Billy Joe McKinney v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, Inc., and Ace Property and Casualty
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related back injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of thirtytwo (32) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employer also challenges the court's determination as to the extent of vocational disability. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be upheld. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Anna E. Givens v. Cleve Mac, Inc., McDonald's Corp. and Wausau Insurance Co.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of ten (10) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be increased to the maximum allowed under the Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. William Granville Howell
Defendant, William Granville Howell, was indicted for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days, with the sentence suspended. On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony pertaining to a prior assault claim against Defendant; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the prior conviction and for opening the door for introduction of this evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wanda Spires v. Watson Supermarkets, Inc. and the PMA Insurance Group, their Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the evidence supports a determination that she suffered a compensable aggravation of her preexisting degenerative disc disease. The employer contends that the trial court properly found that the employee did not sustain a compensable injury and that an award of costs, including discretionary costs, is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Haskell E. Sutton v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rodney L. Marlowe v. Town of Oliver Springs
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals a finding of non-compensability due to a lack of causation. We affirm. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tina Lynn Wyatt v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals from a judgment of non- compensability. We affirm. |
Carter | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Douglas Elliott v. Randstad Employment Services, Inc., and Ward North American Insurance Company
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Terry Hambrick v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' |
Unicoi | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Laura Johnson v. Clover Bottom Development Center, et al.
An employee of Clover Bottom Development Center appeals the summary dismissal of her action under the Tennessee Handicap Act. The employee alleged she was the victim of discrimination due to her medical limitations. The trial court dismissed the action finding the employee failed to show she sustained an adverse employment action, an essential element of her claim. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Percy Lee Palmer v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Percy Lee Palmer, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant concedes on appeal that the trial court's judgment is correct. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Ann (Gallahaire) Cartwright v. Robert Howard Cartwright, Sr.
This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of marital property. The parties signed a prenuptial agreement. After they married, the parties operated a cattle and farming business, which was conducted in the wife’s name only. After three years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. A trial was held primarily on issues related to property distribution. The husband argued that the cattle and farming equipment was purchased with his separate funds and therefore was his separate property under the prenuptial agreement. The husband also alleged that the wife had discarded or destroyed numerous items of his separate property. The trial court found that the cattle and farming equipment was marital property and divided it equally, and declined to find the wife responsible for the items that had been discarded or destroyed. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Johnnie Mae Hall and Theresa Diane Jones, Co-Administrators for the Estate of Billy Wayne Jones, Deceased v. Andrew Stewart, et al.
This is a wrongful death case. On appeal, Ms. Theresa Diane Jones (Ms. Jones) and Ms. Johnnie Mae Hall (Ms. Hall) contend that two erroneous admissions of evidence unfairly influenced the jury’s award of damages for the wrongful death of Mr. Billy Wayne Jones (Mr. Jones). The jury found that Mr. Jones suffered damages in the amount of $100,000 but also found that he was 49% at fault. The jury’s verdict resulted in a net recovery of $51,000. Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall request a new trial of the action they instituted against Fullen Dock & Warehouse, Inc. (Fullen Dock), whose employee ran over Mr. Jones with a bulldozer, resulting in his death. Specifically, Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall argue that the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting evidence of Mr. Jones’s prior medical history during the cross-examination of their own medical expert and of Mr. Jones’s prior guilty plea and conviction for cocaine possession six years prior to his death. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Jackson, Jr., v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Jackson, Jr., of two counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial judge imposed two twenty-year sentences to be served concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed by the habeas court without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he could not have been convicted for these two criminal attempts under statutory law and the underlying judgment is therefore illegal and void. Finding no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sonya Blake, Widow of Terry Blake v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Weakley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the Trial Court and |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs
In this suit for breach of contract, the assignee of a loan agreement alleged that the defendant was in default of the agreement and requested judgment for monies advanced, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The defendant denied owing the debt. The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proof and dismissed the case. Upon our determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court, judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.L.P.
B.R.P. (“Father”) was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person’s child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Patrick Nash
The appellant, John Patrick Nash, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury of six counts of sexual contact with a victim under the age of thirteen. On August 23, 2005, he pled no contest to an amended indictment charging two counts of aggravated assault and retiring the other four counts of the original indictment. He received sentences of six and four years respectively, to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ten years as a standard offender and placed on community corrections. In October 2005, the appellant failed a drug test after testing positive for cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, and a violation of community corrections warrant was filed. Following a hearing on January 9, 2006, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his underlying sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community corrections sentence. After careful review, we find no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenyale Pirtle v. Tennessee Department of Correction
Upon review under common-law writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed disciplinary actions against Petitioner/Appellant by the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm in part and remand. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Charles W. Darnell D/B/A European Service Werks v. Johnny W. Brown, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action immediately following a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman - Concurring and Dissenting
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Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman
We granted and consolidated the applications for permission to appeal filed on behalf of Melissa Ann Layman and Jonathan Ray Taylor to determine the scope of a trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to nolle prosequi to which the defendant has consented. Layman’s appeal also presents the issue of whether a victim’s family has a right to be heard at a pretrial hearing concerning a plea agreement or a nolle prosequi. We conclude that when an uncontested motion to nolle prosequi or dismiss a criminal charge is independent of a plea agreement, a trial court’s discretion to deny the motion under Rule 48(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is limited to extraordinary circumstances indicating betrayal of the public interest. Because in each case the prosecutor’s independent, uncontested motion to nolle prosequi the greater charge of the indictment was neither filed in bad faith nor motivated by considerations clearly contrary to manifest public interest, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the nolle prosequi. We also hold in Layman’s case that the victim’s family did not have the right to be heard at the pretrial hearings concerning the plea agreement and nolle prosequi because such pretrial hearings are not critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2). Any error in considering the statements of the family, however, was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
Glenda White v. Fort Sanders-Park West Medical Center
Plaintiff sued her former employer on grounds of breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Michael Chubb - Concurring
I join with the majority in concluding that the State’s special instruction submitted to the jury constituted reversible error. I write separately only to note the following additional reasons for finding the instruction was error. The special instruction, in its entirety, is as follows: The court instructs you that in a sexual abuse case you may convict the defendant on the basis of the victim’s testimony alone. Corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not necessary. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals |