Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
Telecommunications corporation appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to city, alleging that trial court incorrectly determined that city ordinance imposing a charge of five percent |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Marler
A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of reckless homicide, Class D felonies, and one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the unindicted accomplice's testimony, (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance in order to locate a material witness, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon consideration of the factors enumerated in State v. Howell, 672 S.W.2d 442, 445-46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis
Defendant, Andrew Neal Davis, was indicted on one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of eighteen. Defendant’s first jury trial ended in a mistrial. On the first day of the second trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion, over Defendant’s objection, to amend count three of the indictment, aggravated child abuse, to substitute the words “under six years of age” for “under eighteen years of age.” At the conclusion of his second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of six. Prior to the jury’s verdict, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to count one of the indictment, first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction as a Range I offender and ordered the sentence for aggravated child abuse to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentence. Defendant does not appeal his sentence for aggravated child abuse. Defendant appeals his convictions alleging (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce autopsy photographs of the victim; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting the State’s expert witness, Dr. Ellen Clayton, to offer opinions outside her area of expertise; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Bruce Levy to testify as a rebuttal witness; (5) that the State’s improper cross-examination of Dr. Charles Harlan at Defendant’s first trial which led to Dr. Harlan’s refusal to testify at Defendant’s second trial resulted in a denial of Defendant’s due process rights; and (6) that the trial court erred in allowing count two of the indictment, aggravated child abuse, to be amended on the day of trial to reflect that the victim was under the age of six. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments and briefs of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the lead opinion but write separately to amplify some of my concerns. The prosecution has placed the conviction for aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of six in peril through mistakes, inadvertence, or neglect. There exists no evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the District Attorney General’s office. I hasten to add that this District Attorney General’s office is not an abuser of the power or processes used to prosecute crimes in its jurisdiction. Although I have voted to affirm this conviction, I feel I must add a word of warning to others who may wish to rely upon my decision. At first glance, the practice of amending an indictment without the defendant’s consent at such a late date is looked upon with disfavor. The practice suggests that someone was inattentive to the process and comes dangerously close to violating principles of fundamental fairness. It is akin to changing the rules in the middle of the game, a gamewhich is played by professionals in which inches determine the winner and loser. This competent defense counsel did not appear shaken or surprised by the State’s amendment. Indeed, I have determined trial counsel’s trial strategy was not changed in the least. That is the main reason I have chosen to affirm this conviction. However, I am mindful of the time trial counsel takes in explaining to a client what has just transpired in court. Imagine explaining to a client that after being put to trial once on what was a Class B felony, the client is now facing a Class A felony with a potential for greater punishment. This could have taken away valuable time which counsel could have used to ready for the trial which was about to begin moments later. The impact could have been great upon a trial counsel that was not as prepared or strong as the one in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis - Concurring/Dissenting
I join with the majority in affirming the Defendant’s convictions for first degree felony |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Howard and Suzanne Levy v. James and Rhonda Franks, Lindsey Butler and Tennessee Valley Homes, Inc.
This case involves a dispute between neighbors. The plaintiffs owned a one-acre parcel of property in a rural setting almost completely surrounded by a sixteen-acre parcel of property owned by the defendants. The defendant larger landowners began building structures and storing equipment in an escalating commercial use of their property. The plaintiff small landowners complained to county officials that the defendants' use of their property constituted a zoning violation. The ensuing dispute between the two landowners was marked by the defendants engaging in threatening and intimidating behavior and the plaintiffs repeatedly complaining to authorities and incessantly documenting and videotaping the defendants' activities. Finally, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for, among other things, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the malicious prosecution claim but declined to award punitive damages. The trial court dismissed the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims of malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. We reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for outrageous conduct, finding that the defendants' behavior rose to the level of outrageous conduct, and remand for an award of damages on this claim. Finally, we reverse the denial of an award of punitive damages on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harril Jay Wisdom
The defendant pled guilty to violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender ("MVHO") order, a Class E felony, in exchange for a one-year sentence in the Department of Correction. With the permission of the trial court and the State, he sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the expiration prior to his offense of the three-year time period specified in the order declaring him a MVHO precluded his prosecution for the offense. Because we conclude that the defendant failed to meet the requirements for properly reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. J.D. Jones
Following a jury trial, Defendant, J. D. Jones, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and the unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class C misdemeanor. At the conclusion of Defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and thirty days for the misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the prosecution engaged in improper conduct during Defendant's cross-examination; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to order a gunshot residue test of the samples taken from Defendant's hands; (4) that the trial court erred in not considering Defendant's health as a mitigating factor in determining Defendant's sentence; and (5) that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on the mens rea element of the offense of attempted second degree murder. After a thorough review of the record in this case, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Burton v. Barth Fine
Mrs. Burton and Mr. Fine had an automobile accident. Both sides claimed the accident was caused by the other's fault. Mr. Fine settled his claim with Mrs. Burton's liability carrier and gave Mrs. Burton a general release. Mrs. Burton's claim proceeded to trial and she asserted that the release waived Mr. Fine's defense of comparative fault. The trial judge held that it did not and approved the jury's verdict assessing the greater fault to Mrs. Burton. We affirm. We also affirm the amount of discretionary costs awarded to Mr. Fine. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Darlene Heck
The defendant, Lisa Darlene Heck, pled guilty to six counts of forgery and two counts of theft over $1,000. The Sullivan County trial court imposed a four-year sentence of incarceration on one of the theft cases followed by an effective sentence of four years of probation on the remaining convictions. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing confinement on the theft charge. We affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for entry of an amended judgment as to one of the forgery convictions based upon a clerical error. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Allen Frazier
The defendant, Ricky Allen Frazier, entered pleas of guilt to possession of Oxycodone, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana for resale, a Class E felony; manufacturing marijuana, a Class E felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of open title, a Class C misdemeanor; violation of the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; speeding, a Class C misdemeanor; and maintaining a dwelling where a controlled substance is used or sold, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years. As a part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The single question presented for review is whether the search and seizure of the defendant and his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. The judgments are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latisha Lee Morgan
The Defendant, Latisha Lee Morgan, pled guilty to assault, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, sentencing was left to the trial judge. After a hearing, the trial judge imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in confinement, and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the trial court should have granted the Defendant full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Rice
The Defendant, Charles Rice, appeals as of right his conviction for the first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Emily Branch during the perpetration of a rape. A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder and of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions into one count of first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury found that the proof supported three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: the Defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2); the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(5); and the murder was committed during the perpetration of a rape, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(7). The jury further determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentenced the Defendant to death. The trial court approved of the sentencing verdict. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly restricted the Defendant's right to cross-examine one of the State's witnesses; (3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence tending to prove the guilt of another; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to permit the Defendant to impeach his own witness; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to permit the Defendant to sit at the same table as his attorney; (6) the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser offense of facilitation was error; (7) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the definitions of knowingly and recklessly as to the offense of felony murder was error; (8) the indictment failed to set forth a capital offense; (9) Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional; (10) the evidence is insufficient to establish the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (11) the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the (i)(2) aggravator; and (12) the sentence of death imposed in this case is disproportionate compared to other capital cases. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that there are no errors of law requiring that the Defendant's conviction or sentence be reversed. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict and imposition of the sentence of death. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger Lee Wilson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Roger Lee Wilson, was indicted by the Anderson County Grand Jury on 28 counts, including charges of child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and statutory rape, and against multiple victims. The trial court severed the counts, and count five was the only count to be tried by a jury. The jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offense of rape of a child. Following the jury trial, Petitioner entered "best interest" guilty pleas to several other counts, and the remaining counts were dismissed by nolle prosequi. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence in count five. For all of his convictions, Petitioner received an effective sentence of 22 years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an issue at trial that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof; failing to call Hubert Wallace, Art Moore, and Dwayne Wilson as witnesses at trial; and requesting to reserve his opening statement until after the close of the State's proof. Petitioner also argues that his counsel who withdrew from representation prior to trial was ineffective for misplacing evidence. Finally, Petitioner argues that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that the waiver of his right to appeal is not valid. The trial court denied post-conviction relief and Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kawisha Price
The appellant, Kawisha Price, was indicted for aggravated child abuse. She entered a best- interest plea to aggravated assault with a sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered her to serve the sentence in confinement. She appeals, arguing that the trial court decided the manner of service of the sentence before any proof was offered on her behalf and erred in ordering her to serve the sentence in confinement. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Ellis Ballard
The Defendant, Timothy Ellis Ballard, was found to have violated the conditions of his probation by the General Sessions Court of Carroll County. The general sessions court partially revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve ninety days in jail. The Defendant appealed. After a hearing, the Carroll County Circuit Court agreed that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation and remanded the case to the general sessions court for enforcement of the sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a de novo review of the sentence imposed by the general sessions court and that his sentence was the product of vindictive prosecution. Because the circuit court failed to address the sentencing options following probation revocation, we remand the case to the circuit court for that purpose. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Wilson, D/B/A M & M Auto Sales v. Shane Chapman
This case involves a question of whether a plaintiff who brings suit for a debt due him resulting from his agent’s business activities has standing as a real party in interest. The trial court found that the agent was acting on behalf of his employer, that the plaintiff had standing to sue as a real party in interest, and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Hollingsworth v. Maytag Corporation
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Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sam Spicer, et al. v. Stace Thompson, et al.
Appellant Don Pickard appeals the action of the trial court finding that he defamed Sergeant Sam Spicer in public statements to the news media. Spicer cross appeals from the action of the trial court in dismissing his malicious prosecution action against Don Pickard, Stace Thompson and Howard Morris. We affirm the action of the trial court in the defamation case and affirm the action of the trial court in the malicious prosecution case as to Howard Morris. The malicious prosecution case against Don Pickard and Stace Thompson is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Bryan
The Appellant, Roger Dale Bryan, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving on a revoked license, third offense, by a Bedford County jury. The verdict returned by the jury found Bryan guilty of both driving and being in physical control while under the influence. On appeal, Bryan challenges the legal sufficiency of the proof supporting each basis for conviction. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient for both and affirm the judgments of conviction, which were merged into a single conviction for DUI. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan Miller
The Appellant, Bryan K. Miller, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense. On appeal, Miller raises the single issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Finding the evidence legally sufficient, the judgment is affirmed. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Skyla Sepeda Smith v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Skyla Sepeda Smith, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court. In the petition she alleged that the conviction she received after pleading guilty to one count aggravated child abuse is illegal and void because a conflict between the guilty plea and the judgment effectively resulted in an illegal sentence. The Davidson County Criminal Court dismissed the petition. Because the petitioner does not present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harrison Pearison v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harrison Pearison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chad Kilgore
In 1998, the defendant, Chad Kilgore, who was indicted for aggravated assault, was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered into a forensic services unit for treatment. The defendant was never transferred from a local mental health care facility. In 2003, the defendant filed a motion seeking relief from the prior order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and directed transfer. This extraordinary appeal followed. Because the appeal was improvidently granted, it is dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert William Arndts, by Conservator, Carol Zeliff, Darrell R. Smith, v. Violet A Bonner and Tommy L. Raines
Action was filed by plaintiff's Conservator to recover assets transferred by his wife prior to her death. The Trial Judge awarded certain assets to plaintiff and plaintiff appealed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |