of his employment. When he received a termination notice on March 1, 2012, Mr. Jones filed a grievance. TSU responded advising Mr. Jones that he could not grieve his termination because he was terminated under the terms of his at-will employment agreement “without cause.” Following extensive delays and a declaratory judgment action in a related proceeding, TSU was ordered to afford Mr. Jones a grievance hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(a)(1). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer found that “[TSU] was not obligated to provide a reason for termination under the terms of the employment contract;” nevertheless, he found that good cause for his termination had been established. Therefore, the Hearing Officer ruled that his termination should be upheld. After TSU’s President upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision, Mr. Jones filed a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. The chancellor affirmed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Mr. Jones appeals. On appeal, TSU insists that its compliance with the notice provision of the employment agreement is the substantial and material evidence needed to uphold the Hearing Officer’s ruling. We disagree. As this court explained in Lawrence v. Rawlins, No. M1997-00223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 76266, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), “[w]hen the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-117 in 1993, it modified the employment-will-relationship between the educational institutions in the . . . State University and Community College System [which includes TSU] and their ‘support staff.’” The statute requires these educational institutions to establish a grievance procedure for their support staff, which “must cover employee complaints relating to adverse employment actions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(b)(2)(A). Finding that Mr. Jones’s employment could only be terminated “for cause” or as part of “a bona fide reduction in force,” neither of which was the basis of Mr. Jones’s termination, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and the Hearing Officer and remand with instructions for the Hearing Officer to, inter alia, ascertain the relief and benefits Mr. Jones is entitled to receive. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mawule Tepe v. Connor McCarthy Blair Et Al.
Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge in two separate cases. After a de novo review, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Araceli Cordova et al. v. Nashville Ready Mix, Inc. et al.
This case concerns a dispute regarding attorney’s fees. Appellee is the next of kin of the attorney who represented Appellants for a period of time in the underlying wrongful death action. After Appellants terminated his representation, the attorney filed a notice of attorney’s lien. A few years later, while represented by their new counsel, Appellants settled their claims against the underlying defendants. While pursuing the attorney’s lien, the attorney died. Thereafter, the attorney’s estate was substituted as a party. In a previous appeal, we reviewed the trial court’s $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award to the attorney’s estate. We affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants owe the attorney’s estate fees and that the result the attorney obtained for Appellants was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. In the first appeal, we vacated the $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make findings consistent with Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Following remand, the attorney’s estate was closed, and Appellee sought to be substituted, individually, as a party to this action. The trial court allowed the substitution, over Appellants’ objections. Concerning the amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court referred the parties to a special master, who disregarded this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we affirmed that the “results obtained” by the deceased attorney was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. Rather, the special master concluded that the “results obtained” was a $450,000.00 settlement offer and awarded attorney’s fees of $150,000.00 based on that amount. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings. Although we affirm the trial court’s substitution of Appellee as a party, we vacate the award of $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees as this amount is in conflict with the law of the case, i.e., this Court’s previous conclusion that the results the attorney obtained was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Elijah Garrison v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Elijah Garrison, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue to the jury that an eyewitness’s testimony was unreliable because the eyewitness’s initial statements to police were “essentially coerced” and (2) failing to present and argue to the jury additional evidence that, in his view, contradicted the State’s proof. After review, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Markhayle Jackson
The Petitioner, Markhayle Jackson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his agreed-upon sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an illegal, indeterminate sentence for his conviction of first degree murder. He also contends that he should be permitted the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) by failing to ensure his guilty plea was both voluntary and intelligent. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Fletcher v. State of Tennessee
David Fletcher, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated burglary, first degree murder, and felony murder for his role in a gang-related shooting. He was sentenced to life plus ten years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Fletcher, No M2018-01293-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 995795, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner filed an untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, Petitioner complains that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner a continuance. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Forrest Durham
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant, Forrest Durham, pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated statutory rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an agreed-upon six-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion and by requiring him to register as a sex offender. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
DAVID HEARING v. DAN E. ARMSTRONG ET AL.
Appellant, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving two life sentences, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Chancery Court, alleging that he was not given proper credit for time served. Appellant specifically sought credit for the time he was confined in Texas while fighting his extradition to Tennessee. In his complaint, Appellant requested that the trial court compel the Defendants to enforce the judgments to give him credit for time served and further requested that the Defendants be found in contempt for failure to do so. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, finding that the criminal court that entered the judgments previously denied Appellant’s request for pretrial jail credits. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
NIKKI SIXX v. VANESSA MARIE HENSLEY (CLARK)
This appeal arises from the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent guilty of forty-one counts of criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection issued on February 23, 2024. The respondent timely appealed from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. However, due to significant deficiencies in the respondent’s appellate brief, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Payton Castillo v. David Lloyd Rex, M.D. et al.
In this appeal, we examine the privilege provided under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272, commonly referred to as the quality improvement committee or “QIC” privilege, and its application. Plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action asserting that CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians were negligent in providing care for her husband, who passed away shortly after being discharged from the hospital’s emergency room. Defendants sought a protective order based on the QIC privilege to prohibit inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent’s family. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. Defendants appealed, arguing that the information sought related to QIC activities and therefore was privileged from direct or indirect discovery. We hold the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process, but Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed that privileged information. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Quaddariontae Burnom v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Quaddariontae Burnom, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2022 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, for which he is serving an agreed twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately explain to him the significance of our supreme court’s decision in State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), before he entered his plea. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca Hudson et al. v. Paul Gravette et al.
A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Mack Arnold
Defendant, Thomas Mack Arnold, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Paul Click
In 2014, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of alternate |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Paul Click
In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of conspiracy to |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dylan Ray Thompson
Defendant, Dylan Ray Thompson, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus eight years. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions and that the trial court erred in aligning his sentences consecutively. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Crenshaw on behalf of her mother Dorothy Murphy v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, et al.
This is a health care liability case that centers around the statutory requirements for the pre-suit notice to be provided to defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 26-121. The trial court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss with prejudice after determining the pre-suit notice provided in this matter did not substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip M. Mullins v. State of Tennessee
Nearly twenty-three and a half years ago, Phillip Mullins, Petitioner, was convicted of felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to life without parole. State v. Mullins, No. M2002-02977-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 23021402, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 1, 2004). The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief and habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. See Mullins v. Lindamood, No. M2017-00139-CCA-R3-HC, 2017 WL 3332269, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2017); Mullins v. State, No. M2008-00332-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 5272573, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for DNA post-conviction relief, a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and a petition for habeas corpus relief. Following several hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for DNA analysis of the evidence; (2) the post-conviction court improperly denied his request for expert funding; (3) the post-conviction court improperly determined his petition for error coram nobis relief was untimely; and (4) the post-conviction court improperly determined his habeas claims were without merit or previously litigated. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Stanley Jefferson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the taking of Petitioner’s DNA. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel F.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part, but ultimately affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip Cavitt
Defendant, Philip Cavitt, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced as a Range II offender to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leon Denton v. Chance Leeds, Warden
Petitioner, Leon Denton, was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, and one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years’ confinement. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals that dismissal. After careful review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, Petitioner offers no reasons why the interest of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Gayden
Petitioner, Tommy Gayden, filed a single pro se pleading titled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, Motion for Plain Error Review, and Petition for Extraordinary Writ on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.” The trial court summarily denied the motion to correct illegal sentence portion of the pleading for failure to state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1. Treating the two remaining claims as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, the trial court summarily denied the claims because they did not satisfy any of the criteria to reopen a post-conviction proceeding, they were previously waived, and they were raised outside the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of all claims. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |