Delores M. King v. Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company, et al.
This case involves payment of an insurance claim demanded by Appellee from Appellant after Appellee’s belongings were destroyed in a fire. Appellant refused payment on the basis that Appellee failed to notify Appellant of an address change. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Appellee $32,000, representing her claim under the insurance policy, and $8,000 as a 25% bad faith penalty. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate the award representing a bad faith penalty. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
T. Green, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiffs, police officers along with a number of others, were promoted to sergeant after passing a promotional test. Subsequently, the test was declared invalid by the federal court and the city announced its intention to restore the affected officers to their previous rank pending the administration of a new promotional test. Plaintiffs, along with others, filed suit in chancery court to enjoin this action on the part of the city. The chancery court issued a temporary injunction, enjoining the city from removing plaintiffs from their rank of sergeant or from reducing their pay pending final judgment. The chancellor clarified the injunction by order which provided that the injunction would be in effect only “until such time as promotions are made from the 2001 sergeant promotional process.” Of the fifty-four plaintiffs in the chancery court taking the new promotional test, the seven plaintiffs-appellants did not rank high enough for promotion. On motion of the city, the chancery court dissolved the preliminary injunction previously issued and, by consent order, allowed the plaintiffs full credit of time served as sergeant as a result of the first promotional process. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christa Gail Pike, appeals as of right from an order denying her motion to reinstate a petition for post-conviction relief. Her counsel had previously appealed an order approving the withdrawal of the post-conviction claim. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts (1) that an inmate under a sentence of death should not be permitted to waive post-conviction review of a capital case; (2) that the hearing conducted by the post-conviction court to determine whether her decision to waive further challenges to her conviction and sentence did not comply with due process requirements; and (3) that the post-conviction relief petition was not properly withdrawn. This court concludes that the petitioner, under a capital sentence, may waive post-conviction review; that the hearing was in compliance with due process standards; and that the evidence supported the findings that the petitioner was competent to withdraw her post-conviction petition and that her decision to do so was voluntarily and knowingly made. The judgment of the post-conviction court allowing the withdrawal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed. The order denying the motion to reinstate the petition is also affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Darrell Hines v. State of Tennessee
The opinion of the court in this matter was released on January 23, 2004, and the petitioner filed an application for permission to appeal. On June 28, 2004, our supreme court granted the application and remanded to this court, directing that we reconsider our previous conclusion that "the trial court charged the incorrect version of the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982)." We have reconsidered this issue and conclude that the trial court utilized the correct version of this statute when instructing the jury at the resentencing hearing as to aggravating circumstances. Additionally, as explained in this opinion on remand, we erred in the original opinion by stating that our supreme court had addressed, in the direct appeal of the resentencing hearing, whether "instructing an inapplicable version of aggravating circumstance (i)(5) was harmless error." In fact, the court did not do so. In our opinion on remand, we again affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief, and refile our opinion which has been altered only to reflect our consideration of those matters, as previously explained, set out in the remand order. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Rogers
The appellant, Michael Rogers, was found guilty by a jury in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to deliver. He was sentenced to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Fuller and Marcellus Betty
The defendants, Antonio Fuller and Marcellus Betty, were each convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of evading arrest, and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced defendant Fuller, a Range II offender, to ten years for aggravated burglary, eighteen years for aggravated robbery, thirty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping, seven years for evading arrest, and four years for reckless endangerment and ordered partially consecutive service for an effective sentence of fifty-six years. The trial court sentenced defendant Betty, a Range I offender, to six years for aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated robbery, twenty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping, four years for evading arrest, and two years for reckless endangerment. The terms for especially aggravated kidnapping were ordered to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the other sentences, which are to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-nine years. In this appeal, Fuller asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping of one of the victims violates the rule established in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); (3) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a range of punishment instruction to the jury; and (4) the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors and should not have imposed consecutive sentencing. Betty contends (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his case from Fuller's; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when the state failed to disclose a recording of a 911 call; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; (5) that the trial court misapplied certain enhancement and mitigating factors; and (6) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Because each of the defendants' convictions for the especially aggravated kidnapping of one of the victims violates the rule established in Anthony, they are reversed and dismissed. Further, because the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping were ordered to be served concurrently to each other, no modification of the effective sentence is necessary. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan Luis Ravell
The defendant entered guilty pleas in Giles County to aggravated rape, especially aggravated burglary, and assault. After imposition of the sentences, but before the judgments became final, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant also filed a motion alleging error coram nobis, which was denied by the trial court. Both denials were consolidated for this appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights with regard to her ten-year-old daughter. The Department of Children’s Services obtained custody of the child after discovering that she had been sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend. Approximately three months later, the Department and the child’s guardian ad litem filed separate petitions in the Juvenile Court for Coffee County to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) (Supp. 2003) and severe child abuse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the Department and guardian ad litem had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of abandonment but concluded that the mother had committed severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect her daughter from her boyfriend. The mother has perfected this appeal. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child from her boyfriend’s sexual abuse and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate her parental rights |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for forensic DNA analysis, pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Our review discloses that the trial court ruled correctly, and we affirm the denial of the petitioner’s request. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion. The Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act has no provision that even hints of waiver relative to a request to test evidence for the first time. The applicable requirement for consideration is T.C.A. § 40-30-304(3) which states: “The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis or was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not resolved by previous analysis.” The focus is on the fact that no test occurred, not on whether a previous opportunity existed or was pursued to have the test done. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James G. Huppe, Jr.
The defendant, James G. Huppe, Jr., was convicted of burglary and theft over $1000, Class D felonies, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years, suspended except for fifty-three days, with the balance to be served on probation. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4278 and was fined a total of $10,000. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the court erred in restricting his cross-examination of the victim, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Scales v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Watson
The Appellant, Brandon Scott Watson, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. In January of 2003, Watson pled guilty to two counts of burglary of an automobile, class E felonies. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Watson received concurrent two-year sentences and, following a sentencing hearing, he was placed in the Community Corrections program. On April 15, 2003, a warrant was issued, alleging that Watson had violated conditions of his behavioral contract. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked his community corrections sentences and modified the previously imposed concurrent sentences to reflect that they be served consecutively. In this appeal, Watson contends that: (1) the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence based on "unreliable hearsay" evidence, specifically, the testimony of his community corrections case officer's referencing a report prepared by a Davidson County Drug Court investigator, who was not present to testify at the revocation hearing, and (2) the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run consecutively. After a review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aldred N. Mason
The defendant, Alfred N. Mason, pled guilty to possession of over twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow
This is a premises liability and nuisance case that arose when Plaintiff fell on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff’s fall occurred on a patch of broken concrete located on the portion of sidewalk abutting Neighbor’s property, which is located immediately to the north of the lot owned by Defendants. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her fall was caused, in part, by overgrown bushes on Defendants’ property that obstructed passage on the sidewalk. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, because the fall took place on broken concrete in front of Neighbor’s property, Plaintiff cannot establish duty or causation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, and, for the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion in this case. I disagree first with the majority’s characterization of the evidence. The majority states that Ms. Hale “admitted” that the cause of her fall was a crumbled section of sidewalk in front of the Ostrow property. Ms. Hale certainly contended that the crumbled sidewalk contributed to her fall,but at no point did she concede that it was the only cause. She clearly alleged that she was forced to attempt to walk in the street because the overgrown bushes from the Ostrow property blocked the sidewalk: |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pete Honsa v. Tombigbee Transport Corp. et al. AND Eddie Gene Brown v. Tombigbee Transport Corp. AND William B. Stevenson v. Transway, Inc., et al.
The issue raised in these three workers’ compensation cases, consolidated for appeal, is whether the defendant is the employer of the plaintiffs and thus responsible for providing workers’ compensation insurance coverage for them. In each case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(A), the defendant is not, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ employer so as to subject the defendant to liability under the Workers’ Compensation Law. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Supreme Court | |
Kathryn C. Black v. Stevan L. Black
This is an independent action for fraud and coercion based on a marital dissolution agreement. On September 13, 2000, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement, and they were divorced by final decree entered in circuit court ninety days later on December 12, 2000. In February 2003, the wife brought this independent action in the chancery court below for damages for fraud, deceit, and coercion. She alleged that the husband had coerced her into signing the marital dissolution agreement by the use of threats, had prevented her from obtaining the benefit of counsel, and had misrepresented the value of his marital assets. The husband filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the wife had failed to state a claim upon which relief could granted. The trial court dismissed the wife’s lawsuit, determining that the complaint was essentially an action to set aside the divorce decree, and that the wife did not set out sufficient facts to support that claim. From that decision, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the allegations in the complaint cannot be the basis for an independent action essentially to set aside the divorce decree. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Agee Gabriel
Agee Gabriel appeals from the Giles County Circuit Court's revocation of his probationary sentence. Alleging myriad procedural and substantive errors, he asks this court to reverse the revocation order. However, we are unpersuaded of error and therefore affirm the lower court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Amanda Jo Goode
The defendant, Amanda Jo Goode, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revoking her probation that was ordered for her sentences for solicitation to commit felony murder; two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping; and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The defendant contends that although the trial court was justified in determining that she violated the terms of her probation, it erred by ordering her to serve her sentences in confinement and consecutively to a federal sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Hurley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner has failed to state a facially valid claim for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petitioner's application for the writ of habeas corpus. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Perkey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Thomas Jeffrey Perkey, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Epps v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Epps,1 pled guilty to second-degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of more than 0.5 grams of a controlled substance with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison at 100 percent for the second-degree murder conviction and ordered that the other sentences, which were of shorter duration, run concurrently to the fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney was ineffective for: (1) failing to explain the lesser-included charge of facilitation of felony murder; (2) denying to the Petitioner the right to testify at his motion hearing; and (3) depriving the Petitioner of his right to a speedy trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Moore
The Appellant, Donnie Moore, appeals from the ruling of the Carroll County Circuit Court, which found that Moore violated the conditions of probation imposed by the Carroll County General Sessions Court. Following a hearing, the general sessions court partially revoked Moore’s probation and ordered him to serve ninety days in jail. Moore appealed to the Carroll County Circuit Court. The circuit court agreed that Moore had violated the terms of his probation and remanded the case to the general sessions court for enforcement of the sentence. On appeal, Moore argues that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a de novo review of the sentence imposed by the general sessions court and that his sentence was the result of vindictive prosecution. Because the circuit court failed to review Moore’s sentence following revocation of his probation, we remand the case to the circuit court for that limited purpose. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals |