State of Tennessee v. Anthony Bonds
The Appellant, Anthony Bonds , was convicted by 1 a Shelby County jury of attempted especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bonds raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harvey Phillip Hester v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s granting the petitioner’s request for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder and effective sixty-two-year sentence. In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding (1) that the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that the petitioner did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a twelve-member jury verdict. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief and reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Thompson
The appellant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted on one count of stalking his ex-wife. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion, and this request was denied by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. This Court accepted the appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal and issued a judgment in which we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the issue for further consideration by the district attorney general. The district attorney general denied the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion a second time. The appellant filed a second petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court again denied. We have accepted the appellant’s second application for interlocutory appeal. Because the district attorney general considered the proper criteria when evaluating the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion, including evidence favorable to the defendant and because he articulated sufficient grounds for denying the appellant’s request for pretrial diversion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janette Phelps v. Mark IV Automotive
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in failing to apply the two-and-one-half times impairment cap set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) and that the forty-two percent permanent, partial disability to the body as a whole, awarded by the trial court, was excessive. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge and affirm the trial court. |
Decatur | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Herbert Wayne Ralston v. The Aerostructures Corporation and Zurich American Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends that the trial court erred by applying the 2.5 multiplier cap to the employee’s vocational disability award pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann.§ 50-6-241(a)(1). The employer contends that it should not be required to pay post-judgment interest on the award and that the employee’s appeal is frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s application of the cap. We further find that the employee is entitled to statutory postjudgment interest on the award. Finally, we conclude that the appeal is not frivolous. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sandra J. Simpson v. Calsonic Kansei North America
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the Plaintiff suffered a compensable work-related injury and (2) finding that the Plaintiff was entitled to an award of 23% vocational disability apportioned to her two feet. We affirm the trial court in all respects. Finally, we conclude that the appeal is not frivolous |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Holly J. Young v. Cumberland County Medical Center, et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Holly Young, at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-241(a)(1). In this case, Ms. Young sustained a shoulder injury to her right shoulder resulting in surgery. Following the first surgery, Ms. Young was returned to work performing light duty for her employer, Cumberland County Medical Center (CCMC). She resigned that employment due to progressively intense pain. Thereafter, Ms. Young underwent a second surgery. She was not offered employment by CCMC following her second surgery or after she had reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court determined Ms. Young's anatomical impairment to be fifteen percent to the body as a whole, held the statutory cap of benefits contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6- 241(a)(1) did not apply, and awarded benefits based upon a fifty percent disability to the body as a whole. We affirm. |
White | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Cletus Lee Harvey v. Stone & Webster Construction, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the employer, Stone & Webster Construction, Inc. (Stone & Webster), alleges the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Cletus Lee Harvey, Jr., at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) and in awarding Mr. Harvey a vocational disability of fifty percent of the body as a whole. Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm. |
Sequatchie | Workers Compensation Panel | |
BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC v. Charles Smith - Concurring
I concur with the court’s opinion. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to point specifically to the provisions of Mr. Smith’s employment agreement that undermine the summary judgment in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Roskom
The Appellant, Jamie Roskom, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004, a Class E felony. On appeal, Roskom argues that he was indicted for failing to “register” as a sexual offender, which is a violation of section 208 of the Act; however, he was convicted of failing to “report,” which is a violation of section 204. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208(1), -204(c) (Supp. 2004). As such, Roskom asserts that he was not given notice of the crime for which he was convicted, and there is “no proof that [he] [committed] the offense for which he was indicted.” After review of the record, we agree and conclude that the indicted offense of failing to “register” impermissibly varied from the proof at trial, which established the separate offense of failing to “report.” Accordingly, Roskom’s conviction for violation of the “sex offender registration act” is reversed and dismissed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Wherry and Mary Hopkins, Co-Executors of the Estate of Margaret Archer, Deceased v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
This case involves the alleged negligent administration of a trust. In 1964, the plaintiffs’ decedent established a $1.7 million trust and named herself as the sole beneficiary. The defendant bank was named as the trustee and was given sole discretion to manage the trust investments. From 1964 until the decedent’s death in 1999, the bank managed the trust fund and sent the decedent monthly statements describing the trust activities. When the trust terminated, it was worth approximately $880,000. The plaintiffs, co-executors of the decedent’s estate, brought this action on behalf of the estate for negligent administration of the trust, arguing that the bank negligently failed to maximize the rate of return on the trust assets. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on, inter alia, the doctrine of ratification, asserting that the decedent had ratified the bank’s management of the trust assets by failing to object to its decisions over the thirty-five-year life of the trust. The plaintiffs argued that the decedent was not sufficiently sophisticated in financial matters to ratify the bank’s actions. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that, in light of the undisputed facts that the decedent was legally competent and was fully informed of the bank’s actions in managing the trust investments, the decedent’s level of sophistication in financial matters is immaterial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lynn Osborne, Jr.
In May of 2005, the defendant, Jerry Lynn Osborne, Jr., was indicted for one count of theft under $500, seven counts of identity theft, and seven counts of fraudulent use of a debit card. In July of 2005, the defendant was indicted for one count of driving under the influence and one count of theft over $1000. He pled guilty to all of the indicted charges and received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The defendant requested an alternative sentence of either probation or community corrections, which the trial court denied. The defendant now argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacques B. Bennett v. Virginia Lewis, Warden and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, pled guilty to first degree murder in 1992 and was sentenced to life in prison. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the judgment against him was void because he was not present and not represented by counsel at his sentencing hearing and because the trial court did not follow statutory mandates in sentencing him. The trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Soimis
Andrew Soimis, the defendant, appeals his conviction for second degree murder (Class A felony) on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark A. Schiefelbein
A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Mark A. Schiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a 12-year sentence for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, thereby yielding an effective sentence of 96 years. Aggrieved of the convictions and sentences, the defendant appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to furnish discovery materials to the defendant; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by configuring courtroom seating to shield the public from viewing certain exhibits; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, sua sponte, to disregard certain truthful testimony of the defendant; (4) the trial court’s repeated questioning of State’s witnesses created an appearance of judicial bias and improperly bolstered the State’s case; (5) the trial court committed reversible error in excluding defense-proffered medical testimony that a physical examination of the victim rebutted the occurrence of sexual penetration, contact, or injury; (6) the trial court permitted the introduction of inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay and opinion testimony; (7) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to examine the defendant about his knowledge that a “voice stress analysis” could detect stress in an individual’s voice; (8) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant could be guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he acted intentionally, knowingly, or “recklessly”; (9) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the State could prove the mental state for aggravated sexual battery in the disjunctive by showing that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, “or” recklessly; (10) the trial judge should be disqualified from further involvement in the case; and (11) the defendant’s effective sentence is excessive, illegal, and unconstitutional. As an adjunct to the issues raised on direct appeal, the defendant also pursues Appellate Procedure Rule 10 interlocutory review to bar future prosecution of three related child rape charges that were severed, over his objection, from trial of the aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor offenses. After thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties briefs, their oral arguments, and the applicable law, we hold that none of the errors require reversal of the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery or for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. However, we hold that the incarcerative 96-years’ sentence is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing and does not provide a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its sanctions; therefore, we modify the defendant’s effective sentence from 96 years to 36 years. We order that the trial judge who presided at trial is disqualified from conducting any further proceedings in this cause. Finally, we dismiss the child rape offenses, as improperly severed, and hold that further prosecution on such charges is barred by |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth D. Hoover
The defendant, Kenneth D. Hoover a.k.a. Kenneth Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentence. The defendant was found guilty of second degree murder (Class A felony), reckless endangerment (Class A misdemeanor), and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of a felony (Class E felony). The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting certain autopsy photographs and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ayatolah W. Wallace
The defendant, Ayatolah W. Wallace, was convicted of three counts of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, violent offender. He argues that his convictions must be overturned in light of State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tenn. 1991), which precludes dual convictions for kidnapping and another accompanying felony when the movement or confinement supporting the kidnapping charge is merely incidental to that required to commit the accompanying felony. Because the defendant was convicted only of aggravated kidnapping, however, Anthony is inapposite. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Pamela Greer Chandler
The plaintiff medical group loaned money to the defendant nurse for tuition at a school that trained its students to become nurse anesthetists. As part of the arrangement, the student promised to work for the group for three years after graduation. Seven months prior to graduation, the student notified the group that she would not be able to work for it upon completion of her training. She paid the loan back with interest, but the medical group filed suit to enforce a $15,000 liquidated damages clause in the loan contract. The student then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court held that the sum demanded constituted an impermissible penalty rather than a valid provision for liquidated damages and, thus, that it was unenforceable as a matter of law. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the student and affirm the denial of summary judgment to the medical group because we find that the undisputed facts do not show that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Moss Service & Supply, Inc. v. Tommy F. Gragg, Jr., et al.
The defendants, homeowners, appeal an adverse jury verdict wherein the plaintiff, a heating, ventilation and air conditioning contractor, was awarded breach of contract damages plus discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emanuel Lawrence Harris
The defendant, Emanuel Lawrence Harris,1 pled guilty to nine felony drug offenses and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in ordering that some of his sentences be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Ray Ruth
The Defendant, Frank Ray Ruth, was indicted for thirty-seven counts of filing false sales tax returns and one count of Class C felony theft of property. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion. The trial court reversed, concluding that the district attorney abused his discretion. The State obtained an interlocutory appeal from this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court ordering the district attorney general to grant the Defendant diversion is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melody Weston, Personal Representative, et al. v. Community Baptist Church of Wilson County
This case arises from a dispute between a church and the estate of one of its former members over money given by the former member and her spouse to enable the newly-formed church to pay off a loan on its property. The estate contended that the money was a gift subject to a condition subsequent, with return of the gift required in the event the church ceased existence. The church admitted that it had accepted the gift, but argued that it never accepted any conditions. The court took note of a church resolution that ratified the alleged condition and ruled in favor of the estate. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Earnest F. Brown v. State of Tennessee
In October 2004, Petitioner, Earnest F. Brown, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property over $1,000.00, one count of burglary, two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, and one count of assault. In exchange for his plea, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve two years as a Range I offender for the first conviction of theft over $1,000.00, four years as a Range II offender for the second conviction of theft over $1,000.00, two years as a Range II offender for each burglary of a motor vehicle conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, for a total effective sentence of fourteen (14) years, eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days. In June 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After appointing counsel and conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner post-conviction relief. Petitioner now appeals that denial arguing that the trial court erred in denying his petition because (1) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and (2) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wiley Hawthorne
OnNovember 2, 2004, the appellant, Wiley Hawthorne, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of felony reckless endangerment. On July 27, 2005, a jury found the appellant guilty on both counts. On August 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-two years for attempting to commit first degree murder and eighteen months for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, the sentences to run concurrently. On September 9, 2005, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on both counts of the indictment. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the accused guilty of both counts of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frances Barnett v. Milan Seating Systems
We accepted this appeal prior to its review by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel primarily to determine whether the chancery court correctly ruled that an employee is working for her “pre-injury employer” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) when the company she was working for at the time of the injury is sold to a new entity and the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay with the new entity remain unchanged. We conclude that an employee is not working for her “pre-injury employer” when she returns to work and the company she was working for at the time of the injury then is purchased by a different company, and this is so even if the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay remain unchanged. The judgment of the chancery court on this particular issue is, therefore, reversed. |
Gibson | Supreme Court |